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"AN ABSTRACT OF 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RANDIAN POLITICAL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS" 
The Chesis is, essentially, that the Randian 
political scientific concepts (which are the apparent 
concepts of political governments by Miss Ayn Rand) are not 
political scientific concepts (are not concepts of political 
governments), and are not concepts of anything (are not 
concepts at all).  The thesis is, therefore, a refutation 
(since a refutation is an identification of at least one 
falsely supposed "concept"), and the refutation is primarily 
through Miss Rand's own "fundamental philosophical prin- 
ciples"—through her own true definitions of "things", 
"entities", "actions", "attributes", "existences", "concepts" 
and "meaningless notions".  She denied that political govern- 
ments are entities, and that any attributes (such as con- 
cepts, and other actions, which clearly are attributes) 
can belong to anything that is not an entity—yet she 
ascribed attributes to her political governments (which 
she denied are entities). 
Whereas she correctly held that "metaphysical", 
"epistemological" and other fundamental concepts by any 
conceiver must precede any true political scientific 
concepts by that conceiver, yet she "arrived at" her 
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political scientific concepts first—and then afterwards, 
she "unclergirded" them with their apparent metaphysical 
and epistemological conceptual fundations. 
There is included in the thesis a causal 
explanation of the Randian political scientific concepts, 
which is essentially that they are the effects primarily of 
her "altruistic, mystical, collectivist" Russian persecutors 
and of her "individualistic, scientific, capitalist" 
American business associates.  She held that "the pleasure- 
pain mechanism" in a human body is the inescapable, 
unalterable, infallible "basis of evaluative knowledge"— 
so that, by that standard, her "political scientific con- 
cepts" must be identified as "the necessary consequence, 
and ultimate practical application" (as she herself put it) 
of her "Horatio Alger"-like struggle to success in America. 
Her "political scientific concepts" had to be effects, for 
she held that all false, meaningless "concepts" are effects. 
The thesis also involves a "biographical introduc- 
tion" and a "terminological introduction"; moreover, it 
contains many quotations of Rand's own expressions, so that 
the subjects being analyzed are amply demonstrated to the 
reader.  A widely representative, though not nearly exhaus- 
tive, listing of primary and secondary sources is appended. 
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PART A:  "A BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE RANDIAN 
POLITICAL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS" 
Since the subjects of this analysis are certain 
attributes (are the apparent political scientific concepts) 
that belong to the late, renowned literatist Mrs. Ayn Rand 
O'Connor, therefore this analysis must begin by way of 
this identification of "Miss Rand" (as she is usually 
called): 
Section I:  "How Ayn Rand Left the 'Ugliest Country'" 
I left in 1926 alone. 
In complete loathing. 
For the whole country, and including the 
Tsarist period. 
It is the ugliest, and...most mystical 
country on earth. 
She was born in St. Petersburg, on February 2, 
1905.  Her parents were liberal mercantile Jews; they pro- 
vided their children with considerable travel and enter- 
tainment until the Revolution, but not with any religious 
training.  By thirteen years of age, Ayn considered 
herself an atheist (and she continued to do so, apparently, 
until her death). She was a precocial mathematical talent, 
and might have been an engineer; but, at nine years of 
age, she "specifically, consciously chose" a literary 
career. She immediately began to write plots and char- 
acterisations for her future works—and she became, and 
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remained, as she put it: "single-tracked", or "completely 
devoted to a specific, conscious purpose". 
During her youth in Russia, she had no friends— 
because her interests were entirely intellectual and 
professional, rather than "social and .recreational"— 
because she was unwilling to become a "normal young 
Russian woman", because she did not like "ordinary boys", 
and because even those adults who admired her "for her 
intelligence" were, nevertheless, repelled by her "unre- 
mitting intensity".  It is not suprising that she devel- 
oped, at an early age, a "profound hatred" for all the 
"irrational, collectivistic, incompetent" Russians—and an 
equally deep desire to meet real human counterparts (out- 
side Russia, of course) of the "scientific, individualis- 
tic, heroic" characters projected by her favorite Romantic 
novelists (such as the character "Enjolras", the Parisian 
insurrectionist dubbed "the marble lover of liberty", in 
Les Miserables by Victor Hugo). 
At twelve, when she first met Russian Marxists, 
she immediately rejected their "loathsome immorality" 
(which she later identified as "Altruism, the collectivist 
'morality'", or, "the collectivist ideal of the sacrifice 
of all to all") as leading to "nothing but evil, regard- 
less of any methods, details, decrees, policies and pious 
platitudes" .  Thus, she did not excuse the Marxists as 
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"zealously impractical", or "utopian", or theologically- 
heretical "misguided moral idealists"; rather, she identi- 
fied them as immoralists. But she "despised equally" the 
various Russian Whites (and especially, the Tsar and the 
devotees of his "horrid religion"). 
During the Revolution and the Civil War, she 
neither assisted nor resisted the Reds and various Whites. 
While she remained in Russia, she kept secret her opinion 
that "I don't want to fight for the people, I don't want 
to fight against the people, I don't want to hear of the 
2 
people".   She witnessed the first shots of the Russian 
Revolution from her own bedroom window—and from the same 
window, a few months later, the funeral procession of the 
delegates to the Constituent Assembly (who had been shot 
by Bolsheviks); during the Civil War she was nearly mur- 
dered and nearly starved. After the Bolsheviks' victory, 
she began painting propaganda posters, chanting slogans, 
and attending the "recommended" meetings. 
In 1921, she entered the University of Petrograd, 
where she studied history and somehow escaped the general 
dismissals, exiles and executions of "bourgeois students". 
She also studied there with the then-preeminent Russian 
philosopher Nicholas Lossky; he graded her final examina- 
tion "Perfect", despite her disagreement with him on the 
fundamental philosophical issues, and despite her bold 
prophecy to him that "My philosophical views are not a 
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part of the history of philosophy yet, but someday they 
will be"3. 
After her graduation in 1924, she requested a 
temporary visa to the United States.  She left Russia 
(which she called "the most incompetent nation") without 
any intention of ever returning, gladly rid of its mysti- 
cal, altruistic inhabitants. 
Section II:  ''How She Judged the Americans" 
The United States and Soviet Russia...are 
incommensurable entities, intellectually 
and morally. 
Americans...were the people who created the 
phrase "to make money". 
No other...nation had ever used these words 
before. 
The words "to make money" hold the essence of 
human morality. 
On her arrival in the spring of 1926, she took 
the skyline of Manhattan "as proof" that some real counter- 
parts of her favorite "scientific, individualistic" 
fictional heroes were living (or had been living) in 
America—and within a few months, on the first day of her 
employment by Cecil deMille (on the set of "King of Kings") 
in Hollywood, she "met such a man": actor Frank O'Connor. 
She married him in 1931, and never ceased to "worship" 
him. It is not suprising, therefore, that she could never 
become "homesick" for Russians—and that she began to 
speak of "the grace of the United States of America", be- 
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came ready to "bow the knee" at any reading of the Declara- 
tion of Independence, and took the dollar symbol (which is 
an abbreviation of "United States") as her "private icon" 
(wearing it habitually as a gold brooch over her heart). 
She also adopted a new name, ostensibly to protect her 
relatives in Russia from reprisals on her account:  She 
adopted that literary pseudonym "Ayn Rand", by which she 
is now universally and exclusively known (even by her 
closest followers). Now, although "Ayn" is the supreme 
Kabalistic (medieval Jewish theological) deification 
(signifying "The One Only One"), and though "Rand" is the 
name of the world's largest gold-bearing reef, (and of a 
contemporary gold currency standard), and "The Golden One" 
(also called the "one...alone...and only") is the heroine 
of her second novel (since Rand usually identified her 
heroines with herself)—and even though she emphasized 
"the personal choice of names"  (indeed, of "significant" 
names)—yet her biographer believes that the name "Ayn 
Rand" was chosen only for its agreeable sound and appear- 
ance. 
Rand's literary career, which had been impossible 
in Russia, was delayed in America for only a few years 
while she struggled to master the English language.  While 
she studied and prepared to begin, she was employed in 
various capacities by Hal Wallis Pictures, R.K.O. Pictures, 
Universal Studios, Paramount Pictures and Metro-Goldwyn- 
■ .    7 
Mayer. But in 1932 she completed and sold her first screen- 
play (entitled "Red Pawn"), and in 1934, her first stage 
play (which was published later as Night of January 16th, 
and which has become a "contemporary stage classic"); and 
finally, in 1936, her first novel (entitled We the Living) 
was completed and published.  (The novel was later pro- 
duced as a motion picture in Italy; its theme Rand identi- 
fied as "Man versus the State", and she wrote that "We the 
Living is as near to an autobiography as I will ever 
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write", and of course that its "heroine is me". )  Her 
second novel (Anthem) was published in Britain in 1938 
(and was a portrayal of "total collectivism, with all of 
its necessary consequences"). Also in 1938, her second 
stage play ("The Unconquered") was produced on Broadway. 
But in 1940 her career was interrupted, while she worked 
with her husband as a full-time volunteer for the election 
of Wendell Wilkie: 
The O'Connors lost their entire small savings in 
the process, and found themselves "betrayed" by Wilkie— 
because he "softened" his position in the last months of 
the campaign and appeared to accepted most parts of the 
New Deal ideology. Afterward, Rand rejected American con- 
servatives as "blatant irrationalists", "religious mystics" 
and "craven compromisers" who must inevitably succumb to 
the "logic" of the Leftists.  She developed the same "con- 
tempt" for Republicans and most Democrats that she had for 
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the moderate Russians:  She applauded the recent exile of 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn because she considered him to be an 
advocate of "theocratic tyranny", and she "abhorred" 
William Buckley, and denounced Eisenhower, Nixon and 
Reagan for their similar "God-and-country" stances; she 
would not support the "compromiser" Kerensky, nor the 
"meaningless, unphilosophical, unintellectual" compromiser 
Barry Goldwater; she rejected the Russian Whites as 
"irrationals", just as she once called George Wallace 
(Governor of Alabama) "some other product of irrationa- 
lity" .  She identified both Leftists and Rightists as 
"altruists", but distinguished the Right-wing altruists 
as those "too craven to admit" that their collectivist 
ideal can easily be "realized in practice"—whereas the 
Left-wing altruists freely admit it, and act with bold 
Q 
logical consistency to "put Altruism into practice" .  Yet, 
paradoxically, she testified in 1947 before the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities against cinema propa- 
ganda by card-carrying Communist directors in Hollywood— 
and she coordinated the efforts of the conservative 
directors "to agree never to smear Americanism" (by writing 
her Screen Guide for Americans); she also waxed enthusias- 
tic at President Ford and his conservative policies. 
Her international fame began with the publica- 
tion of her third major novel (The Fountainhead) in 1943, 
the same year that her friend Isabel Paterson published 
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The God of the Machine.  (The Fountainhead was produced as 
a "block-buster" motion picture by Warner Bros, in 1948; 
the theme of the novel was the inalienable, unalterable, 
"inviolable integrity" of "true, rational individualists"; 
the novel was a portrayal of the impotence of "mindless, 
subhuman parasites" to destroy the few truly human, 
creative, productive individuals upon whom their survival 
depends.)  In 1957, her last novel (entitled Atlas 
Shrugged) was completed and published.  (Atlas Shrugged is 
still expected to be produced both as a major television 
series, and as a motion picture; its theme Rand described 
as "the role of Reason in human existence", and she por- 
trayed in it the inevitable, necessary fate of irrational, 
parasitic subhumans when their ultimate roots of nourish- 
ment—the few truly rational, productive humans--suddenly 
go on strike and disappear:  the United States is reduced 
to anarchy, and room is made for the return of the strik- 
ing "rationals" and for the establishment by a capitalist 
"Judge" of a new, capitalist Constitution.)  Taken toget- 
her, Rand's four major novels have been read steadily (not 
within some brief period of vogue) over four decades, on 
every continent, in more than twenty million copies 
published in several languages and more than a dozen edi- 
tions.  One of her publishers (an editor-in-chief of the 
New American Library) has stated that:  "Once or twice a 
year we reissue these books... and...not...a printing of 
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10,000.  These books are reprinted in runs of 50,000 and 
100,000 copies.  What this means is that every year, 
100,000 new people read The Fountainhead"—and "Other than 
g 
with Fitzgerald and Hemingway... this just doesn't happen". 
Her novels have achieved the status of "modern literary 
classics", and are not merely amusing books, but lengthy, 
serious, didactic works designed to disseminate Miss 
Rand's own original "philosophical system" (which she 
named "Objectivism") to the largest possible audience, and 
to foster an informal (unorganized) new "philosophical 
movement" (which is also called "Objectivism") by her 
readers. 
She believed that, in order to write her fiction, 
she -"had to become a philosopher in the specific meaning 
10 of the term" --and not an "ivory-tower-cloistered" pure 
theorist either, but an active "philosophical radical" 
(or, as some of her followers put it:  "an intellectual 
activist").  She not only produced several non-fictional, 
philosophical books, but she also initiated a philosophical 
colloquium in New York City (named "The Class of '43", 
signifying the year of publication of The Fountainhead). 
The class included, from the beginning, a young psycho- 
logist who had adopted a new name after meeting Rand: 
"Nathaniel Branden" (perhaps meaning, as it has been 
suggested:  "Son of Rand", or "Ben-Rand"); other early, 
immediate disciples of Miss Rand were:  the philosophers 
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Leonard Peikoff (a professor at New York University and 
Long Island University, and after Nathaniel Branden, Rand's 
"chief intellectual heir"), Alan Gotthelf (at Wesleyan 
University, Swarthmore, and Trenton State College of New 
Jersey), David Kelley (at Vassar), John Hospers (at New 
York University, and U.C.L.A.), James Lennox (at the 
University of Pittsburgh), Michael Berliner (at the Cali- 
fornia State College in Northridge), George Walsh (at 
Eisenhower College, and at Salisbury State College in 
Maryland), and Harry Binswanger (at the New School for 
Social Research, and also, the editor of The Objectivist 
Forum); the economists George Reisman (at Pepperdine), 
Northrup Beuchner (at St. Johns University in New York), 
and Alan Greenspan; the historians Robert Hessen (at 
Stanford) and Mary Sures; psychologists John Ridpath (at 
York University in Toronto) and Edwin Locke (at the 
University of Maryland); journalists Edith Efron, Robert 
Bleiberg (editor and publisher of Barron's), Susan Ludel, 
Jerry Schwartz (with The Atlanta Constitution) , and Peter 
Schwartz (editor of The Intellectual Activist); a medical 
doctor, a psychiatrist, a registered nurse, several 
lawyers, a stockbroker, several artists, an actress, a 
dramatic producer*and others.  Rand also became a popular 
philosophical orator, before "overflowing audiences", at 
many colleges and universities (including Harvard, Yale, 
Princeton, Columbia, M.I.T., Michigan, Wisconsin, Johns 
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Hopkins, and even West Point)--and in numerous public 
forums (such as her debate with Walter Mondale on "The 
Limits of Government", at the National Town Meetings 
Bicentennial Series at Kennedy Center in Washington).  In 
1961, Nathaniel Branden established a philosophical academy 
(called the Nathaniel Branden Institute) in New York, and 
began (along with several associate lecturers) to instruct 
thousands of college students and professionals in 
nearly a dozen serial lecture courses (such as "Basic 
Principles of Objectivism", "The Economics of a Free 
Society", "Ancient Philosophy", and "Contemporary Theories 
of Neurosis") on many aspects of Objectivism; Rand sup- 
ported the enterprise.  After she renounced her associa- 
tion with the Brandens in 1968 (which was not unlikely, 
since she "broke with" other followers, such as Edith 
Efron, in 1967, and later, Henry Holzer), her new "chief 
intellectual heir" Leonard Peikoff created new lecture 
courses (such as "Modern Philosophy", "Introduction to 
Logic", "Founders of Western Philosophy", "Principles of 
Grammar", and in 1976:  "The Philosophy of Objectivism"), 
enrolling more thousands, in dozens of cities (not only in 
North America, but in such diverse locations as South 
Africa, Norway, Vietnam and Guatemala).  In 1962 Rand 
edited a philosophical journal (entitled The Objectivist 
Newsletter in North America, but in such diverse locations 
as South Africa, Norway, Vietnam and Guatemala).  In 1962 
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Rand initiated a philosophical journal (entitled The 
Objectivist Newsletter until 1966, The Objectivist until 
1971, and finally The Ayn Rand Letter). The circulation 
averaged perhaps 40,000 (certainly more than many academic 
philosophical journals, and distributed among a more varied- 
audience) - Miss Rand contributed most of her philosophical 
essays to the journal; her non-fictional books are pri- 
marily anthologies of her journal articles.  (The journal 
was discontinued in 1976, but was replaced in 1980 by The 
Objectivist Forum, a similar publication edited by her 
disciple Harry Binswanger; the new journal has also con- 
tained several contributions by Rand.) 
Her first major non-fiction work (entitled For 
the New Intellectual) was published in 1961 (and was sub- 
titled "The Philosophy of Ayn Rand", even though it was 
not a complete, systematic treatise of her "system", but 
simply a combination of an essay on her philosophy of 
history with an anthology of the theoretical passages in 
her novels).  Her second major non-fiction work was The 
Virtue of Selfishness, an anthology of her essays on the 
"Objectivist Ethics" (on her "morality", though by morality 
she meant "rationality"—by which, in turn, she meant 
"rational selfishness", or "Egoism"); the book was pub- 
lished in 1965, and was voted "The Book of the Semester" 
at Rice University in the same year.  In 1965 also, The 
Ayn Rand Papers Collection was established at the Library 
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of Congress (but as of 1982, it sCill contained only one 
letter, a personal note in which Rand "politely told-off" 
some persons seeking "pull" on their behalf to get an 
acting job).  In the next year, her third non-fiction 
book (Capitalism) appeared; it was an anthology of her 
essays concerning political governments (and also included 
essays by Nathaniel Branden, an essay by Robert Hessen, 
and several by Alan Greenspan).  In 1967 her Introduction 
to Objectivist Epistemology (an extended, technical essay 
on "the nature of concepts") was published; and in 1969, 
The Romantic Manifesto (an anthology of her works on 
"aesthetics") was published; in 1971, it was The New Left 
(another anthology of "political scientific" essays). 
Her last book (entitled Philosophy) was posthumously pub- 
lished in 1982 (and was another anthology, containing her 
essays on "the nature and importance of Philosophy").  Her 
non-fiction books have been read in millions of copies 
worldwide, and there has already been at least one foreign 
language edition (a printing of Capitalism in the Nether- 
lands, in 1976).  During the last twenty years, these 
works have become secondary, and sometimes even primary 
subjects of university courses and graduate seminars (such 
as the five-credit graduate seminar named "Objectivism's 
Theory of Knowledge", offered by the Department of Philos- 
ophy at the University of Denver), masters* and doctoral 
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theses, and many textbooks and academic journal articles. 
One of her opponents (a chairman of the philosophy depart- 
ment at the University of Southern California) has stated 
that:  "Miss Rand's philosophy is probably doomed to aca- 
demic immortality"  —and that "she is winning the free 
competition of ideas, not only in...the public arena, but 
12 
significantly, in...the academic marketplace itself" 
A better-known opponent, Robert Nozick (professor at 
Harvard), has admitted "Miss Rand is an interesting 
thinker, worthy of attention", "exciting, powerful, illum- 
13 inating, and thought-provoking". 
The degree and extent of her popular, "public" 
(or "cultural") influence is easily calculable from her 
frequent appearances on such television shows as "Today", 
"Donahue", "Comment!" (NBC), and "The Tonight Show"— 
from the many articles concerning her in popular magazines, 
including Time, Newsweek, Life, Reader's Digest and 
Mademoiselle—from the hundreds of pertinent newspaper 
articles, and her own regular column in The Los Angeles 
Times—and from her frequent appearances on popular radio 
programs (such as "The Raymond Newman Journal") and her 
own serial radio programs (such as "Commentary" series on 
WBAI in New York, and "Ayn Rand on Campus" on such college 
stations as CJUS-FM in Saskatoon, Canada, WBAA at Purdue, 
and WKCR at Columbia).  Her name became (for a decade, at 
least) a "household word" in America.  She continues to be 
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popularised by members of nearly one hundred Randian clubs 
(such as "The Washington, D.C. Area Society of Students of 
Objectivism", the"San Francisco Ayn Rand Society", "The 
M.I.T. Society of Radicals for Capitalism1', and the "Har- 
vard-Radcliffe Ayn Rand Society"), in dozens of cities and 
campuses (even some as small as Moravian College, in 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania) on several continents.  Her 
followers, the "Objectivists" (or, as she preferred to have 
them call themselves:  "students of Objectivism"), wish 
for no less than a complete "philosophical and cultural 
revolution", and a predominance of Objectivism in all 
levels of educational institutions.  Since 1968, The 
Foundation for the New Intellectual has held "Objectivist 
Workshops" and other "philosophically-oriented educational 
activities" for graduate students and professors, and has 
provided scholarships and research grants.  (In 1982, 
another Objectivist educational organization appeared: 
The Thomas Jefferson Institute, chaired by George 
Reisman.)  Despite their theoretic moral rejection of 
"state education and educational aid", and their denuncia- 
tion of "non-profit labor", yet the Objectivists accept 
positions in state colleges and universities, and tax 
"grants", and even non-profit status for their enter- 
prises; they take every advantage in order to bring about 
what Rand called "the new Atlantis" (a truly capitalist 
"social system"; a rational, genuine "political state"), 
17 
which would be devoid of such advantage-taking. 
In her last decade, Ayn Rand was seriously ill 
several times, suffered the shock of her husband's death 
(in 1980), and although she planned to write a lengthy, 
"complete, systematic treatise on Objectivism" and at least 
two more novels, she managed to complete only a few brief 
essays.  Her last public appearance was at the convention 
of the National Committee for Monetary Reform, in New 
Orleans, in November of 1980 (where she read her last 
essay, entitled "The Sanction of the Victims").  She died 
on March 6, 1982, in her Manhattan apartment.  Her passing 
was noted by most important news media in many countries, 
and since that time nearly a dozen serious books and essays 
concerning her life and works have been completed and 
published — including, especially, The Ominous Parallels by 
Leonard Peikoff {described by Harry Binswanger as "After 
Ayn Rand's works...the single most important book of our 
age"). 
PART B:   "A TERMINOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SUBJECTS" 
Since some of the key words and phrases of which 
this analysis is composed (such as the phrase "political 
scientific concepts") are unconventional (in meaning, if 
not also in appearance), therefore this analysis must in- 
volve these definitions of the unconventional essential 
18 
expressions: 
Section I:  "Definition of 'Concepts t n 
By "political scientific concepts" are meant 
only those things that are such that each of them is a 
concept of at least one of the things that are political 
governments.  By "concepts" are meant only those actions 
which are such that each of them is an identifying (an 
identification) of at least one thing.  A concept is an 
action that is divisible into at least two component 
actions, which are:  (Da perception (a perceiving) by 
the same conceiver to whom the concept belongs of the 
thing/s being so identified, and (2) a written and/or oral 
expression which is the completion of the concept.  Since 
every concept involves (is composed of) at least one 
perception of at least one thing, and at least one (written 
and/or oral) expression, then there cannot be any "unex- 
pressed or 'inexpressible' concepts", nor any "concepts 
that are intuitive and spiritual, rather than perceptually 
(factually) based"; nor can there ever be "a concept that 
is a mere (written and/or oral) expression, such as a word, 
phrase, or sentence, or discourse"—nor any "concept that 
is a mere act of perceiving, an 'ephemeral, purely sensory, 
mental vague'".  Furthermore, since every action is neces- 
sarily an action solely by—and belonging only to—that 
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thing which so acts (since every thing acts "acts alone", 
according to Rand), and every concept is an action, there- 
fore there cannot possibly be an "group concepts, which 
are such that each is an action commonly by~-belonging 
commonly to--several things".  A concept is neither a per- 
ception nor an expression; rather, it is a composite action 
beginning with at least one perception and ending with at 
least one expression; it is an action solely by--and be- 
longing only to--that conceiver which so acts {and to 
whom each of the component actions belongs). 
Miss Rand believed that "A man thinks and acts 
alone", and that every action is an attribute of only one 
acting thing (of only that thing which so acts).  The 
Eleatic philosopher Parmenides held similarly that "think- 
ing and that...by which thought exists are one and the 
same thing, for thou wilt not find thinking without the 
being from which it receives its name".    Rand also held 
that every concept (every "conceptualization") is an action 
that necessarily involves "concept-formation" (is composed 
of its component perception/s and expression/s).  She 
therefore rejected the apparent theories of concepts 
offered by most other philosophers, because such "theories" 
are not identifications of the things that are concepts— 
but rather (if they are identifications of anything at 
all), identifcations only of perceptions and expressions. 
She noted that such mistaken "attempts to define concepts" 
20 
are "evasions"; they are as inadequate as attempts to con- 
ceive the motion of an internal combustion engine by con- 
sidering only its component compression cycle, or else, 
only its component expansion.  She wrote of:  "the twists 
of undefined verbiage...words with rubber meanings... 
terms left floating...by means of which they try to get 
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around" identifying concepts. 
She distinguished only "four schools of thought 
1 ft 
on this issue"   (other than her own Objectivist school of 
thought concerning concepts);  She rejected the "Platonist 
view" that concepts are the only "really real entities"— 
along with the "moderate realist position" (the Aristote- 
lian "school") that concepts "refer to essences", and the 
"nominalist view" that concepts are mere expressional 
"images"—and the "conceptualist" position that concepts 
17 
are non-imaginal expressions.    She claimed to transcend 
all such inadequate attempts (or, evasions) and to have 
found the "only true solution" to the vexed "issue of con- 
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cepts...philosophy's central issue"  :  She held concepts 
to be "identifications of things", and she emphasized that 
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every concept is "a process of identification"   (or, as 
she also put it:  a "conceptualizing", which is "not a 
passive state...but an actively sustained process of 
identifying" perceived things); she elaborated that every 
20 
concept is "an awareness of something"  , and that "a state 
21 
of awareness is not a passive...but an active process"  -- 
21 
and- an active process involving at least two "stages": 
22 
"the perceptual stage" and "the conceptual stage"  .  She 
considered sensations to be components of perceptions, and 
perceptions to be such that each of them is a composite 
"of sensations automatically retained and integrated by 
21 the brain" of the perceiver.    She considered that 
although there are many entities that are perceivers, only 
a few perceivers have concepts (are conceivers), and 
therefore she knew that most perceptions are not com- 
ponents of concepts—but that a few perceptions are com- 
ponents of concepts, because every concept involves at 
least one perception.  A perception involved in a concept 
she defined as "the data...integrated by that concept", 
and "the implicit knowledge that permits" the explicit 
knowledge (the concept as such) "to develop".    She also 
called concepts "measurements", and considered identifica- 
tions of things to be measurements of things; measurements 
she held to be the "expansions" of consciousness "beyond 
...limited perceptual experience" (beyond...the immediate 
25 
concretes of any given moment")  —since the "range of... 
2 f> perceptual awareness ... is limited"  by human physiology, 
and though a human "can perceive the length of one foot 
27 directly...he cannot perceive ten miles"  .  An irrational 
animal may perceive five trees all at once, but cannot 
possibly conceive of all trees; a rational human, however, 
is aware of more than can be directly perceived--so that 
22 
(according to Rand) the "range of conceptual awareness" is 
"unlimited":  "Man is the measure of all things" she 
insisted ("with the opposite of the meaning Protagoras in- 
tended" )--"Man is the measure, epistemologically" (not 
"metaphysically"), and "man has to be the measure, since 
he has to bring all things into the realm of the humanly 
28 knowable".    Concepts, for her, are actions of "making 
the universe knowable by bringing it within the range of 
man's consciousness, by establishing its relationship to 
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man"  ; for her, concepts are motions "in two interacting 
directions:  toward more extensive and more intensive know- 
ledge. . .wider integrations and more precise differentia- 
30 tions"  —which means that succeeding concepts by a con- 
ceiver are progressively macroscopic or microscopic identi- 
fications.  Rand knew also that concepts are necessarily 
"of rigorous, mathematical precision"; she held that a 
"concept is like a series of specifically defined units, 
going off in both directions, open at both ends and in- 
cluding all units of that particular kind" of which it is 
31 
an identification.    She considered concepts to be such 
32 that each of them is "a scientific discovery"—and every 
real scientific discovery is a true concept (a true 
identification of at least one thing, a discovery of at 
least one fact); for her, concepts are the only "Truths" 
and the only full "states of awareness" (the only full con- 
sciousnesses) insofar as perceptions ("perceptual states 
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of awareness") are "merely implicit" knowings.  She noted 
that only a "Truth is..-recognition" of "that which 
exists"—insofar as a perception is a merely physical, 
non-volitional, automatic process:  "senses...give the 
evidence...but the task of identifying" any perception is 
conceptualisation {"senses tell...only that something is, 
but what it is must be" known by way of true identifica- 
tion).    She wrote that a human "perceives a blob of 
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color... integrating the evidence of his sight and touch", 
but "the identifying of...what it is must be...by his, 
mind"  —and "mind" means "rational consciousness" (or, 
identification); she emphasized that a "mind" (or, "pro- 
cess of cognition") is a "process of apprehending some 
existent/s"  —and that "All through this process, the 
work of...mind consists of answers to a single question: 
38 What is it?"  ; she wrote that every awareness (every con- 
cept) "is an awareness of something" (of at least one 
thing), since a "content-less state of consciousness is a 
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contradiction"   and "Some object" (at least one perceived 
thing) "is involved in every state of awareness" (for 
"Directly or indirectly" every concept "is derived from... 
the external world")  .  She emphasized that "If nothing 
exists, there can be no consciousness; a consciousness with 
nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms". 
Therefore, she denied that there can ever by any "concepts 
of things that are not perceived or imperceptible, or con- 
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cepts of 'nonexistents'"; she insisted that there cannot 
be any "concepts not based on perceived facts (not involv- 
ing perceptions)".  For her, there cannot possibly be any 
"intuitive, or spiritual (mystical) concepts". 
Rand distinguished "learned", from "original" 
concepts:  a learned concept is a concept of the meaning/s 
of a concept by another conceiver, which is necessarily 
involved in an identification of that other conceiver's 
concept—since "Learning" another conceiver's concept 
"consists of grasping meanings...grasping the referents... 
the...existents" which that other,conceiver had conceived 
(and which that other conceiver's concept "denotes") 
Any conceiver who conceives another conceiver's concept/s 
must (in the process) conceive the meaning/s of that other 
conceiver's concept/s:  in any process of scientifically 
discovering the rational thoughts of someone else, one who 
so discovers much necessarily "learn" (or re-identify") 
the facts of which that someone else's thoughts are identi- 
fications.  But "original" concepts, on the other hand, 
are concepts of things other than concepts by other con- 
ceivers.  Thus, for Rand, a concept must be either wholly 
original (not learned, not a re-identification), or else 
truly learned; for her there cannot be any "other form of 
concept-formation, such as 'memorization', or 'semi- 
learning'":  not even learned concepts can "consist of 
memorizing sounds...the process by which a parrot 
in 
learns"^ .  For her, all true "Consciousness is Identi- 
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fication", and every fully conscious state is a concept. 
She held that every concept involves at least one (written 
and/or oral) expression:  every concept necessarily "exists 
in concrete, verbally-objectified form"--since "A concept 
is a mental integration...united by a specific defini- 
tion"  , and since every "Man retains his concepts by 
means by language" (by language—every expression of 
which—every phrase, term, or sentence, or discourse of 
which is a completion of a concept)  .  For her, a concept 
is to be considered a "noncontradictory identification", 
because it necessarily is linguistically consistent with 
the expressions involved in all prior concepts by the same 
conceiver:  therefore, she was certain that "No concept is 
valid" (that there cannot be said to be a true concept) 
unless it is "integrated" without'contradiction into the 
total sum of...knowledge" by the same conceiver.    She 
wrote that "A rational man does not hold any conviction... 
without relating it to the rest of his knowledge and re- 
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solving any possible contradictions". 
Rand did not divide "deductive concepts" from 
"inductive" ones; she held rather that every concept is 
not only induction (an identification of objective 
evidence, of perceived facts), but also deduction (an 
integration that is logically consistent with any prior 
concepts, involving language that is referentially univocal 
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and nonconfcradictive of Che language of any prior concepts 
by the same conceiver).  She knew that in order for any 
conceiver to proceed beyond its first concept—in order 
for the conceiver to be having any "more extensive and 
more intensive knowledge" of things—it must be that 
"linguistically" (deductively) that conceiver's "earlier 
concepts are integrated into wider ones or subdivided into 
narrower ones".    It was in reference to the language 
of a conceiver's concepts that Rand spoke of a conceiver's 
"conceptual system":  since it is linguistic expressions 
that are the completions of concepts, it is by expressions 
(by language) that every conceiver's concepts are said to 
be "unified" or "systematic". 
There is one concept by every conceiver having 
more that one concept that is the ultimate composite of 
all the other concepts by that conceiver; its expression 
is composed of all the other expressions involved in all 
its component concepts:  its language is the general 
language of that conceiver, in which all the particular 
language of that conceiver is involved.  Rand considered 
such an ultimate composite concept by a conceiver to be 
its "total sum of knowledge", but she did not call it the 
conceiver's "Philosophy", since she did not admit all con- 
cepts to her category of "philosophical concepts". 
She considered every concept by a conceiver 
except its first concept (which must be its "concept of 
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things as such") to be "systematically organized", founded 
on the language of all that conceiver's prior concepts: 
"By organizing his...concepts into...concepts, man is able 
to grasp and retain, to identify and integrate...knowledge 
extending beyond the immediate concretes of any given, 
49 immediate moment".    She denied that there can be any 
"unsystematized, or unexpressed, or, 'inexpressible' con- 
cepts", and she affirmed the expressional nature (the 
linguistic nature) of every true concept; thus, she was 
certain that "New concepts can be formed by integrating 
earlier-formed concepts into wider categories, or by sub- 
dividing them into narrower categories"  .  She knew that 
every concept except the first concept by a conceiver is 
not only inductive--involving at least one perception of 
at least one thing--but also- deductive—composed of (among 
other things) at least one expression.  She did not imply 
that there are any "concepts formed by a process of pure 
deductive reasoning divorced from any factual, inductive 
basis"; nor did she imagine any "experiential constructs, 
or 'practical discoveries' not the results of deduction". 
Rand divided concepts into:  "concepts of 
entities" and "concepts of attributes" (though she may 
have admitted a third division, "concepts of relation- 
ships", which must be identified as either a meaningless 
notion or as a subdivision of her "concepts of attri- 
butes").  Thus, she wrote that:  "The first concepts man 
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forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the 
only primary existents"  —and "It is only after" a con- 
ceiver has some "concepts of entities that he can advance 
52 to...forming...concepts of attributes"  , since "Attributes 
cannot exist by themselves" and "are merely the char- 
acteristics of entities" (such as "motions", which are 
attributes of moving entities--as Rand insisted that 
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"motions are motions of entities").    She distinguished 
concepts of motionless entities (concepts of entities that 
are not acting and to which there do not belong any 
actions) from concepts of moving (acting) entities; she 
distinguished concepts of attributes that are not actions 
from concepts of actions (and since she held concepts are 
actions--though not all actions are concepts--she distin- 
guished concepts of non-conceptual actions from concepts 
of concepts).  She identified "false concepts" (meaning- 
less notions) which are actions that appear to be concepts, 
but "do not give the identity" of that of which they are 
supposed to be identifications (and which "keep telling... 
what it is not, but never tell...what it is", for they 
"are not acts of defining, but of wiping out").    She 
distinguished such false concepts from true concepts (from 
the actions that really are concepts).  She also divided 
false expressions (such as contradictions, redundancies, 
equivocations and other "logical fallacies") that are the 
completions of meaningless notions from the truly meaning- 
ful expressions that are completions of concepts. 
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In summary, then, her concept of concepts as such 
is that they are identifications of things.  Her disciple 
David Kelley (a professional philosopher) wrote that: 
true, identificatory knowledge is "radically dependent... 
55 for its contents" on "things as they are".    A concept 
according to him—and also, for Rand —"is an outward 
focus, the grasp of what exists independently of it"  , 
since "to be conscious is to be conscious of something", 
and a concept (as an attribute, which cannot exist on its 
own or have any attributes of its own—such as actions 
of its own) cannot possibly "create its own contents" 
Another disciple of Rand's, Leonard Peikoff, described her 
view—and his own—as being essentially that a concept is 
a recognition that something "is what it is independent of 
CO 
...opinions or feelings about it"  ; he distinguished her 
"objective" epistemological and metaphysical position from 
any "subjectivism" such as the "Pragmatist view" that a 
concept "is simply a 'hypothesis' which has served men's 
59 purposes for a substantial period of time"  .  A third 
disciple, James Lennox, divided her view of concepts from 
the "Positivist notion" that concepts (or "theories") are 
"free creations of our own minds, the result of an almost 
poetic intuition".   She also had (according to Peikoff) 
utterly rejected the "Idealist theory" that concepts 
"create (or sustain) physical objects", or that concepts 
"have the power to alter facts" and to "control reality". 
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She held that concepts are not "free" (in the sense of 
"merely accidental", mere products of "chance"); instead, 
concepts are exact identifications (or full awarenesses, 
or, "accurate recognitions") of "things as they are". 
Rand also held that concepts as actions cannot act {for 
since they are attributes they cannot have attributes), 
that they do not "exist on their own", and that they refer 
to things which necessarily are what they are regardless 
of whether they are identified or not; concepts are not 
"free" in the sense of "efficaciousness" either--they 
simply are states of awareness.  Rand utterly rejected 
the Kantian position that the mind is impotent to grasp 
things as they are; for her, the mind is impotent to alter 
realities and not impotent to know them. 
Section II:  "Definitions of Meanings, Means, and Meaning- 
ful and Meaningless Perceptions and Expres- 
sions" 
According to Miss Rand, there are many percep- 
tions that are involved in (are not components of) con- 
cepts, and there are many expressions that are not com- 
ponents of concepts.  Expressions that are not involved in 
concepts are "meaningless expressions", and perceptions 
that are not involved in concepts are called "meaningless 
perceptions".  Expressions that are components of con- 
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cepts are, of course, "meaningful expressions"; and per- 
ceptions involved in concepts are "meaningful perceptions". 
A meaningless perception is a sensory collate that has not 
led to any full awareness--that has not resulted in any 
true identification—of the thing/s so perceived; a mean- 
ingless expression only appears to be the completion of a 
concept, for it is really no the symbol of any identifica- 
tion of anything.  A meaningful perception is one that has 
led to at least one concept; a meaningful expression is 
the symbol of a true identification and really does refer 
to at least one fact. 
A concept that is truly a concept does not in- 
volve any meaningless perceptions and expressions; like- 
wise, a false concept cannot involve any meaningful per- 
ceptions and expressions.  A given perception or a given 
expression may be a component of one or more concepts or 
meaningless notions (false concepts) by the same entity-- 
but, in no case can a meaningless perception or expression 
compose a concept--nor a meaningful perception or expres- 
sion compose a meaningless notion.  Nor can a meaningless 
perception or expression belong to a conceiver; nor can a 
meaningful attribute belong to any entity that is not con- 
ceiving (that is not a conceiver):  Rand held that every 
human must be "either rational or irrational" (either a 
conceiver or a pseudo-conceiver); according to her, "at 
any given time" a human must be one or the other, and 
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cannot possibly be "a little of both, somewhat conceptual 
though also to some degree irrational".  Therefore, if a 
human is demonstrated to have a meaningful expression (if 
the referent/s of the expression can be re-identified by 
the one who so demonstrates), then that human must have at 
least one concept and must be rational (and cannot be 
irrational); but if the human's expression be identified 
as meaningless, then that human must be irrational (and 
cannot have any concepts).  Yet, if the human is rational 
at one time, at another time it could have been irrational; 
according to the Objectivist view, even though someone may 
be "refuted" (insofar as its apparent concepts are identi- 
fied as meaningless) yet that person may have been or may 
become rational at some other time.  A few individuals, as 
Rand claimed herself to be, are consistently rational; she 
considered that a few are also consistently irrational, 
but that the majority are bodies that shift frequently 
from awareness of realities to blind imitation (from 
rationality to irrationality)—yet she insisted that such 
"inconsistent" individuals are not properly to be identi- 
fied as "semi-rational" or "semi-irrational" (but rather, 
each body has as many souls as it has rational and irratio- 
nal periods—though the bodies of such inconsistents may 
be the same, the souls are discontinuous).  Her "concept 
of 'free will1" apparently conflicts with such dis- 
continuity (for if a person has "the capacity to choose to 
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think", then it must be the same person throughout its 
rational and irrational periods--and hence, a continuous 
semi-rational- or semi-irrational human); but her free will 
is really an attribute only of rational souls, since the 
irrational are not free (but are "non-volitional").  Thus 
her terms "freedom" and "rationality" (and "capacity to 
choose") must be considered synonymous—so that a human 
may be either free or not free (rational or irrational) at 
any given time, but not both volitional and non-volitional 
(not somewhat conceptual, but also non-conceptual) in any 
given period. 
"Meanings" are things of which there are con- 
cepts :  a meaning is simply an identified thing, and every 
identified thing is a/the referent of at least one concept.' 
There is at least one meaning of every concept, since 
every concept is an identification of at least one thing. 
A "means" of a concept is a meaning of at least 
one concept that is prior to the concept of which it is 
a means:  For an example, consider a tree that has been 
identified by a conceiver--and recognize that the concept 
of the tree has also, in turn, been identified by the same 
conceiver—so that the tree, which is the meaning of the 
prior concept (which is the concept of the tree) must be 
a/the means of the subsequent concept (the concept of the 
concept of the tree), for without the tree to be identified 
the concept of the concept of the tree would have been 
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impossible.  (Now, it is not clear whether Rand held that 
both entities and attributes can be means, or if she held 
that only entities—and not attributes—can be means; but 
I hold that only entities, not attributes, can be means.) 
Only entities can be "used" (can be means); one cannot 
"use" an attribute (so that one cannot "use thinking to 
think", for an example).  Every means is a thing, but not 
every thing can be a means; moreover, every means is a 
meaning, but not every meaning a means.  There also cannot 
be any "means" of a false concept" (no "thing employed for 
an irrational action"):  only a thing that is already 
known (previously identified) can be truly used (effica- 
ciously controlled)--and only a conceiver (who cannot have 
any false concepts) can truly know anything.  Every means 
is used for a rational action, by the employer/s who pre- 
viously identified it.  In summary, then, a means is an 
entity that is a meaning of a concept that is a component 
of at least one subsequent concept by the same conceiver. 
It is evident that there cannot be a means of the first 
concept by an conceiver; but every subsequent concept must 
have some means. 
Section III: "Definitions of Things as Such, and 
Entities, and Attributes" 
By "things" Rand meant real, tangible objects— 
35 
facts.  According to her, a thing—whether it be identified 
or not, and whether it is an ultimate subatom, or the 
universe, or a tree, or a sound, or a concept, or a 
bacillus, or a color, or an ocean, a breath, a location, 
an existence, an emotion, a political government or any- 
thing else—is a real, tangible object, a perceivable 
reality—a demonstrable, irrevocable, indubitable, irrefut- 
able fact.  Therefore, she denied that there can ever be 
any "other things, such as 'Ideal Forms', surds, non- 
existents and 'unreal, intangible objects' that are 
transcendental, paradoxical, spiritual, imperceivable, 
indemonstrable and undefinable".  She also rejected mean- 
ingless notions that there can be "concepts of nonfactual, 
unknowable things"--so that there are for her no "mystical, 
intuitive, or emotional or instinctual concepts":  Only 
facts exist, every fact is a thing, and every concept is 
an explicitly expressed, perceptually-based identification 
of at least one thing; every concept is meaningful and 
every meaning is a fact.  Miss Rand was certain that a 
conceiver, "before it could identify...had to be conscious 
of something", and that whatever may be identified, "the 
axioms remain...that it exists and that you know it" 
for if one claims to know something that "does not exist, 
or cannot be perceived"--"what you possess is not con- 
sciousness" (what one has is not identification)  .  She 
also wrote that:  "The building block of...knowledge is 
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the concept of an 'existent'—of something that exists...a 
thing"  ; she added that "cognition starts with... 
things" J, and she called things "existents", "facts", 
"objects", "realities", "facts of reality" and "perceptual 
concretes".  She considered every thing to be a real thing, 
and insisted that "the unreal does not exist".    Even 
"such actions as thinking, feeling, reminiscing, etc." she 
called things. 
But she did divide things that are attributes 
(such as actions) from the things that are entities (the 
things to which attributes, such as actions, belong); yet 
she held both entities and attributes to be things. 
Attributes are "necessary things", and the things 
to which attributes belong are called "absolute things"; 
Rand called absolute things "primary existents", and 
attributes she simply named "attributes".  Necessary 
things (attributes) are those things which are such that 
each of them belongs to one other thing, which is not 
another necessary thing, but an absolute thing.  A neces- 
sary thing cannot belong to another necessary thing:  an 
attribute cannot belong to another attribute, but must 
belong to some entity—to that one and only one entity of 
which it is its characteristic.  (An attribute is said to 
be a "necessary" thing because, since the absolute thing 
to which it belongs — and of which it is a characteristic- 
is what it is, it must necessarily have such a characteris- 
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tic—its attribute is "necessary".)  Rand did not accept 
notions of "attributes of attributes" (such as "actions by 
actions", and' "existences of existences"); she did not 
posit "characteristics belonging to characteristics" as 
long as she uttered metaphysical concepts {though later 
she posited such absurdities as her "political scentific 
concepts"). 
Absolute things (entities) are those things 
which are such that each of them does not belong to any- 
thing.  But to every absolute thing there belongs at least! 
one necessary thing:  Since every absolute thing is at 
least existing (even if it has no other characteristics), 
and every existence (every "existing") is a necessary 
thing, therefore there must be at least one necessary thing 
belonging to every absolute thing; every absolute thing 
must possess its existence, which is a necessary thing. 
Some absolute things are not only existing, but also, are 
acting (possessing one or more actions); thus, every acting 
absolute thing must have more than one attribute—at least 
one necesary thing in addition to that which is its exis- 
tence. 
A necessary thing is either an existence or an 
action.  There cannot be any "other necessary things" 
(such as "non-existings" and "inactions").  A thing is 
either absolute or necessary.  There cannot be any "other 
things, which are both somewhat like entities and yet also 
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like attributes—both necessary and absolute--both belong- 
ing to something else and yet not belonging to anything". 
(Rand apparently held this position, though her mention of 
"things that are relationships" if intended as "things 
other than entities and attributes" would be contradictory; 
in any case, she wrote few metaphysical essays, so that 
the issue is difficult to prove.)  An absolute thing must 
either have only its existence (as its sole attribute), or 
else, have its existence and one or more actions:  Thus, 
an absolute thing must be either a "motionless absolute 
thing" (or "motionless entity") or else, a "mover" (an 
acting thing, or acting entity).  There cannot be any 
absolute things that both act and do not act; there are 
no things such that each of them both possesses action and 
does not possess action.  Actions, as attributes (and there 
are no "actions that are not attributes of entities"), do 
not exist without acting things:  Rand knew that a "motion 
pre-supposes that which moves", since motions, as attri- 
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butes "cannot exist by themselves".    Existences also 
cannot exist without absolute things, "since entities are 
69 the only primary existents".    Rand wrote of "an entity 
...made of specific attributes"  , indicating her cer- 
tainty that an attribute is a thing which--if its entity 
exists and is what it is--must necessarily also exist 
(because the attribute is a/the characteristic of that 
entity).  She knew that there cannot be any "attribute 
belonging to several entities—such as a 'collective 
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existence' (an existing by several things), and a 'group 
action' (an action by several things)":  "there is no such 
71 thing as a collective thought", she wrote.    Since some 
entities have actions as well as existences, there must be 
more attributes than entities.  Attributes are never 
"shared" (never "belong commonly to several entities"). 
Since concepts are actions by conceivers, and some con- 
ceivers possess more than one concept, there must be more 
concepts than conceivers.  Concepts are never "shared"; 
conceivers do not "possess ideas in common"—nor do they 
"think together". 
Section IV:  "Definitions of Existences, Actions, Motion- 
less Absolute Things, and Movers" 
"Existences" are those things which are such 
that each of them is the existing by an absolute thing as 
itself:  If there is an entity "A", then there must also 
be that necessary thing which is the existing of A, by A, 
as itself (as A); this necessary thing (this attribute) is 
its total character "B", the "existence" of A.  An 
existence is the ultimate composite of all other attri- 
butes of an acting entity, or the simple "being-what-it-is" 
of a motionless absolute thing.  Every absolute thing is 
existing by itself as itself; therefore, there cannot 
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possibly be any "other existences, which are such that 
each belongs to several or even to all entities, or per- 
haps to one or more other existences or other attribute/sM 
(there is not possibly any "Ground of Being" or other 
"super-existence" to which both entities and ordinary 
attributes are supposed to belong).  Such false notions 
are rejected because a thing cannot both be what it is 
(have an existence) and also be what something else (be an 
existence of that something else); things cannot possibly 
be what things other than themselves are, for to be such. 
is to be what they are not.  Therefore Rand emphasized 
72 that:  "Existence is Identity"  , that it is necessary 
that "A thing is itself"73 and that "To exist is to be 
something" unique  .  She explained that "An atom is it- 
self, and so is the universe; neither can contradict its 
own identity; nor can a part contradict the whole" 
because there is no entity "exempt from the law of 
7 ft identity"   (no absolute thing lacking its own existing, 
for even a "man-made product...once made...does exist"  ). 
A thing "cannot be true or false" insofar as its identity 
(its existence) is concerned; its existence is neither 
"good" nor "evil":  "It simply is" what it is, and a "man 
determines the truth or falsehood" of any apparent con- 
cepts "by whether they correspond to or contradict the 
78 facts of reality".    Absolute "things are what they are.. 
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79 they possess a specific nature, an identity"   that is not 
to be changed or negated by "declaring it true or false" 
or "passing moral judgement upon it", nor by "wishing, 
80 praying, screaming and foot-stamping"  .  When Rand wrote 
that "Existence exists", she did not imply that there is 
only one existence (that there is only one, "The" overall, 
universal "Existence"); she identified many (not "only 
one") "natures" (or existences, or, identities) of 
things--and she did not posit "only one overall 'Nature'". 
81 She meant by "Existence exists"   that every thing neces- 
sarily is, and cannot not be, what it is--that knowledge 
of what a thing is cannot alter or revoke its existence, 
but rather, is a recognition that the thing is what it is. 
The philosopher Parmenides held similarly that "It is 
necessary to think that being is...and it is impossible 
that non-being is"  ; "the trustworthy path", which "truth 
attends", is that of "assuming that being is and that it 
83 is impossible for it not to be"  .  He held that things 
not only are what they are, but must be, and cannot be not 
what they are:  "Nor is there nor will there ever be any- 
84 thing apart from being"   (there are no entities at all 
that lack existence, that are not absolutely what they 
are).  He did not admit of any "semi-existences" (no 
"somewhat natures" of things), for he insisted that "it is 
85 
necessary that being either is absolutely or is not"  -- 
and concluded that "it is impossible to say or think that 
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non-being is"   {"for thou canst not recognize non-being 
87 
...nor couldst speak of it"  --so that it cannot be that a 
thing is not what it is).  Rand's is a rigid pluralist 
metaphysics, and she rejected "the Heraclitean-Hegelian... 
Q O 
flux"   proposed by "process theorists" (such as Heracli- 
tus, Hegel, Spencer, Bergson and Whitehead, for a few 
obvious examples) who "claim that they perceive a mode of 
89 being superior to...existence"   (a supposed "other mode 
of existing" which is such that "all things flow"—that 
every thing is both what it is and also what it is not, 
"becoming" but never really "being" itself, constantly 
"contradicting" itself and "resolving its contradictions"). 
Existences were for Rand "rigid", necessary; things for 
her are self-consistent, immutable objects.  Parmenides 
held the same:  "that non-being is and that it necessarily 
is, I call a wholly incredible course, since thou canst 
not recognize non-being (for this is impossible), nor 
90 
couldst thou speak of it"  :  he also rejected the "flux" 
notions.  Aristotle's insistence that "A is A" proves that 
he too, like Rand and Parmenides, rejected notions of 
"processive existence".  Existences for them are the 
natures (identities) of absolute things. 
"Actions" are necessary things that are motions 
by absolute things (movings by entities).  Actions are the 
necessary things that are not existences, since a necessary 
thing must be either an action or an existence.  Actions 
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are by, and belong only to, acting entities--for some 
entities are motionless (not acting); moreover, each action 
is solely by--and belongs only to—that entity which is 
so acting (not to any other entity than the one which so 
acts, and not to several entities).  Some acting entities 
are such that to each of them belong several actions; the 
remainder of acting entities have, of course, singular- 
actions.  Thus, there are more actions than acting entities 
(because, some have more than one action, and no entities 
"share actions" or "act in common"—every thing that acts, 
acts alone).  The entities having more than one action 
each must necessarily each have one ultimate composite 
action of which all its other actions are components. 
Now, an action by an entity that is a com- 
ponent of another entity is not also by, and belonging 
to, that entity of which the former entity is a component; 
nor is an action by the. latter entity, if that entity acts, 
to be considered also by, and belonging to, the former 
entity:  A concept by a human conceiver cannot also be by 
one of its component organs (such as a liver, or a 
leucocyte); for another example: the motion of a planet is 
not also by the galaxy in which the planet is involved-- 
nor, for a' third example, is the motion of the galaxy also 
by one of its component planets or stars (or dust 
particles, electrons or light particles, or nebulae or any 
other parts).  Therefore, Rand could write with certainty 
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91 that every "man thinks and acts alone"  —and that any 
other motion presupposes only one mover, only that mover 
of which it is its moving.  Every thing that acts, acts 
alone.  An action is necessarily by, and belongs to, an 
entity; there are no "actions by actions" (such as any 
supposed "self-development of an idea"), nor any "actions 
by existences". 
The absolute things that are not acting (and to 
which there cannot belong any motions) are:  the universe, 
and the ultimate subatoms.  Since an action is a changing, 
a "process" by an entity, then the universe (which is the 
ultimate composite entity, of which all other entities are 
components) cannot possibly change or move anywhere—for 
it cannot "change in reference to its parts" and there are 
no "other things" against which it might move.  The ulti- 
mate subatoms (which are the only incomposite entities-- 
the things that are not composed of anything, but which 
are the "least common denominators", the things that are 
components of all other entities) cannot change either 
(cannot gain or lose parts, cannot "be in process"), for 
otherwise they would not be the ultimate subatoms.  Thus, 
both the universe and the ultimate subatoms are called the 
"motionless absolute things".  Since Rand called acting 
entities "movers", in this thesis all the absolute things 
that are neither the universe nor ultimate subatoms are 
called movers. 
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Section V:   "Definitions of Causes, Effects, Reflex 
Movers, and Conceivers" 
She distinguished movers whose motions are "mere 
reflex actions" from those movers she called "Immoveable 
Movers" (and also, sometimes:  "Un-Moved Movers" and "Prime 
92 Movers").    She implied by such titles that the movers 
having mere reflex actions are "moveable movers" (or 
"moved movers'!, or, "secondary movers").  The actions by 
and belonging to moved movers may be called "effects", so 
that every motion by a moved mover—every "reflex action" 
—is an effect; every effect is an action by a moved 
mover, and every action by an unmoved mover cannot possibly 
be an effect.  Motions by unmoved movers are concepts, and 
every concept is a motion by an unmoved mover.  Every 
action that is not an effect must be a concept, and no 
concept is a reflex action.  A moved mover may be called a 
"reflex mover", because its every action is an effect; an 
unmoved mover must be called a "conceiver", since its 
every action is a concept.  Rand also named conceivers 
"rational beings", or simply:  "rationals".  All other 
beings she considered to be "irrational beings", or 
"irrationals".  The conceivers (or unmoved movers, or, 
rational beings) may also be named "identifiers", since 
they are the only things that are identifying things. 
They might also be named "uncaused causes" because (though 
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they may be causes of certain effects) their own actions 
cannot possibly be effects; all other causes are caused 
(have actions that are effects). 
"Causes" are absolute things that are being 
resisted (moved against) by reflex movers.  Moreover, 
every cause is a mover (there being no motionless absolute 
things that can be moved against).  Effects are non- 
identificatory (nonconceptual, irrational, unconscious) 
motions; effects are simply "resistances" (motions against 
entities) by entities.  Every reflex mover necessarily is 
moving against at least one other entity, which must be 
a/the cause of its motion.  For every thing that is a 
cause there must be at least one reflex mover resisting 
it, and if the cause is the only thing being resisted by a 
reflex mover, then the cause is the "entire cause" (or 
"exclusive and complete causal factor") for the resistance 
by the reflex mover.  A given entity may be resisted by 
more than one mover, so that it is a cause of several 
effects; an effect may, likewise, have more than one cause. 
But Rand was certain that concepts are "uncaused" motions: 
there are no "causes of ideas".  She absolutely rejected 
the "Behavioralist notion" of concepts as "'reflexes,' 
93 
'reactions,' 'experiences,' 'urges,' and 'drives'"  .  She 
identified false, meaningless "concepts" (meaningless 
notions) as reflex motions, however, for such supposed 
"concepts" are indeed reactions, experiences and drives; 
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meaningless notions are not uncaused, but "had to be" 
according to the "law of causality" as proposed by Rand. 
But with regard to true concepts, she refuted the fallacies 
of the behavioralists:  she wrote that "Nothing can force" 
94 a rational being "to think."  , and that a conceiver "is 
not to be 'commanded1 in any sense... applicable to the 
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rest of things"  —and she rejected the popular "technique 
of...palming off" any concept "as if it were the meta- 
physically-given" (as if it were an effect, an action that 
"had to be")  .  She argued that, whereas "Natural objects 
can be reshaped to serve...goals", yet a conceiver "cannot 
and is not so malleable" (cannot be so governed, cannot be 
97 caused). 
She held that every conceiver is a human being, 
but that not every human is a conceiver.  She held that 
every human, at any given time, must be either one or the 
other—either rational or irrational—and not "a little of 
both".  She did not posit any "relative rationality con- 
taining varying amounts of irrationality".  She did not 
"make semi-rationality the normal human condition"; rather, 
she believed that there are some individuals who are 
rational, and that the remainder (at any given time) are 
irrational.  Some humans are uncaused movers, and the 
remainder are reflex movers who merely appear to be 
rational (and really are not).  She did not accept any 
opinions of "other rational beings that are not humans" 
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(such as "supernatural beings", and "extra-terrestrial 
intelligences", which do not possess human bodies and have 
never been perceived by anyone):  "Nothing but a man's 
mind can perform that complex, delicate, crucial process 
of identification which is thinking.  Nothing can direct... 
98 but his own judgement".   Thus, only humans can identify 
anything.  But most humans, according to Rand,- are "sedate 
little souls" who are caused and do not identify any- 
99 thing  :  they are the "masses...millions of dull... 
stagnant souls that have no thoughts of their own, no will 
of their own...who chew helplessly the words others put 
into their brains"   .  She emphasized that "men are not 
equal...and one can't treat them as if they were" (and she 
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added that "I loathe most of them").     She considered 
that the humans that are not conceivers must have pseudo- 
concepts (actions that are meaningless notions); to every 
irrational human there must belong at least one pseudo- 
concept.  Thus, there must belong to every human either at 
least one concept or at least one pseudo-concept. 
Now, a meaningless notion (or false concept, or, 
pseudo-concept) is an action that "apparently is a con- 
cept", for it is, like any concept, divisible into at 
least one perception of at least one thing, and at least 
one (written and/or oral expression.  But it is unlike a 
concept in that its component perception/s is/are neces- 
sarily of one or more rational and/or irrational humans-- 
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and, it is also different in that its expression/s is/are 
illogical.  A concept is not necessarily involving per- 
ception/s of some human/s, but every pseudo-concept in- 
volves perception/s of some human/s—for every pseudo- 
concept is an imitation (which is an effect) of some other 
human/s:  Rand knew that if an irrational human did not 
perceive any other human, it could not have any meaningless 
notions; and, if there were no rational humans there could 
be no meaningless notions at all {for there would have 
•been no conceiver to imitate)—for even if irrational 
humans generally imitate the false notions of other 
irrational humans, yet any "chain of causality" is trace- 
able to at least one rational human.  She held that 
irrationals do not "originate" their pseudo-conceptual 
actions; they do not get their notions "from nowhere", 
because they "create nothing" and must "exist entirely 
102 through the persons of others"  —they must be caused by 
whatever humans they happen to be resisting (who may be 
rational or irrational, though they cannot tell the 
difference). 
Humans always appear to be conceivers; whether 
or not they really are rational is a matter of identifica- 
tion (a matter for rational judges to decide).  Pseudo- 
conceivers do not know that "all humans appear to be con- 
ceivers", of course, since though they may mouth such 
expressions as "conceivers" and "irrationals" they cannot 
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possibly mean anything.  Irrational humans are, for Rand, 
mere unconscious "imitators" of other humans; their 
apparent "concepts" are truly "imitative actions".  But, 
false "concepts" must not be said to be "imitations of 
concepts" in any case, because irrationals do not think 
abstractly (cannot abstract attributes of entities), 
cannot perceive and identify any attributes such as con- 
cepts; they do not "imitate concepts that they perceive", 
because they do not perceive concepts (nor any other 
attributes).  Rand held that a human must "survive in only 
one of two ways--by the independent work of his own mind 
103 or as a parasite fed by the minds of others"   :  a human 
either thinks abstractly, or does not, and any one who 
doesn't, cannot know anything about rationality and 
irrationality (regardless of any apparent "expressions" it 
may have).  An apparent conceiver that "really isn't", is 
described by Rand as "a metaphysical monstrosity... running 
blindly amuck on a trail of destruction"   .  Such 
irrational humans "survive by imitating and repeating... 
the sounds and motions they learned from others", and can 
"never...understand their own work"—and "their survival 
is made possible only by those who did...think and...dis- 
cover the motions they are repeating".    She elaborated 
that:  "The survival of such mental parasites depends on 
blind chance; their unfocused minds are unable to know 
1 Oft 
whom to imitate, whose motions it is safe to follow" 
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and they "have no concern for facts, ideas, work" since 
"They're concerned only with people" (since they cannot 
perceive attributes, they are concerned "Not to judge, but 
to repeat", and they"don't ask:  'Is this true?'" but only 
1 07 
ask:  'Is this what others think is true?"1).    They are 
"utterly irrational"; they are mere reflex movers whose 
meaningless motions are effects of other pseudo-conceivers 
and of true conceivers—whichever they may have happened 
to encounter and resist.  They are, as Parmenides wrote: 
"mortals knowing nothing" who "wander aimlessly, since 
helplessness directs... and...are borne on deaf and... 
blind, amazed...who consider being and not-being the same 
108 
and not the same".    They are always "learning not con- 
cepts but... strings of sounds...the facial expressions .and 
...vibrations of" whatever other humans they happen to 
109 
"move against", Rand held.     Irrationals "do not accept" 
any "phrase by a process of thought", but merely repeat 
expressions — they simply "seize upon....a ....phrase — 
110 because it fits their emotions".    They lack any signifi- 
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cant "instinct of self-preservation"   , since what they 
enjoy is to imitate others, and the success of their 
imitative motions depends upon whether there are success- 
ful (efficacious), rational human/s to imitate or at least 
some irrationals to imitate who have closely followed some 
rational human/s; she called irrationals "parasites in- 
112 
capable of survival"   , since without at least one 
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rational human, they could not exist.  Animals have 
"significant survival instincts", but human life depends 
upon, or consists of, rationality; therefore, she was 
certain that irrational humans are not only "subhuman", 
113 but "less than animal".    Therefore, since there are 
many irrational humans, there must be admitted to be at 
least one rational human (which must have existed before 
all of them, or at least with the first of them). 
Irrationals are surviving, then some rationals (or at 
least one) must exist:  Rand noted that "we must remember 
that no matter how many men mouth a concept as a meaning- 
114 less sound, some man had to originate it at some time"   , 
and there must always be (or have been) at least one 
"first cause...a Prime Mover" who is "the creator... self- 
sufficient, self-generated" entity whose action the 
115 original concept was   .  If there are many illogical 
opinions of what political governments are, for instance, 
there must also be at least one true conceiver of political 
governments, of whom the opinions are imitations (whether 
directly, or indirectly—immediately or mediately); move- 
over, the conceiver/s must have preceded the imitators or 
at least have been present with the first of them. 
Rand called conceivers "creators", egos", 
"intellects", "Producers", "conceptual consciousnesses", 
"volitional beings"--and even "active minds": an "active 
mind achieves an unassailable certainty...untainted by 
53 
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spots of blind faith, approximation, evasion and fear" 
she wrote.  Such a mind is absolutely rational, and has no 
actions that are neither concepts nor components of con- 
cepts.  She even called the rationals the "Active Men", 
while the irrational humans were identified as "Passive 
Men":. "The Active Man is the producer, the creator... 
originator...individualist" who "neither needs nor seeks 
...nor can...be made to work under any form of compul- 
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sion"   , and■"The Passive Man" is "a parasite who expects 
118 to be taken care of by others"   .  If the Active should 
disappear entirely, "the destruction of the Passive... 
119 follows automatically".    Only conceivers "perform the 
120 process of thinking...the process of defining"  —and 
only they can really "do good work" and truly "know what 
they are doing", and "deal with reality...conquering 
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nature"   .  She called conceivers "Atlases", because they 
are the ultimate supporters of the irrational masses of 
the world.  (She wrote that "When you work in a modern 
factory, you are paid...for all the productive genius 
which has made that factory possible", since every factory 
machine is but "the frozen form of a living intelli- 
122 gence"   —so that the "man at the top of the intellectual 
pyramid" of sensate things "contributes... to all those 
123 below him"   and no matter how many millions of dollars 
he may earn, he can never be paid sufficiently for his 
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work--just as any irrational human, no matter how little 
he may have, is always overpaid for his "work".)  Irra- 
tionals are "guilty" of "stealing" from the rationals; 
according to Rand, they constantly "feed on stolen wealth" 
(or, as she also put it:  they "feed on stolen concepts") 
—they are "parasites in matter and parasites in spirit"-- 
even "parasites of lunacy" who re-steal already-stolen 
concepts (whenever they imitate other irrational humans). 
The "survival", (or life, or ultimate composite motion) of 
an irrational human is not "life by...reason" but rather, 
"life by force or fraud".     They "go through life in an 
unfocused state of stupor, merely repeating the words... 
125 the motions they learned from others".    But no matter 
how many times a meaningless notion may be removed from 
its ultimate source/s (from the concept/s which it pre- 
supposes)—no matter if it be second-hand, third-hand, or 
tenth-hand (a direct imitation of a conceiver, or an imita- 
tion of another irrational human)—every altered, memo- 
rized, mimicked3 meaningless notion necessarily pre- 
supposes at least one true concept by some conceiver at 
some prior time; meaningless notions are but garbled, im- 
perfectly transmitted or re-transmitted vibrations from 
true conceivers (although some are so far removed from 
their original source/s and so extremely distorted that 
"chains of causality" cannot be traced back to the original 
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source/s, and although others are so slightly distorted 
that they are virtually indistinguishable from the original 
concept/s).  Some meaningless notions- are so slightly 
distorted that they appear to be genuinely learned con- 
cepts.  But, a true conceiver, who necessarily is "in- 
1 9 f> transigently fact-centered"   and "never fails to 
pronounce judgement" on other humans, is capable of the 
distinction. 
Rand distinguished irrational humans as those 
who "survive by adjusting themselves to their background", 
whereas the rationals are such that each of them "survives 
127 by adjusting his background to himself".     The irra- 
tionals she also named "savages", since "A savage is a 
being whose use of words is guided by...feeling", and who 
1 28 
"has not learned to speak" meaningfully.    She also 
called them "mystics", signifying their "blind faith" (un- 
conscious, parasitic mimicry) and their characteristic 
"beliefs" in such imaginary entities as "Society", "tradi- 
tion", "race", "brute force"—and their notions of "mysti- 
129 
cal 'dialectics and super-senses'"   :  mystics appear to 
identify "collective thought", "collective action", 
"Fate", "historical necessity" and arbitrary "free will"— 
and they hold essentially that "the world is a place of 
130 
unintelligible miracles"  —but their apparent concepts 
are nothing but distortions of truths held by rationals. 
Thus, all the apparent meanings of their false "concepts" 
56 
are senseless:  there is no "Fate", no "historical neces- 
sity", nor any "collective thought", etc.—even though 
such "things" may appear to have been identified.  The 
irrationals may appear to learn concepts, but they really 
cannot, since to learn a concept "is to grasp and...to re- 
trace the process by which it was formed"—"to grasp" (to 
identify) "at least some of the units which it subsumes" 
and "to link one's understanding of the concept to the 
131 facts of reality" that are its meanings.    The irra- 
tionals cannot tell what they mean by their supposed "con- 
cepts", because they never identify anything—and since 
they are not capable of scientific discovery, they never 
learn anyone else's concepts.  A mystic is concerned only 
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"to impress, to cheat, to flatter, to deceive...others" 
—and its wishes are for "others to support" it (so that, 
"Every mystic is a...dictator" and "craves obedience...not 
agreement" by others, since only a stable source of 
nourishment held down in a state of "forced obedience can 
133 give...security")   ; "His lust is to command, not to con- 
vince" (since a mystic, being irrational, can neither con- 
vince nor even conceive of convincement)   .  Rand knew 
that every irrational's "imitation of living beings" may 
appear to be "a conspiracy against the mind...against 
135 life" (against the rational)   , but really "is a con- 
spiracy without leader or direction, and the random little 
thugs of the moment are chance scum riding the torrent 
57 
from the broken dam of the sewer of centuries... the 
reservoir of hatred for reason...stored by every" irra- 
tional human   —for theirs are merely "apparent hatreds", 
simply unconscious "resistances", totally reflexive, 
caused motions.  Mystics are unable to distinguish ra- 
tionals from irrationals, and can neither command, nor 
even conceive of commanding anything; theirs are only 
apparent "desires to command, to force, to enslave", for 
regardless of whether they are called Prime Ministers or 
slaves, party bosses or untouchables, they are not self- 
movers and cannot initiate any motion or create any new 
product (nor can they even truly learn)--so that they must 
always "flow with the tide", whenever any "tide" may be 
encountered and wherever it may cause them to move.  When 
any mystic encounters an Immoveable Mover (a rationale 
human), it does not command the Immoveable Mover; mystics 
may mouth such words as "power" and "command", but all 
their actions (including such mouthings) are effects. 
That the irrational are indeed "impotent" may be proven as 
follows:  Rand wrote that "man's survival requires that 
those who think, be free of the interference of those who 
don't"1-' , that "Reason requires freedom"    (that it is 
necessary that concepts as scientific, controlling measure- 
ments of things must be uncaused--since otherwise the 
conscious would be ruled by the unconscious), and that a 
reasoning involves not only its completing expression/s 
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but also the beginning of the process, which is the con- 
trolling and disposing of the things being measured by the 
conceiver to whom the process of reasoning belongs (that 
to "think and act alone" means "the right to keep and dis- 
pose of" the means and material products of a concept); 
therefore, since both rational and irrational humans are 
surviving, the rationals must necessarily be not caused by 
the irrationals.  If irrationals in any way "negated" or 
altered the free actions of the conceivers, then the con- 
ceivers would not be conceivers (the rational would not be 
rational) and the irrational would not be surviving. 
Therefore, Rand was certain that "evil is impotent" and 
that all things are truly "benevolent" for true conceivers; 
she emphasized again and again that "there are no contra- 
dictions in reality".  The Stoic philosopher Epictetus 
held similarly that:  "the rational being", who is 
"naturally constituted free" and whose action is "free and 
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unhindered action"   , is "proof against compulsion and 
hindrance and violence, whose impulses are untram- 
melled"   .  According to him, the rational are "free from 
hindrance" and "walk alone" (survive independently), 
whereas the irrational are "forlorn" (impotent, helpless), 
"weak, servile, subject to hindrance", so that they "cannot 
walk alone"; while a rational being cannot "live de- 
141 ceived"   , yet an irrational human cannot not be de- 
ceived (has no fully conscious awareness, and "therefore 
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neither is he free"   ).  Rand's expression that "the 
universe is benevolent" resembles the expressions of 
Epictetus that "there is nothing intrinsically evil in the 
world" and that the "world itself" is "free from hindrance 
and perfect" for the rational, so that a rational need not 
be "unhappy by reason of any" and must "be happy by reason 
of all" things    (since, according to him, such "was and 
is and shall be the nature of the universe"   ; Rand was 
certain that, because there are no negations of the free- 
doms of the rational, "the good man can suffer no defeat". 
A free, rational being "blames none, praises none, com- 
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plains of none, accuses none"   —so that the heroic 
character ("Howard Roark") in The Fountainhead is serene 
while he is apparently "persecuted", and in Atlas Shrugged 
the hero ("John Gait") was shown to "never...take 
seriously" any of the apparent threats against him by the 
mindless thugs (officials of the "United States govern- 
ment")   —and even in Anthem the hero is portrayed as 
holding certainly that the rational "can never be lost" 
and "can never perish" (for "Through all...the shame of 
which men are capable, the spirit of man will remain alive 
.... It may sleep, but it will awaken.  It may wear chains 
but it will break through.  And man will go on.  Man, not 
men"--truly human beings, not their imitative para- 
sites   ).  She knew that there is no such thing as a 
"radical, actual Evil"—a reality contradictive of ra- 
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tional beings—and she held that humans are neither 
"totally depraved", nor "somewhat evil" entities; for her 
"reality makes sense" (things are, and can only be, what 
they are)—so that there can be no "painful or sinful 
"paradoxes", and no "dichotomy or trichotomy of human 
nature" (no "conflicting instincts of love and violence, 
or of self-preservation versus self-destruction").  An 
irrational human necessarily is what it is, and cannot be 
something else again that negates what the rational are. 
Irrational humans are for Rand simply "mindless animals 
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moved by irrational feelings"   , not mystical "destroy- 
ers" empowered to make knowledge impossible.  In summary, 
then:  because there are "states of human progress", "in- 
dustrial revolutions", "scientific advances" and all kinds 
of "capital", it is required that there must be some ra- 
tional humans and that such rationals must be unimpeded by 
the irrational humans who imitate them (for "To interpose" 
even so much as one "threat of physical destruction between 
a man and his perception of reality" would be "to negate 
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and paralyze his means of survival"   --making the ra- 
tional not rational). The ancient philosopher Gorgias (of 
Leontini) held similarly.that "It is a law of nature that 
the strong shall not be hindered by the weak, but that the 
weak shall be ruled and led by the strong; that the strong 
1 'SO 
shall go before and the weak shall follow after."    If 
there were no free (conscious, efficacious), truly strong 
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(rationally strong) beings, there could not be any weak, 
irrational, parasitic humans either--and there would be no 
progress, no industries, no sciences and arts. Therefore, 
Rand was certain that "There can be no 'right* to destroy" 
the only "rights" which are conceivers:  there can be no 
"other, 'super-free' beings which contradict the freedoms 
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of the rationals.    According to her, every conceiver 
"is free to rise as far as he's able or willing", though 
"the degree to which he thinks...determines the degree to 
which he'll rise". 
Section VI:  "Definition of Societies" 
By "human being" is never meant any such falsely 
supposed entity as "Society"—nor any other imaginary 
entities such as "races" and "human groups"—because except 
for heaps of humans or human bodies on gymnasium floors 
and battlefields there are no "composite human things, 
made up of only humans as their 'lowest common denomina- 
tor'".  The earth is composed of all humans, of course, 
but also involves many other entities that are neither 
humans nor components of humans nor entities of which 
humans are parts; therefore, the earth cannot be identifed 
as a "composite human thing".  The universe also involves 
all humans, but it is not "Society" either.  In Ayn Rand's 
view, "There is no such entity as Society"—and she denied 
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that there can ever be any "such thing as a collective 
153 brain" or "collective thought".    She considered 
"Society" to be a mere fallacy, a mystical notion.  She 
described it as "Society—a thing they define as an orga- 
nism that possesses no physical form, a super-being em- 
154 bodied in no one in particular and everyone in general". 
She considered not only "Society" but other "human col- 
lectivities" (such as "groups", "tribes" and "the public") 
to be equally absurd.  She even urged that "the word 'We1 
must never be spoken" by the rational "except as an after- 
thought", and that it must "never be placed first, else it 
becomes an unspeakable lie" (for 'We' is as lime poured 
over men, which sets and hardens to stone", and "is the 
word by which the depraved steal the virtue of the good, 
by which the weak steal the might of the strong, by which 
155 fools steal...wisdom").    Meaningful societies, for her, 
were merely "sums" or "additive numbers" of humans—and 
therefore, in this thesis a "society" is properly meant 
as a concept that is a sum of humans in a given spatio- 
temporal location.  A society is therefore a necessary 
thing (an attribute rather than an entity), and cannot 
possibly think or otherwise act.  Other sums of humans, 
such as "races", "human groups" and "business associa- 
tions", are not entities either.  Miss Rand demonstrated 
that she knew that there are no "social or 'class' or 
racial ideas" and no "cooperative discoveries and group 
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products", when she wrote that "Theories, ideas, dis- 
coveries are not created collectively; they are products 
1 Sfi 
of individual" rational humans.     In fact, even an 
action that is not a concept—just like every action that 
is a concept—is by, and belongs only to, one entity 
(which is the entity that is so acting).  (There are no 
"compound entities" that are both one and many—and in 
fact, there are no "compound things" that are both one and 
many—for every object is only that one thing which it is.) 
Conceivers are able' to distinguish humans as individuals 
and to recognize that every mystical "notion of 'Society' 
as an entity" is a perversion of truth by some parasite; 
the rationals are able to reject myths of "human collec- 
tivities" as futile attempts by the irrationals (who are, 
according to Rand, the "fundamental antagonists throughout 
history" of the rationals) to deceive the rationals about 
their own freedoms and individuality and to "leash them in 
order to live" (though it is certain also that the irra- 
tionals only appear to have such "evil goals" since they 
are not able to know anything about freedoms, or about 
individuality or who is rational and who isn't).  The 
conceivers are not misled by any indemonstrable, meaning- 
less myths—rationals, according to Rand, "never cease 
judging", are always "fact-centered", and always "rely on 
their own rational judgement", so that they never have to 
"see by intuition, or with blind faith, that entity which 
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Is Society". 
Section VII: "Definitions of Governments as Such, and 
Political Governments" 
"Political governments" are only those concepts 
that are identifications of human conceivers.  A political 
government is a concept of at least one of the humans that 
are identifiers.  There are no "other political govern- 
ments that are entities—absolute existents occupying 
spatiotemporal locations and having attributes such as 
thoughts and other actions"; there cannot possibly be any 
"Political States, which think, decide, and execute 
decisions".  Any meaningful "political states" or "polit- 
ical governments" (or "political processes") must be only 
those states or processes of identification which are 
individual conceivers1 political concepts; any "other 
political states and processes" must be meaningless 
intonations by pseudo-conceivers.  "The State" (in the 
"sense" of "che only political state in a wide spatio- 
temporal location" and "an entity that is independent of 
outside control of its actions") is a notion by some 
irrational mimic, because any such supposed entity is 
indemonstrable, unperceived, illogical and necessarily 
nonexistent.  Since such a supposed entity is not known 
by way of identification but "by tradition, or by intui- 
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tion", and since there is no other way of knowing anything 
except by identification, then those who appear to know 
about "political government as an entity" really know 
nothing (have not identified anything). 
All political governments (political concepts, 
or, concepts of conceivers) are governments (are concepts), 
but not all governments are political governments (not all 
concepts are political concepts).  A "government" is 
simply a concept, for every concept is a governing action, 
a "controlling" of at least one object.  A concept (or 
government) is a scientific discovering action, an action 
that is not externally-caused (not an effect, not a reflex 
motion) but a purposive, fully conscious and precisely 
controlling measurement of at least one thing perceived 
by the conceiver who so governs.  Everything that is known 
is conceived of (since every concept is a knowing, and 
every knowledge a concept) , everything that is conceived 
of is measured (since every concept is a measuring, and 
every measurement a concept), and every measurement is a 
governing action (so that every concept is a government, 
and every government a concept).  There are no "purely 
theoretical, impractical and unapplied concepts, which are 
divorced from and not involving observation of concrete 
realities"—because in order for there to be any concept 
of a thing, that thing must have been controlled (governed, 
precisely measured) by that entity which so identified it. 
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For an example:  in order for there to be an identifica- 
tion of a tree, that tree must have been perceived, its 
characteristics (or at least some of its characteristics) 
abstracted, tested, compared—the tree must be governed. 
Likewise, every identification of a galaxy involves 
telescopy, and every discovery of a bacillus involves 
microscopy (for every concept is a governing action, a 
precisely controlling measurement).  A known thing is a 
thing that must have been observed—and, in the process 
of observation, controlled, measured, governed--in order 
for there to be any such meaning.  For Rand, there is no 
"other way of knowing, such as a priori 'remembering' of 
'Ideal Forms', or blind faithful acceptance of popular or 
traditional or spiritual beliefs—or even 'pure expe- 
riential, subjective, reflexive behavior'".  To know^ for 
her, is to govern for oneself—to govern actually per- 
ceived things, and to do so consciously and not as a moved 
mover.  She held that a rational "Man is the measure" of 
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all things "epistemologically"   , and her disciple Harry 
Binswanger elaborated that "one must recognize that all 
physical processes...are...amenable to man's control; that 
man's reason is fully competent to gain the knowledge re- 
quired to exert this control; and that man's mastery of 
nature is his moral right... since man's life...is an end 
158 in itself"   .  Rand held that even such an emotional 
human attribute as "love" can be (and to be known, must 
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159 be) precisely, rigorously, "mathematically" grasped. 
For her there can never be any "surds"; every thing is 
knowable: even rational beings which are free may be 
known, and being known, necessarily are "governed".  To 
identify (to control, to measure) is to govern—but not to 
cause:  that which is governed is not necessarily an 
effect of that which governs, because otherwise a free 
being would, in any process of being identified, become 
unfree (caused)—in the act of being known, the free being 
would be not free, which is that which it is not—and 
thus, the known would be unknown.  Miss Rand rejected 
utterly the original "meaning" of Protagoras' statement 
that "Man is the measure of all things":  that "Man is the 
measure...metaphysically"   :  In opposition to the 
Protagorean notion that measurements (concepts, govern- 
ments) make the things so measured be what they are and/or 
what they are not, her position was that measurements are 
simply "outward focuses" (or identifications, or, fully 
conscious awareness) of things as they necessarily are in 
themselves.  She also rejected the Kantian opinion that 
"things-in-themselves" are essentially unknowable, and 
that in any process of understanding, the natures of the 
things understood cannot be understood because of the 
inescapable "mental categories"; for her, unlike Kant, 
concepts do not produce or alter the facts of which they 
are the identifications—for her, knowledge is truly know- 
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ledge and the known, which is truly known, necessarily is 
only that which it is and is known as such.  Given that 
some things are uncaused (free), she knew that a concept 
(government) of such uncaused things (free beings) does 
not make them caused; a concept of an action by a free 
thing does not make the action (which cannot be an effect, 
since it is by a free being) into an effect.  If things 
could not be governed without simultaneously changing them 
(making them what they are not), then "all things would 
flow" and nothing could be identified as such.  Rand 
agreed with Francis Bacon's aphorism that "Human knowledge 
and human power meet in one":  for "Nature to be commanded 
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must be obeyed"   —that governments (concepts) of things 
are not metaphysical, but epistemological actions.  Bacon 
also wrote that:  "Towards the effecting of works, all 
that man can do is to put together or put asunder natural 
-ICO 
bodies.  The rest is done by nature working within." 
Neither a conceiver nor anything else can abolish, cause 
or alter the existences of things--nor can a conceiver or 
anything else ever "add to or take away from the attri- 
butes of things"; a conceiver "is the measure of all 
things, epistemologically—not metaphysically".  Bacon 
also held, like Rand, that a human "interpreter of nature, 
can do and understand so much and only so much as he has 
observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature: 
beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do any- 
69 
thing."    There are no "governments beyond the govern- 
ments that are concepts" (no "powers beyond the only 
possible controlling actions, which are concepts", no 
"super-powers"):  Governments are the only powers (the 
only controlling, uncaused, free actions), and there are 
no "other powers"; all actions that are not governments 
are passive, caused, utterly unconscious and inefficacious 
actions.  To suppose "powers other than concepts" ("govern- 
ments other than the full conscious identifications of 
things") would be to "falsely admire and extol the powers 
of the human mind" (as Bacon put it).    To so falsely 
"extol a mind's ability" and suppose it to "go beyond mere 
identification of things that are what they are", and 
suppose it to have a "superior, transcendental kind of 
power or knowledge" would be meaningless opinion. 
Having defined Rand's views of things as such, 
and of concepts, and of motions, societies, conceivers, 
etc., it is evident that for her political governments can 
never be anything but what they are: They cannot be 
"institutions that arise spontaneously from societies, 
races, and other human associations or 'collectivities'"; 
they cannot be "actions by and belonging to cultures, 
societies and other human groups"; nor can they be "pro- 
ducts of approximate, gradual, common advances, or institu- 
tions that are phenomena of 'the Divine Idea' or of a 
'social evolutionary process1 spanning many centuries--or 
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through a cultural development brought about through 
massive selection and trial-and-error by millions, or 
through rare and 'inexplicable' intuitive insights or 
supernatural revelations, or through racial, or 
instinctual or historical 'necessity'".  Political govern- 
ments, like any other concepts, must be specific behav- 
ioral products each of which belongs to only one con- 
ceiver and is made solely by that individual conceiver 
at only one specific time and place.  Political govern- 
ments, like any other concepts, do not "evolve" or other- 
wise move; they are definite actions that are attributes 
of specific entities; they are free actions (not effects) 
but do not act (neither freely nor determinately); they 
are, like any other concepts, merely the necessary attri- 
butes of the uncaused acting things.  Political govern- 
ments are measurements of rational humans as such, and 
therefore, any measurement  of an action by a rational 
human, or of a component of a rational human, or of a 
composite that includes a rational human, cannot possibly 
be a political government; for several examples: con- 
sider that a rational human's body is one of its parts, 
so that a concept of that body cannot be said to be a 
political concept (insofar as the body is not a rational 
human as such)—and consider that a concept by a con- 
ceiver may be conceived of, but that such a concept of 
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the concept is not a political concept (insofar as the 
concept so conceived is not a conceiver).  A political 
government, like any other concept, is not also any of 
its means, nor its meaning/s, nor any of its component 
concepts (the prior concepts by the same conceiver, with 
which it is linguistically consistent) nor any concept/s 
of which it is a component;, for examples, consider that 
a means of a plumbing activity is lead, but the plumbing 
as such is not the lead as such; a concept of a gneiss 
involves a concept (by the same conceiver) of igneous 
rock, but the concept of the gneiss is not also the con- 
cept of igneous rock; a concept of a political govern- 
ment, of which the political government so identified is 
the meaning, is not also the political government; a 
political government (a concept of some rational human/s 
as such), which must involve at least one concept of a 
human as such, cannot be the same as its component con- 
cept/s of humans as such.  Political governments, like 
any other concepts, must be absolutely distinguished from 
things that are not concepts:  The universe, which is 
not a concept and which is the ultimate composite of all 
other entities, is not the same as a concept that is a 
sum of all things other than itself; similarly, a "mag- 
istrate", or politically governing entity, is not a con- 
cept that is an identification of the magistrate; nor can 
the entities that govern politically also be the concepts 
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that are polticial governments. 
Section VIII:  "Definition of Political Scientific Con- 
cepts" 
"Political scientific concepts" are concepts (or, 
"governments") of political governments (political concepts) 
A political scientific concept is simply an identification 
of at least one of the things that are political govern- 
ments.  Like any other concepts, political scientific con- 
cepts are precisely controlling measurements.  The mean- 
ings of political scientific concepts, like any other mean- 
ings, are real, tangible, perceived, governed objects. 
Therefore, it would be false to express that "Political 
governments are things that are intangible, wholly abstract 
and unreal things that can never be consciously grasped or 
scientifically measured"; it is also meaningless to 
opine that "the science of political governments is an in- 
exact, normative, 'human' science, rather than a 'cold', 
exact, objective science"; moreover, it is an absurdity to 
hold that "political states must be believed in al- 
though they cannot be seen either with naked eyes or with 
any other sense or by means of any sensory aid (such.as a 
radio telescope, by which even the subtle attributes of 
distant galaxies are revealed, or electron microscopes, 
through which even the shells of atoms have been seen)". 
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Rand held that even "love" can be measured precisely and 
scientifically—just like wavelengths of light ("colors"); 
therefore, if even love is measureable, then political 
governments are measureable.  What is real is measureable; 
there are no "unreal things"; and, everything that is 
measured is measured not "by intuition, or opinion, or 
pure deduction", but by actual, precise, scientific con- 
trol.  It is contradictory to suppose that "political 
science as a rigorous science is impossible", because in 
order for the one who pretends to know that true knowledge 
of political governments is impossible for everyone at all 
times (while continuing to hold that there really are such 
things as political governments, implying that it is truly 
known that there are such things—that the things are 
truly known), the one who so supposes must already have 
had knowledge of the sort being denied; the skeptic must 
either deny that there are any such things as political 
governments, or else remain silent, to avoid contradiction. 
If "two criteria of knowledge, one for the natural sciences 
and the other for the humanities" be claimed by some 
mystic, then it is also implied that there must be a 
"third criterion, which is a knowledge of the other know- 
ledges, a science by which the other sciences are estab- 
lished as sciences"; now, if the "natural" science is 
exact, "cold" and conceptual (whereas the "human" science 
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is inexact, "normative" and nonconceptual), then the third, 
"superior" science must be something "other than" the con- 
ceptual and the "normative" (neither identification nor 
opinion), which would be impossible if it also is identi- 
fication (conception) of the "inferior" sciences—since if 
it is identification, it cannot be "superior to identifica- 
tion and other than identification".  There are, for Rand, 
no "several modes of knowledge":  Concepts are simply con- 
cepts, so that political concepts—just like physical con- 
cepts and biological concepts—are concepts as such; and 
any science of political governments is a science as such 
(and just as exact and scientific as any other science). 
Political governments are things just like any other 
things, and are measured just as any other objects are 
measured. 
Of course, most "experts" hold that "'Scientific1 
1 f\ s political science" is but "an ambiguous term"   and that 
the "higher" knowledge of political governments (called 
"Political Philosophy") is "essentially not the possession 
of the truth, but the quest for the truth"166 (is not 
exact, "cold" knowledge of political governments, but the 
"appreciation" of them, the "admission" that "we do not 
know" what they are as such—since "the distinctive trait 
of the philosopher is that 'he knows that he knows 
nothing'"167).  Such "philosophical political scientists" 
opine that "All human societies seem to possess an inherent 
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capacity to develop systems of social control", including 
political "governments", which are systems of social con- 
trol that "have acquired a definite institutional organiza- 
1 AR 
tion and operate by means of legal mandates"   ; they 
opine that "Whenever a group...actuated by common interests 
and desires creates an organized institutional mechanism 
for the...adjustment and control of relationships, there 
169 is government"   , and that a political "Government is...a 
device for finding ways to relax tension in the political 
170 
system"   , and that "The state, as a concept... is a 
community of persons...permanently occupying a definite 
territory, independent...of external control, and possess- 
ing an organized government to which the...inhabitants 
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render habitual obedience"   —and even that "The State is 
172 the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth"   .  Political 
governments are even supposed to be "group processes", 
"communication networks", "social contracts" and "class 
rules"; still more typical suppositions are: that pol- 
tical government is a "special kind of power, which is 
'legal coercion' or simply brute force without ethical 
justification", and that a government is "an institution 
composed of both men and laws" (a "thing made up of both 
entities and attributes", which therefore would be"both 
an entity and a non-entity"), and that a political govern- 
ment is "the men themselves who are wielding 'political 
power' in a given area, the 'authorities in their relation- 
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ships to one another and to the commonalty'", and so on. 
But, even Rand failed to identify the things that are 
political governments with her expression of "political 
governments"; her apparent ideas of political govern- 
ments violate her own rules for valid ideas, and contradict 
her own fundamental, "metaphysical" and "epistemological" 
principles.  Like most other political experts, she must 
have begun by perceiving at least one other human who ex- 
pressed an apparent political scientific concept—and she 
must have proceeded to imitate, adding her own unique 
alterations.  Like many others, she implied that political 
governments are entities.  She called them "institutions" 
and imagined such components of theirs as "justice", 
."rights" and "constitutions".  Given her fundamental phi- 
losophical concepts, which are true concepts, the apparent 
political scientific concepts of most theorists must be 
judged false—but, along with them Rand's own "political 
scientific concepts" must also be identified as meaning- 
less notions. 
Most "Political philosophy has...been supposed 
to" be knowledge of "a particular entity called 'the 
state1", yet "in fact political philosophers have always 
concerned themselves with" such imagined things as the "col- 
173 lectivity as a whole"   ; and whereas "Problems of defini- 
tion. . .might appear to be prior to..-prescription in poli- 
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tical philosophy", yet since "ethical doctrine has always 
had a powerful effect on the view which a political thinker 
takes...he has tended to see it in terms of what he thinks 
it ought to be"174.  It is also true that "A distinctive 
characteristic of political philosophizing is that it has 
usually been undertaken in response to some particular 
political...threat" which "has led to a .raggedness, even 
175 incoherence...and emphasis on intuitive agrument".     Now, 
it is apparent that Ayn Rand's "political scientific con- 
cepts" are also responses to threats; they are to be con- 
sidered reflex motions, effects rather than concepts. 
They are "not acts of defining, but of wiping out"; she 
followed the course she had once denounced (when she had 
written:  "Don't bother to examine a folly—ask yourself 
1 7fi 
only what it accomplishes"   ), for she never identified 
what the apparent political scientific concepts of those 
she encountered are—but simply "used" them. It was she 
who had described "the anti-conceptual mentality" (irra- 
tionality) of someone who "may profess some intellectual 
convictions" but when asked "what he means by a given 
177 idea...will not be able to answer"   ; yet, she failed to 
demonstrate what she meant (supposing that she meant some- 
thing) by her "concepts of political governments".  If she 
did not demonstrate, then she did not identify any poli- 
tical governments; therefore, she did not have any poli- 
tical scientific concepts. 
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It is possible that she did not have any true 
political concepts either; it is also possible that she 
did have some true political concepts.  But it is certain, 
given this analysis, that she could not distinguish between 
concepts that are political governments (political con- 
cepts) and the concepts that are political scientific con- 
cepts; she could not divide them clearly, because she did 
not have any political scientific concepts (and no one can 
understand ideas that one does not actually possess). 
Instead, she appeared to distinguish them:  she opposed 
"abstract political theorizing" to "practical, immediate 
political decision-making", but without any essential 
differences—without any definite "line of demarcation" 
between them.  She opined that the former is "more theo- 
retical and less practical, less concerned with details 
and implementation", and that the latter is "less theoret- 
ical and more practical, entirely a matter of details and 
implementation"; the former she named "Politics" (and also 
called it "political philosophy", or, "political theory", 
and sometimes, "social theory"); the latter was "political 
science" (or "philosophy of law", or, "legislation").  Her 
"political philosophy" she claimed to be "the study of 
principles governing the proper organization of soci- 
178 
ety"   ; she supposed that "it is based on ethics, the 
study of values", and that "both ethics and politics, 
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necessarily, have been branches of philosophy from its 
179 birth"   .  She elaborated that the "branch of philosophy" 
called "Politics" (the "political philosophy"-type of 
Randian political concepts) are "a philosophical discip- 
line", and "Politics is based on three other philosophical 
disciplines:  metaphysics, epistemology and ethics", for 
"It is only on such a base that one can formulate a con- 
1 80 
sistent political theory and achieve it in practice". 
The remainder of her "political scientific concepts" (the 
"philosophy of law"-type of Randian political scientific 
concepts) she considered to be mere "practical application" 
or "implementation" of her "consistent Politics" (of the 
"political philosophy"-type Randian political scientific 
concepts).  Thus, she held that "It is political philosophy 
that sets the goals and determines the course of a coun- 
1 R1 
try's practical politics".    For one instance of this 
"distinction":  she wrote that "The nature of...foreign 
policy is a proper concern of philosophy" (of her "Poli- 
tics"), but ."the strategy of...military operations is not" 
—"the goal of the war in Vietnam is a proper concern of 
philosophy", but "the practice...of bombing" is a "prac- 
1 R7 
tical political" matter.    This supposed distinction 
must be judged meaningless and inconsistent with her 
fundamental philosophical views.  She did not discriminate 
between political and political scientific concepts be- 
cause, evidently, she had none of the latter; so, she 
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offered a new distinction between "abstract" and "practi- 
cal" political principles. Logically speaking, there can 
be no such distinction. 
She was also wrong in her claim that her concepts 
of political governments were not her "primary interest" 
but only "the consequence" of her "fundamental philosophi- 
1 R*\ 
cal principles"   —for she had arrived at her "political 
scientific concepts" first, and only later had she "under- 
girded" them with a "philosophical foundation".  Now, that 
which is the logically prior must necessarily also be the 
temporally prior:  if it is held that political and poli- 
tical scientific concepts really do "depend on" (involve, 
or, are composed of) prior metaphysical and epistemological 
concepts, then the political and political scientific con- 
cepts by any conceiver must necessarily be subsequent to, 
and cannot be temporally prior to, that conceiver's meta- 
physical and epistemological concepts (for if it were 
otherwise, then what the supposed "conceiver" would have 
are not political and political scientific concepts, but 
meaningless notions).  She was also wrong to hold that 
linguistically prior (logically prior) concepts can "pro- 
vide" (or "necessitate", or create) subsequent concepts: 
she believed that her "politics is only a consequence of 
1 8& philosophy"    (it is wrong; because political and poli- 
tical scientific concepts cannot be "consequences" and 
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"results" (or products) of any prior concepts).  Concepts 
do not conceive concepts; therefore, if a given conceiver 
has a given concept it does not follow that the concept 
must "result in" a subsequent concept.  What is necessary 
is that if someone has a concept that is logically subse- 
quent to some other concept, then that conceiver must al- 
ready have conceived the logically prior concept:  For 
example, if someone has some true political scientific 
concepts, then that conceiver must have some true politi- 
cal concepts—and since that conceiver has true political 
and political scientific concepts, it must also have some 
true epistemological and metaphysical concepts.  But the 
Randian revision of "logical necessity" appears to be that 
"ideas give birth of themselves to logically subsequent 
ideas (epistemology 'resulting in' politics, for in- 
stance)"; yet, in truth, only entities can act so as to 
give birth to other things—and only entities can have 
ideas (for ideas are attributes, and they are not, nor are 
there any, "super-entities"). 
She supposed that concepts really can act, and 
held that political and political scientific concepts can 
truly govern.  She advocated "a government of laws and not 
of men".  Through the vague, intermediary stages of "phi- 
losophy of law" (or "legislation") she saw her "Political 
Philosophy" (or "Politics") as causing the entities that 
are political governments to exist.  Any "government offi- 
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cials", she opined, although they may otherwise be free, 
rational beings, must become "mere robots" in the hands of 
the ruling ideas that create, direct and sustain the poli- 
tical governments.  Now, she knew that a concept cannot 
also be its meaning/s:  she knew that a concept of a chair 
and the chair of which the concept is an identification 
cannot be the same thing (nor can they "become the same, 
become united" in the "process of conceptualization"), and 
she knew that the concept does not produce the chair (nor 
the chair produce the concept); yet she opined that con- 
cepts of political governments really can produce their 
own meanings—or else, that concepts of political govern- 
ments are the same as (or "unite with") political govern- 
ments.  She supposed that "ideas in the man-made realm of 
political government" both govern humans and are identi- 
fications and creators of themselves; this supposition 
must be judged false, even by her own metaphysical prin- 
ciples that things are only what they are and that ideas 
do not act, and by her own epistemological distinction 
between ideas and their meanings (for she must have known 
that no concepts can also be things that act, and that no 
concepts—not even political and political scientific con- 
cepts—can also be their meanings). 
She attempted to resolve the inconsistencies of 
her pseudo-distinction of "abstract" versus "practical" 
concepts of political governments, by dividing conceivers 
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of concepts of political governments into "abstract think- 
ers" and "practical, implementative thinkers":  she dis- 
tinguished (1) political philosophers, and (2) political 
scientists (or, "legislators").  A philosopher she imag- 
ined to be a "commander-in-chief" of a "culture", whereas 
18 5 
a scientist is a "lieutenant-commander-in-chief".     Her 
"political philosophers" are the only things that can dis- 
cover or create "the broad outlines" of "the principles 
governing the proper organization of society"—so that 
their lieutenants (the various "legal philosophers") can 
only accomplish the mundane, "practical details" of the 
visions of the political philosophers.  Thus, for Rand, a 
political philosopher "saw" the ideas that are really 
governing (saw the "principles governing the organizing of 
society"), and because of this "sight", the lieutenants— 
such as judges, police and soldiers—automatically govern, 
acting as robots.  But she did not tell whether the phi- 
losophers (the thinkers "at the top of the intellectual 
ladder") simply create the meanings of their concepts "out 
of nothing" in the act of conceiving—or whether they 
actually perceived the things that are political govern- 
ments before identifying them.  She did not tell how a 
thing could be identified if it was not existing until 
after being identified, nor why (if she believed that 
political governments exist before being identified) it is 
that only political philosophers can perceive and identify 
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them.  It is absurd, of course, for her to suppose that 
things that do not exist until after being conceived of 
can be conceived of; it is impossible for a concept to 
"create its own meaning/s" or otherwise act (since a con- 
cept is an action).  It would also be absurd for her to 
think that only political philosophers, and no other con- 
ceivers, could perceive and identify political govern- 
ments—for if the "lieutenants" really implement the ideas 
of the commanders, then they must have learned from the 
commanders (they must have identified the commanders' con- 
cepts) and in the process of learning, re-identified the 
political governments that are the meanings of their 
commanders' concepts.  A re-identification, like any other 
concept, involves at least one perception of the thing/s 
being so identified by the conceiver that so identifies. 
Thus, in truth, concepts of political governments must be 
possible for not only original conceivers of political 
governments, but also for any "implementors" of the con- 
cepts. 
Rand was wrong to warn that should any "would- 
be" philosopher of law "attempt to rush into politics" 
without the "guidance" of any political philosopher "the 
result is...impotence, futility, inconsistency and super- 
ficiality"  D; she was wrong, because a political phi- 
losopher (before becoming such, before having any concept 
of political concepts) must first have been a legal phi- 
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losopher (having at least one political concept).  Every 
conceiver that has any concepts of political governments 
must have "rushed into" conceiving some political govern- 
ments before conceiving of them.  If there are no things 
that are political governments, then there cannot be any 
concepts of political governments—and if there are any 
concepts that are political governments, then any concepts 
of political governments must be subsequent to them. 
Political scientific concepts (ideas of political con- 
cepts) are not both identifications of the things that are 
political governments and also the political governments 
so identified (just as it would be absurd to hold that a 
concept of concepts as such is both an identification of 
concepts as such and the creation of concepts as such, for 
if it were the creation then concepts did not exist before 
it and nothing could have been identified).  The Randian 
opinion is similar to a view that "Ideas of trees are both 
the identifications of, and the creations of trees them- 
selves—that ideas of trees must be 'abstract' first, 
followed by the ideas that are 'practical, detailed' 
specific trees—so that specific trees cannot be 'rushed 
into1 without the 'guidance' of those who are uniquely 
able to create 'tree philosophy'"; to imagine that ideas 
are of, and yet also make, and even become, their mean- 
ings, is absurd; to distinguish such absurd ideas into 
"those that are of, and make their meanings" (the "ab- 
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stract, primary" ones), and "those that are of, and become 
their meanings" (the "practical, detailed" ones), is also 
absurdity.  Ideas of trees that are true ideas of trees 
are only identifications of the other, distinct things 
that are trees; ideas of ideas of trees are the ideas that 
are "uses of trees as means"; but neither ideas of trees 
nor ideas of ideas of trees "bring trees into existence"— 
for the trees themselves (which exist as themselves by 
themselves) are presupposed by all of them.  It would be 
an absurd superfluity to divide ideas of trees into "de- 
tailed" and "abstract", or "impractical" and "practical" 
ideas of trees; all ideas are abstractions, all are as 
"detailed" as their numbers of objects, and none are "im- 
practical, purely theoretical, cerebral, divorced from 
reality"—for all are fully conscious awarenesses of facts 
of reality, precisely controlling scientific measurements, 
actual governments of their meanings.  Rand reversed her 
original view that identifications of things must follow 
the things so identified; she contradicted her own meta- 
physical and epistemological concepts, when she supposed 
political governments and knowledge of them to be "a moral 
issue":  She relegated their identification and creation 
(and basic direction) to a few elites who are uniquely 
able to imagine "things that ought to be"—she supposed 
that those "possessing the virtue of rational selfishness" 
and the "ability to think philosophically" are the only 
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ones capable of insight into the transcendental "world of 
Values"—the only ones, therefore, who can "provide the 
intellectual guidance" necessary to "create a political 
government" (and maintain it, explain it, etc.).  Yet, 
in truth, any "knowledge of things that ought to be" is 
simply a meaningless notion (a pseudo-concept, not know- 
ledge at all).  Real political scientific concepts (true 
knowledge of political governments) have to be, like any 
other concepts, awarenesses not of "things that are not, 
but should be" but of things that are. 
It has been written that "Politics is the master 
science, in the Aristotelian sense of the term, as much 
today as it was in classical Greece more than two thousand 
187 years ago"   , and that "The most important events in the 
lives of individuals and of communities, whatever their 
scope or location, are all shaped more by politics than by 
anything else, even so-called acts of nature or of God, 
-too 
such as earthquakes or epidemics"   .  Aristotle supposed 
that his "Politics" (or "political science", or, "science 
of state-craft") is concerned with "the Supreme Good", 
which "Good is the same for the individual and for the 
state" (though "the good of the state is manifestly a 
189 greater and more perfect good"). °7  (For him, political 
knowledge is a matter of "knowing that which ought to be", 
and he restricts such evaluative knowledge to a very few 
elites who are aged and "guide their desires and actions 
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190 by principle".   )  Since no one can actually perceive or 
measure or demonstrate "the Good", and "uncertainty sur- 
191 
rounds the conception of the Good"   , therefore political 
scientific "conceptions involve much difference of opinion 
and uncertainty" and even appear "to be mere conventions 
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and to have no real existence in the nature of things"   ; 
it would be "unreasonable", Aristotle thought, having 
started "from premises thus uncertain", to "demand strict 
demonstration" rather than "mere generalities".  Yet he 
considered so "inexact" a "science" to be "the most author- 
itative of the sciences...science which is pre-eminently a 
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master-craft"   ; he emphasized that "the science of 
Politics...ordains which of the sciences are to exist in 
states, and what branches of knowledge the different 
classes of the citizens are to learn, and up to what 
point; and...even the most highly esteemed of the faculties 
...are subordinate to the political science" so that all 
"the rest of the sciences are employed by this one, and... 
it lays down...what people shall do and what...they shall 
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refrain from doing"   .  Professor Carl Friedrich (at 
Harvard) wrote:  "Aristotle's philosophy has probably 
exercised a deeper influence upon the Western mind than 
any other source except...Christianity.  Nowhere has this 
influence been more all-pervading than in the field of 
politics.  Monarchists and Republicans, aristocrats and 
democrats, idealists and realists—all have drawn upon the 
89 
195 philosopher for inspiration and authority."    He ex- 
plained that:  "The state, modelled upon the Greek concept 
of the polis, was deified as the concrete embodiment of 
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all value as represented by man's culture"   , for "the 
concept of the state crystallized in Aristotelian terms 
after the Renaissance and the growth of Humanism" and "re- 
ceived its final apotheosis in Hegel and the Hegelians who 
have inspired both conservative and radical thinking 
197 throughout the West during the last hundred years" 
The Randian "political scientific concepts" are the same 
sort of intonations; she believed like virtually all other 
"experts" that political governments are "moral" (or 
"evaluative", or, "Ethical") matters.  In the typical 
Greek versions:  "The...Olympus with its many gods had 
permitted each polis to share in the deity through a 
special local favorite, such as Athens' Athene.  Govern- 
mental offices were closely related to priestly ones, and 
in many cases overlapped.  Thus the polis was really a 
church as well as a 'state', and the two were so closely 
intermingled that a man's religious as well as... .political 
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allegiance was bound up in such a polity."    The notions 
of political governments as entities, and of political 
scientific knowledge as "evaluative" (as intuitive grasp- 
ing of things that are indemonstrable, but which "ought to 
be"), are to be equated with mystical notions of churches 
and "the gods"; for Rand to hold such notions (and she 
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does) is clearly contradictive of her fundamental phi- 
losophical principles.  All common political ideologies 
are "religious", not scientific; "nationalism", for 
example, "has, in recent times, come to take the place of 
the Christian religion...is a substitute for religion and 
has contributed considerably to a reappearance of the kind 
of tribal allegiance which animated the Mediterranean 
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world in the days of the Greek city 'state'".    The most 
popular cinematic productions (all released from Holly- 
wood in the last decade) have involved theistic expressions 
of "The Force", and are no less fantastic than the most 
popular "political scientific" works and their noncon- 
ceptual expressions of "Political Power".  In primitive 
tribal Shamanisms and in classical polytheisms, supposi- 
tions that "people are interrelated and interdependent as 
they participate in the supernatural, unknowable 'Powers', 
and as such 'power' is compresent with them" are identi- 
fied; likewise, contemporary political experts are "hallow- 
ing... power"   , and attempting to "predict future social 
and political trends" and succeed in the "power struggle" 
(attempting to "identify" with or become the ascendent 
leaders and bosses who have the "know-how" to acquire and 
distribute power).  Rand identified the "materialistic 
mysticism" of contemporary political theorists, as being 
an attitude that "there isn't such a thing as a...mind" 
91 
but "only your body" (that "you're not a man, but a col- 
lection of atoms") which must be given "For the good of 
the whole, and...to the state, and whoever says it, is or 
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wants to be the state".     Yet, she accepted the mystical 
notions of "States" and "political power", in full viola- 
tion of her knowledge.  She expressed no meaningful poli- 
tical scientific concepts, and it was necessary, since she 
never identified any of the things that are political 
governments, that she could not distinguish between politi- 
cal governments and concepts of political governments 
(between political concepts and concepts of political 
concepts). 
Section IX:  "Definition of This Analysis as a Refutation, 
and as an Objective Relationship" 
The Randian political scientific concepts cannot 
be other than meaningless notions, according to this 
analysis.  (But it is possible that she had some true 
political concepts, because political scientific concepts 
presuppose political concepts and she had no political 
scientific concepts, so that nothing can be assumed about 
the prior, political concepts—about whether there ever 
were any.)  To know whether Rand had any political con- 
cepts would require an examination of every apparent poli- 
tical concept of hers to determine whether any or all of 
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them are identifications of any rational human/s; but this 
analysis is not that task.—it is not an examination of her 
apparent political concepts, but an examination of her 
apparent political scientific concepts.  This thesis, to 
put it simply, is an answer to the question:  "What, if 
anything, did Ayn Rand mean by her expressions of political 
government?".  If the thesis had been, instead, an examina- 
tion of Rand's apparent political concepts, and even if it 
had been shown that she had some true political concepts, 
it would not be a proof that she also had some true poli- 
tical scientific concepts (some true knowledge of political 
governments) since the latter are logically subsequent 
ideas.  Political concepts are "axioms" of political 
science:  Rand wrote that "An axiom is a statement that" 
is a "base of knowledge and of any further statement per- 
taining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily con- 
202 tained in all others".     If it were proven in this 
analysis that she had even one true concept of political 
governments, then it would be "axiomatic" that she had at 
least one true political concept.  Therefore, this thesis 
may be considered the primary task (and any task of exa- 
mining her apparent political concepts as secondary).  Now, 
since Randian "political scientific concepts" are identi- 
fied as meaningless notions (as being neither concepts of 
political concepts, nor concepts of anything else), the 
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second task must be carried out by anyone desiring to know 
whether she had some political concepts.  Also, since the 
Randian political scientific concepts are identified as 
meaningless notions, this thesis is to be considered a 
"refutation".  A refutation is not "an emotional, ideo- 
logical, or semantic dispute", but a dispassionate, fully 
demonstrative, scientific analysis—a meaningful (identi- 
ficatory) judgement of some human's apparent concept/s. 
Rand held that one must "treat all men as...you treat 
inanimate objects, with the same respect for truth, by... 
203 a process of identification".     This thesis is no "mere 
semantic argument, consisting of peculiar, absolutistic 
definitions applied so inflexibly as to disallow any sub- 
realities, evolutionary processes and anomalous facts"; 
since this work is meaningful, its words and phrases may 
be translated into other words and phrases—while its 
referents remain unchanged.  Rand held similarly that all 
"facts established by measurement will be the same, regard- 
less of the particular standard used"   ; it is certain 
that, regardless of the particular words and phrases she 
used, if her apparent political scientific concepts were 
identifications of some fact/s, then they would have to be 
judged (in this thesis) as meaningful regardless of the 
language of this judgement. 
"Subjectivists" are those who suppose that 
"wishes, whims and words can alter facts and control 
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reality"; hence, they appear either to resist independent 
thinking (and "peculiar new definitions") or else, to 
advocate "radical, nonconformist thinking" (either to wel- 
come or to resist "the changing of reality through the 
development of new 'paradigms' of thought—new 'categories 
of perception' and new logics and languages").  But Rand's 
"Objectivity" is "the recognition" of facts—that they are 
what they are regardless of words used—that every recogni- 
tion requires language—and that words cannot "cause a 
loss of objectivity").  She held that in regard to any 
issue (even any political issue) "only one answer is true, 
205 the truth"   regardless of its words or phrases of identi- 
fication.  If things are identified, no matter how they 
are identified, they are identified—and whether or not 
they are identified, they remain being what they are. 
Such "objectivity", Rand knew "is the only common bond 
among men, the only means of communication, the only 
not 
universal frame of reference and criterion of justice". 
A true, objective analysis is a demonstration of its 
meaning/s, and involves at least one demonstrated standard. 
It involves its own proofs; and proofs are not "persuasive 
rhetoric, compelling uses of language" but demonstrations 
of irrefutable facts.  The foregoing contents of this 
thesis are mostly demonstrations of the main standard (a 
concept of meaningless notions) and other standards of 
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measurement.  The following parts are mostly demonstrations 
of the various Randian political scientific concepts, 
which are the subjects being measured (or, the meanings of 
the analysis).  For Rand, a true measurement is a "rela- 
tionship" of some clearly defined standard/s to at least 
one perceived subject.  This thesis may be considered such 
a relationship.  Other "relationships", such as "political 
power" (for that "power" is "a human relationship has... 
always been accepted as axiomatic by political think- 
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ers"   ) or "love relationships" (such as "family ties"), 
are figments of irrational imagination.  Such false "rela- 
tionships" are supposed to be "common attributes shared in 
by the interrelated things, or super-attributes or super- 
entities that make the grouped entities have their indivi- 
dual attributes, or even 'processes1 in which the inter- 
related things 'evolve together1".  Now, every concept 
except the first concept (the concept of "things as such") 
by any conceiver must involve at least one prior concept 
by the same conceiver, and is therefore a relationship to 
at least one demonstrated standard (to at least one prior 
concept's expression); all true concepts except "first 
possible concepts" (concepts of things as such) necessarily 
are relationships.  Political and political scientific 
concepts must be relationships.  Political scientific con- 
cepts, being concepts of political concepts (and since 
political concepts are relationships), must be relation- 
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ships.  The subjects of this analysis, insofar as they 
have been refuted (identified as meaningless "concepts", 
as not concepts), are not relationships; but this thesis 
itself is a relationship of the Randian political scien- 
tific concepts to several standards—the essential one of 
which is, of course, the prior definition of "meaningless 
concepts".  The main standard is the essential expression 
of the subjects, and the other standards are the "dif- 
ferentia" . 
PART C:  "THE ESSENTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE RANDIAN POLITICAL 
SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS" 
We think that in the wisdom of women the Golden 
One had understood more than we can understand. 
Anthem. 
Section I:  "Refutation of Her Notions of Political Govern- 
ments as the Things Exclusively Retaliating in 
Their Respective Locations" 
Rand "defined" a political government as "an 
institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce cer- 
tain rules of social conduct in a given geographical 
208 
area".     But such a "definition" is meaningless, because; 
(1) an institution, if it is anything but a meaningless 
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notion, must be a concept (and any true expression "insti- 
tution" must refer to a concept, not to any action that is 
not a concept, nor to any entity nor any existence); (2) 
an institution as an attribute (for every concept is an 
attribute—and even if every expression "institution" were 
meaningless and referring to nothing, such would be an 
attribute) cannot hold something or have any other 
actions; (3) since a "power", if it is a meaningful expres- 
sion, must refer to a conceptual action (to a government) 
and every action is an attribute and cannot be "held" or 
otherwise move; (4) since a society is a sum it cannot act 
(cannot "have conduct"); (5) since rules (if not identi- 
fied as meaningless notions) must be concepts that are 
axioms, they cannot "be enforced" or otherwise move; 
and every power is an action solely by—and belonging only 
to—the individual mover which so conceives, and powers 
cannot be distinguished as "shared" or "exclusive" (since . 
there are no "shared powers", and "exclusive powers" is a 
redundancy).  It is true that every political government 
is an institution (if by "institution" is meant "concept") 
—institution would be the true essential standard; but, 
the differentia of Rand's "definition" are false:  a 
political concept is not one that acts so as to "hold 
power"—a political concept is not "retaliating" or having 
any other action—since concepts do not act.  She elabo- 
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rated that a political government "holds a legal monopoly 
209 on the retaliatory use of...force"   ; in its respective, 
wide "geographic area", a political government is exclu- 
sively retaliating:  "Only a government holds that kind of 
210 power"   .  She also called political governments "social 
organizations" (or "social powers") as well as "institu- 
tions".  Her disciple Harry Binswanger has explained that 
"Once...a government, or anything approaching it, has been 
established, there is no such thing as a 'right' to 'com- 
211 pete1 with the government"   in its "retaliatory func- 
tion"; political governments actually (or at least "legal- 
ly") have "retaliatory power" (or, "political power") all 
to themselves in their respective, mutually exclusive 
locations.  None of the foregoing "explanations" makes 
sense,•however.  Political theorists who are not Objecti- 
vists have similar "explanations":  "An institution is a 
pattern composed of culture traits specialized to the 
shaping and distribution of a particular value (or set of 
values)" and the "culture of a group is the totality of 
212 its culture traits"   , so that if a political government 
were an institution exclusively retaliating in its own 
area, then it would be a "pattern of traits" that is act- 
ing.  (Rand herself never offered a definition of her 
term "institution".)  "Power" is defined by some non- 
Objectivists as "participation in the making of decisions" 
such that "G has power over H with respect to values K if 
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G participates in the making of decision affecting the K- 
213 policies of H"   and a "decision is a policy involving 
severe sanctions"   —so that if a political government 
is a "social power that holds the power of physical 
coercion in its area", then it would be a "participation" 
that is acting so as to hold a "participation".  That 
"power" is "a human relationship" has been accepted by 
political scientific authorities as diverse as Locke, 
and Hobbes, Spinoza, Hegel and the original Utilitarians 
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and their "liberal" descendants.    Thus, since Rand 
never defined "power", her "political governments" must be 
things holding "a human relationship" all to themselves. 
But every relationship is an attribute, belonging to one 
entity; a relationship cannot be "shared", nor "stolen or 
fought over", and "exclusively-held attribute" is a re- 
dundancy.  Rand had also considered political governments 
to be "social organizations holding monopolies on force in 
their areas"; since she did not define "social organiza- 
tion", it is helpful to cite those who wrote that "Endur- 
ing common objectives engender organization" and "stable 
power is...based on organization and the control of 
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organization"   , and that "The social order is the 
217 pattern of mores and countermores institutions" 
Apparently, then, again a pattern holds a pattern; beneath 
the patterns that are retaliations (or political powers, 
or "forces") are the patterns that are political govern- 
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merits (the "institutions" or "social organizations" or 
"social powers or orders" on which stable power is imme- 
diately "based" and which "hold" the retaliatory powers) 
—and beneath the patterns that are political governments 
are other, super-patterns (which are "controls of social 
organization"):  The "enduring common objectives" (the 
"Values", which are reducible to the "Supreme Good of the 
State" in which all the greatest goods for the group mem- 
bers inhere).  But, in truth, patterns and organizations 
(if they anything other than meaningless notions) must be 
concepts; any patterns and organizations that are not con- 
cepts must nevertheless be attributes of some sort—so 
that, it is certain that they cannot act (they cannot 
"control" anything nor "hold" things).  Thus the Randian 
political scientific concept of things exclusively retal- 
iating in their respective locations must be refuted (it 
must be identified as a meaningless "concept", for it is 
neither an identification of any of the things that are 
political governments—is not a political scientific con- 
cept—nor an identification of anything else—is not a 
concept at all); it is not an identification of anything. 
It is, rather, an imitation of other/s' opinions of 
political governments (a reaction to some other human/s 
who apparently knew what political governments are). 
Section II:  "Refutation of Her Notions of Political 
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Governments as Retaliations" 
Rand wrote that "The difference between political 
power and any other kind of 'social1 power, between a 
government and any" other "organizations is that a govern- 
ment holds a legal monopoly on the use of physical 
.1.219 
218 force"   , and that only a political government ("only 
political power") "is the power of physical coercion' 
She elaborated that a political government is "the power 
to force obedience under threat of physical injury—the 
threat of property expropriation, imprisonment, or 
220 death"   , and that such a "power" has "only three func- 
tions":  "The proper functions of a government are:  the 
221 police...the military...and the law courts"   , which are 
essentially:  (1) "to protect men from criminals", (2) 
"to protect...from foreign invaders", and (3) "to protect 
men's property from breach by force or fraud, and to 
settle disputes among men according to objectively defined 
222 laws"   .  But she contradicted herself when she added 
that a political government "is only a policeman, acting 
223 
as an agent of...self-defense"   because a policeman is 
an entity and a power is an action, an entity cannot be 
an action, and a political government cannot be both an 
entity (a policeman, acting as something) and an action (a 
power of forcing obedience under a threat).  She also was 
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inconsistent in her notion that political governments as 
powers can have "functions" (that powers, which are attri- 
butes, can possess other attributes such as "functions"; 
then, too, she was wrong in her equation of police and 
soldiers (which must be entities) with functions (which 
necessarily are attributes).  She could have said that a 
"retaliatory action" can be either an action against a 
criminal, or a foreign soldier, or else, an action against 
an individual who has defrauded another", rather than 
imagining that the latter actions "belong to" retaliatory 
actions.  Yet, "to settle disputes according to objectively 
defined laws" implies that laws are presupposed by this 
"function" or manner of retaliation—and that laws are not 
political governments.  In truth, political governments 
are the only laws for rational humans; every law for 
rationals is a political government—so that political 
governments are not what they are "according to" or be- 
cause of laws, nor do they "use" laws, because they are 
the laws.  They do not "hold power/s", since they are 
powers.  They do neither govern nor judge, for they are 
judgements (governments).  Now, Binswanger explained 
Rand's position that:  "A proper government is restricted 
to the protection of individual rights against violation 
by force or the threat of force.  A proper government 
functions according to objective, philosophically vali- 
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dated procedures, as embodied in its entire legal frame- 
work, from its Constitution down to its narrowest rules 
224 
and ordinances".     (He told me personally that when full 
"Capitalism comes, the only thing left to vote on would be 
225 the color of the policemen's uniforms".   )  But if a 
government (political government, of course) is a retalia- 
tion, it cannot be "restricted to retaliating" (inasmuch 
as a retaliation cannot even be retaliating, and certainly 
cannot have other activities other than retaliations); it 
is true that a political government is based on a "con- 
ceptual framework"—on all logically and temporally prior 
concepts by its conceiver—and it is true that such con- 
cepts (indeed, that all concepts) must be "embodied"— 
expressed in concrete, perceivable forms; but, if the 
"Constitution of the United States" be meant by the 
Objectivist as an expression on which any political govern- 
ment is based, then he is wrong.  Even if it were proven 
to be a truly meaningful expression, that "Constitution" 
could only be a standard for one conceiver's political 
concepts (for that conceiver whose attribute it is, suppos- 
ing that it belongs to a conceiver).  (Perhaps it is a 
composite of several individuals' expressions—being made 
up of both meaningful and meaningless expressions; but 
whether or rot this is the case, the foregoing objection 
stands.)  Dr. Binswanger went on to oppose the libertarian 
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"theorists of competing protection agencies ('competing 
governments')" who "damn governmental retaliation because 
9 9 fc\ it is objective"   .  But he added that "The government 
has to regard...private force as a threat...as a potential 
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violation of individual rights".    He distinguished 
falsely between retaliations (powers, or forces) by 
governments and retaliations by humans (private forces), 
as if it were true that governments could act (and more- 
over, as though governments could think and perceive and 
"regard private actions as threats"); to imagine that 
thoughts such as political governments can do things is 
not objective but subjective.  If libertarians suppose 
that notions of "a political State as an acting entity" 
are objective, it is simply because they do not know what 
objectivity means.  Regardless of any further "explana- 
tions", the Randian political scientific concept of retal- 
iations (the Randian notion of political governments as 
retaliations) must be refuted. 
Section III:  "Refutation of Her Notions of Political 
Governments as Entities to Which Things May 
be Delegated" 
She often emphasized a "principle of...delegat- 
228 ing to the government"   , as if political governments 
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were entities (for entities are the only things to which 
existences belong—the only things possessing locations— 
the only things to which other things may be delegated, 
to which other things may move); only entities can be 
"delegated" or otherwise move, and only entities are things 
to which other things may be delegated or otherwise move. 
If political governments were "forces" or "patterns" or 
"retaliations", then they are attributes and cannot 
also be entities (to which things may be delegated).  Rand 
was also inconsistent in that she had held "It is right 
for a man to think" and that "A man's ideas...are ex- 
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clusively his...and cannot be delegated"   , but also 
insisted that every human's "Right" (every human's essen- 
tial action, which is its thinking if it is a conceiver) 
must always be delegated to "The Government".  She held 
that political governments are things to which all rights 
necessarily are delegated, and she considered political 
governments to be "organizations"—yet she wrote that 
"No...organization has the right to take an ideological 
stand" (that no organization, not even a political govern- 
ment, can have any right which is an essential human 
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action).     So she imagined that free actions (conceptu- 
alisations) must be moved to governments but that they 
cannot be acquired by the entities to which they are moved 
(that the governments cannot acquire the actions delegated 
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to them); it is trebly contradictory: not only contra- 
dictory in that if they are moved to the others' locations 
they cannot not be moved there, and not only because 
actions cannot move, but also because if conceivers' 
rights—their free actions—were delegated away from 
them, they would not be free beings and the delegated 
actions would not be their attributes.  Her notion there- 
fore is refuted. 
Section IV:  "Refutation of Her Notions of Political 
Governments as Means" 
Rand supposed that political governments must be 
"means" rather than "ends", that "Man is an end in him- 
self", and that any political state is "but a servant and 
a convenience for a large number of people, just like the 
231 plumbing system".     She asked (rhetorically):  "And 
wouldn't it be preposterous to claim that men must exist 
232 for their plumbing, and not the plumbing for...men" 
She emphasized that "forcible restraint...is the only 
233 
service a government has to offer".     But this "defini- 
tion" of hers is improper because it does not contain the 
essence, and it is false because the differential standard 
is wrong:  Her notion implies that political governments 
necessarily are means; but, in reality, political govern- 
ments need not be means (so that, some are means, but 
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others are not means), and every political government must 
be not a means before it can be a means.  Her expression 
of "an end in himself", .if it means anything at all, must 
mean that a conceiver is a free, uncaused mover (a self- 
moving entity); but to "define" political governments as 
things that are not free movers (things that are not 
"ends in themselves") would not be proper.  (One might as 
well attempt to define a political government as "that 
which is not the ultimate composite entity-—that which is 
not the universe", for there are nearly as many things 
that are not ends-in-themselves and not political govern- 
ments as there are things that are not the universe and 
not political governments.)  Her supposition that a politi- 
cal government, as a means, must be a "servant or agent", 
is also incorrect.  Any thing, or at least any entity, 
may be a means (may be a meaning of a concept by a con- 
ceiver that is prior to at least one other concept by that 
conceiver—so that the meaning of the prior concept must 
be "used" in the subsequent concept); but not every thing 
is an agent (acting entity).  Since she had already con- 
sidered political governments to be "institutions", 
"powers", and other attributes, she could not consistently 
have held them to be agents or servants too (she could 
not have also held them to be movers).  Therefore, her 
"concept" of political governments as means is refuted. 
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Before any political concept can ever be employed as a 
means in a process of conceiving of something else, it 
must have been created, and when it was created, it was 
not a means.  There are no supernatural "Ends" for which 
things like political governments "come into being"; 
political governments are not "teleological matters" nor 
are there any other telic things.  Nothing is necessarily 
a means, since nothing "ought to be known" (free, rational 
beings do not ."have to think of" anything) and, therefore, 
nothing "has to be used".  To imagine that concepts are 
created "to serve goals" (with "their purposes or func- 
tions already in mind") is to suppose that they were con- 
ceived of before they were conceived of—that the concepts 
so "employed" were already existing while the goals for 
which they were to be created were being imagined.  Rand's 
"definition" of political governments as "Means" must be 
identified as just another theistic (religious, or mysti- 
cal) intonation—just another version of belief in a 
supernatural Fate (or ultimate "Telos") in which all 
things are "grounded" or "inherent".  In such notions, she 
agreed with the very "Heraclitean-Platonic-Hegelian" 
theorists she apparently so deeply despised. 
Section V:  "Refutation of Her Notions of Political Govern- 
ments as Things Having Authorities, as Things 
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Belonging to or Composed of Laws, and as 
Things Having Purposes" 
She wrote of "the government's authority"   , as 
if political governments can be entities haying author- 
ities.  But political governments, as attributes, cannot 
be things to which other things belong.  Nor can they be- 
long to things that are not entities:  Rand imagined "a 
government of-laws and not of men", as though laws (which 
are concepts, and thus, attributes) can also be entities 
(things to which attributes such as political governments 
belong).  Even if her phrase were interpreted as "a 
political government composed of laws, rather than com- 
posed of men", it would not be an essential definition of 
any political government—for if by "laws" are meant 
axioms (axiomatic concepts) then there must be many con- 
cepts that are composed of (that involve) laws but which 
are not political governments.  (Every concept except the 
first concept by any conceiver must be composed of at 
least one such "law", so that political governments are 
not the only concepts so composed.)  If her expression 
were meant to differentiate political governments as 
things not composed of men, it would still be false: 
attributes can never be composed of any entities such as 
men, and to identify some attributes (political govern- 
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merits) as being not composed of men is an implication that 
some attributes may be composed of men—or else, that 
political governments are entities (for there are some 
entities composed of men).  Then, having "defined" govern- 
ments as either attributes of laws or things composed of 
laws, she went on to hold that "the proper purpose" of a 
political government is "to make social existence possible 
to men, by protecting benefits and combating...evils". 
But, in truth} a purpose must be an action (or at least, 
a free action—a concept), so that a government, which is 
itself an action, cannot be that to which any purpose 
belongs.  A political government cannot be "protecting, 
combating evils" or otherwise moving (insofar as it is 
itself a motion).  (Her expression is false, too, because 
there is no such thing as a "social existence", nor any 
"existence possible to men":  every society is not an 
entity and cannot possess an existence of its own, and 
every human—like any other existing thing—necessarily is 
what it is, and its existence is not a "possibility" but a 
necessary thing.)  After she had announced the "only pur- 
pose of a political government" she added inconsistently 
that "the proper functions of a government fall into three 
...categories ... the police...the armed services ... the law 
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courts"   —that it has not one purpose, but at least 
three purposes (or "functions").  Yet police, soldiers 
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and judges are not purposes or functions; they are entities 
to which purposes belong.  Thus the Randian political 
scientific concepts of things having authorities, things 
belonging to or composed of laws, and things having pur- 
poses are refuted. 
Section VI:  "Refutation of Her Notions of Political 
Governments as Rights" 
She "defined" a political government as "the 
means of placing the retaliatory use of physical force 
Tit 
under objective control"   , whereas she had earlier des- 
cribed it as the thing which retaliates, and as the 
"objective control", and even as the "retaliatory use of 
physical force" and as the "retaliation" (or power, or, 
force) itself.  It is clear that all these cannot be pred- 
icated of the same thing—that a thing cannot logically be 
the means of what it does as well as what it does, or the 
control of what it does as well as what it does, or both 
the use of what it is and what it is—yet, Rand said so. 
Moreover, her phrase "placing of retaliation under control" 
is incorrect (inasmuch as a retaliatory motion cannot have 
a motion—cannot "be placed" or otherwise move).  It is 
possible for a thing to be a means of its own action: only 
if the thing is a conceiver that has identified itself; 
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nothing else can be a means of its action, and a political 
government is not a conceiver (is not a rational being). 
But Rand insisted that it can be so: 
She wrote that every political government must 
237 be "the means of subordinating might to right"   , that 
"rights" are "the means of subordinating society to moral 
law"238 and that a "Right" is a "moral law", and "might", 
the nature of present "society" (so that "Right" is "that 
which ought to be", and "might", the evil that really is). 
So she implicitly equated political governments with 
rights, and through rights, with moral laws—yielding the 
absurd conclusion that political governments are the means 
of subordinating societies/mights to themselves (which is 
absurd because political governments are not conceivers, 
and only conceivers could possibly be the means of some of 
their actions).  Thus, for her Rights are the means of 
putting society under themselves; "Values" (which are re- 
ducible to the "Supreme Good") are the means of making 
reality subordinate to themselves, of "sublating" or over- 
coming and replacing, re-making reality with their "super- 
reality"—their "moral Law" through which that which is 
"becomes" that which ought to be.  Yet, she knew that 
"rights" (or "freedoms") are free actions, which can be- 
long only to the only free beings; rights were for her 
"inalienable" and "natural" to rational humans.  It is 
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true that political governments do have rights as their 
means (since political governments are concepts of ra- 
tional humans, and therefore, involve concepts of rational 
actions—which are rights), but rights are certainly not 
the only means of political governments ("Rights" are not 
"The" means).  Rights may be a means of any conceiving of 
(or, controlling of) a concept that is a society, but they 
are not the only means of a concept of a society.  They 
are certainly,not things under which a society may be 
placed ("to which a society must be subordinated"); nor 
are societies able to "be subordinated" or otherwise move, 
since they also are attributes.  Rand attempted to explain 
that "a 'right1 is a moral principle", which is "the con- 
cept" that is "defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of 
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action in a social context".     But, a concept cannot 
possibly "define a right" or otherwise identify anything; 
a government cannot govern.  Her "moral principles" cannot 
"sanction a man's freedom" either—because to do so would 
make the freedom unfree.  Nor does her phrase "freedom... 
in a social context" make sense.  "Freedom of action" 
seems to be a redundancy.  Thus her "concept" of political 
governments as rights must be judged a meaningless notion. 
Her "concept" of "Oughts" (or "values", or 
"rights") is meaningless:  She considered them to be 
"implied" by the realities (the things) that are, for she 
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wrote that "to a living consciousness, every 'is' implies 
an 'ought'"    (she opined that certain indemonstrable, 
imperceivable "super-things" called "goods" are "immanent" 
in "ordinary, perceivable things"—and that such imper- 
ceivables "communicate themselves" or "are implied" to 
rational beings whenever those fully alive, rational 
beings perceive facts).  She considered "Morality" (or, 
"moral principles", or "rights") to be "evaluative know- 
ledge".  She imagined that the "basis" of such "knowledge" 
is "the pleasure-pain mechanism in the body of man" 
Thus, her expression that "Rights is a moral concept" is 
to be equated with her "single principle", the "pleasure- 
pain mechanism"; the said "mechanism" is uncontrollable, 
inescapable and unknowable; for Rand, every human has such 
a mechanism (or at least, every rational human does), and 
it is its mechanism that "requires" (or causes, or neces- 
sitates) its other actions.  For her, a man "has no choice 
about what is good or evil"; "morality is an objective 
matter", and Subjective Ethics must be false opinion. 
"Rights are conditions of existence required by man's 
9A9 
nature for his proper survival"   —which must mean that 
the Rights which is the pleasure-pain mechanism is that 
which requires the Rights which are; the "moral principles" 
which are "that which a man ought to be" ("man's nature" 
which is "inherent" in real men) is that through which men 
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"become" (or are "sublated" to be) actually what they are 
not.  The singular "Rights" (or, pleasure-pain principle) 
necessitates, according to her, that "It is right for him 
to use his mind...to work...and to keep the product of his 
work"    (that the human whose body contains the singular 
"Rights" ought to be rational, ought to act efficaciously 
and productively, and ought to control the material pro- 
ducts, the wealth that is the embodiment/s of his con- 
cept/s).  Because of his Telos as a human being (because 
of his purposive "Nature"), a man "has a right to live as 
a rational being":  his "nature forbids him the irra- 
tional"   .  (She supposed that the rational alternative 
to belief in God must be a concept of "Nature".)  She also 
called her "rights" values or "virtues"; she had imagined 
one basic Right (the pleasure-pain principle) and plural 
rights (such as "a man's right to the product of his 
work"), and so she wrote of both plural virtues/values and 
also that "Thinking is man1s...basic virtue" (the one 
basic Virtue)   .  But, if the basic right/virtue/value/ 
ought is "the pleasure-pain mechanism", then it is impos- 
sible for it to also be "thinking" (conceiving)-—a moral 
(hedonic and involuntary, sensory, reflexive) process 
cannot also be a rational (free, identificatory) process— 
yet she thought it could:  She wrote that "A rational pro- 
cess is a moral process" and that "reason is a process of 
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constant choice" (constant "moral judgement", which means 
submission to what gives pleasure or pain, which one 
cannot have any choice about, according to her).    What 
she may have "meant" was that a rational process (a con- 
cept) belongs to a moral process (to the concept's con- 
ceiver's "Nature"); but this would also be incorrect, be- 
cause a process cannot be that to which something else 
belongs—and if a "Nature" (or "hedonic mechanism") is 
construed as an entity, it cannot also be a process. 
She called her ultimate "Rights" free wills, 
and "souls" (or "spirits", or, "conceptual consciousnesses"). 
"That which you call...soul or spirit is...'free will1... 
your... freedom to think...the only will you have...your 
only freedom...choice...life and character"  —so that 
rights/virtue/value/ought is human spirit/soul/character/ 
freedom/moral law/pleasure-pain mechanism or principle. 
She held any pleasure-pain principle (or "freedom", or 
"free will" or "nature") of a human being to be that 
"man's...moral faculty"   ; thus, for her, that which is 
moral "underlies" that which is rational—so that identi- 
fications are not possible without hedonic mechanism (the 
only free actions are caused by involuntary, reflexive, 
biological action).  This opinion is absurd because it 
"makes" the free things not free (the uncaused to be the 
caused).  She supposed that the Nature (or singular 
"Rights") of a conceiver is a state (process, or action) 
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of "rational selfishness"—an attribute that is a constant 
moral judgement (continuous evaluation, constantly pro- 
nouncing things "good" or "evil"); its "perceivable mani- 
festations" (or "measurable phenomena") are that con- 
ceiver's ordinary, knowable attributes (including its 
various concepts). "The Virtue of Selfishness" is itself 
unknowable (she apparently knew); if the attributes of a 
conceiver exist, she supposed, then a "Ground of Human 
Being" must also exist in the world of Ideas.  Now, 
pseudo-conceivers, the humans who appear to conceive but 
really only imitate, lack such Virtues (or Grounds):  she 
insisted that "the values required for...human survival" 
are "not the values produced by...the feelings...of ir- 
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rational brutes, who...never... can conceive"    (whereas 
the Feeling of a rational produces genuine values).  It 
is not clear whether she held that irrational humans can 
have, or else lack, "pleasure-pain mechanisms"—but even 
if she thought that they do have them, it is clear that 
they are not the same as the pleasure-pain mechanisms had 
by the rationals; the rationals' mechanisms are manifested 
in values that are truly values (in free actions that are 
truly free, in knowledge that is ful  conscious awareness, 
in power that is uncaused government), whereas the ir- 
rationals' mechanisms (assuming that she thought they had 
them) manifest themselves in values that are not values 
(in free actions that really are reflex actions) but which 
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only appear to be values.  Irrationals' Natures do not 
allow them to produce or comprehend the "right" rights, 
the good virtues, the "oughts" that they really should 
have been.  They therefore cannot "survive properly"; an 
irrational human may live, but cannot "live as a man"—as 
a fully conscious, free human being.  Conceivers, on the 
other hand, are always "morally ambitious", she held, and 
"never cease to pronounce moral judgement"; they are con- 
stantly "focused on reality", continually "identifying" 
things that they perceive, and "integrating" their most 
recent concepts with all their foregoing concepts' expres- 
sions.  They do not "practice morality as a duty"—no 
choice or effort is involved, because rationality is what 
gives them pleasure.  The irrationals cannot know that 
identification is joy, because they cannot identify, be- 
cause they lack the Right Natures. 
Rand believed that rights cannot be "violated" 
(or, negated), and also, that they have often been and can 
be violated:  She wrote that the "survival" of a conceiver 
"requires that those who think be free of the inter- 
ference of those who don't"—so that, if anyone is free 
then that free individual cannot be one whose actions are 
not uncaused.  If an individual's actions are violated, 
then they are not free actions and the individual to which 
they belong cannot be identified as free; but if someone 
is identifying (knowing) anything, then that knower cannot 
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be an entity whose knowledge is an effect, because if 
knowledge is caused then it could not be known by the 
knower that its knowledge is caused and it would have to 
be admitted that nothing is known (though to suppose that 
it can be known that nothing can be known is a contra- 
diction) .  Thus, knowledge presupposes that the knower to 
which it belongs is an unmoved m.over (not a mover that 
can be "violated" or caused in any way).  Now Rand suppos- 
ed that "A right cannot be violated except by physical 
force" (such as when "a man is made to act without his 
free, personal, individual...consent")—that in such a 
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case "his right has been violated" (negated).     But she 
also held every free being to be "free to rise as far as 
he's able"—and she emphasized that true rights are "in- 
alienable", and that true (free) rights are "necessary 
conditions" of "man's survival qua man" (of a rational's 
acting or living as a human being "ought to live"). 
Thus, she contradicted herself.  She wrote that "Of all 
the statist violations of individual rights in a mixed 
economy, the military draft is the worst", for "It is an 
abrogation of rights" and "negates... the right to life— 
and establishes...that a man's life belongs to the state" 
(that a conceiver's rights are the attributes of the sup- 
posed entity called "The State").  x  Then she contra- 
dictorily held that such violations are impossible, be- 
cause some humans really are "surviving qua rational 
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beings", and since to negate their rights (to violate 
their free actions, to cause their concepts and other, 
component actions) would be "To interpose...physical des- 
truction between" such conceivers and their "perceptions 
of reality" so as to make each one not free—"to negate 
252 and paralyze his means of survival"   —then, if there 
were any such violations of rights, the rights so violated 
would not be rights, and the conceivers who are supposed 
to be made not free would not be conceivers.  There cannot 
be any caused uncaused cause, nor any violated inviolable 
action; if a thing is free, it is not subject to any- 
thing; if it were subjected, then that which is subjected 
could not have been a free thing.  Rand knew that "There 
can be no compromise between freedom and government con- 
trols; to accept 'just a few controls' is to surrender 
the principle of inalienable individual rights and to 
substitute for it the principle of the government's un- 
253 limited, arbitrary power"  —so that, if someone were to 
admit that a rational being's rights can be violated even 
"just a little" ("somewhat violated", or "slightly ne- 
gated"—made not what they are as well as what they are), 
then the one who so admits would have to conclude that 
such a supposed "violator of rights" as a political 
government is a genuinely free being, and that the ration- 
al being whose rights are violable is only apparently 
free; to put it simply, the one who believes that the 
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free can be subject to political governments "will believe 
anything" {they will even admit that political govern- 
ments are the "supreme" powers).  Yet she admitted that 
such violations are possible, anyway.  Then she denied 
that they are possible:  She wrote that "There is no con- 
ceivable law by which a man can be forced", and that 
"There is no conceivable law to prevent him" from work- 
ing "on any terms he chooses to set"    (since "All pro- 
perty and all forms of wealth are produced by...mind", 
and since "you cannot have wealth without its source: 
intelligence" for one absolutely "cannot force intelli- 
255 gence"   , and since property and wealth do indeed exist). 
Then she denied her denial, for when she opposed "Any 
group, any gang, any nation that attempts to negate man's 
2.56 
rights"   she implied that there are negations of rights. 
(Or, perhaps, she meant that any apparent "negation of 
rights"—any such supposed "attempt"—must be failed, mis- 
taken, futile opinion.  But if this is not an instance of 
an admission by her of violations of rights, other exam- 
ples could be cited.)  Therefore her notions of political 
governments as rights (given the fact that her rights are 
things she supposed to be both what they are and not what 
they are) are identified as false. 
Her "source of...rights is the law of causal- 
257 ity"   expressed through pleasure and pain in a con- 
ceiver's body.  She believed that such a "Law" is irrefut- 
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able and universal—so that she rejected any "claim that 
rights are a gift of God...or...that rights are a gift of 
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society, to be broken at its whim"   .  She held an in- 
dubitable Source: the "Law of Causality" (for since 
"everything must have a cause" and wealth exists and must 
have a cause, then free and rational creators of the 
wealth must have existed and must have "rights", which 
are freedoms); but this was in contradiction to her con- 
cept of rational humans as "Unmoved Movers", the excep- 
tions to her supposed "Law".  She elaborated her view of 
rights by naming and equating "human rights" and "pro- 
perty rights"; she held that only "mystics...offer...the 
fraudulent alternative of 'human rights' versus 'property 
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rights'".     Since all rights (all free, uncaused ac- 
tions) are scientific controllings (conscious governments) 
of things, then all rights require (presuppose) things as 
their meanings and means; if humans did not control (or 
"own") the subjects and means of their thoughts, they 
would not be thinking.  To be fully (rationally) human, 
for Rand, was to control physical things—to govern one's 
property.  Having identified human rights as property 
rights, and all property rights as all human rights, she 
rejected supposed "rights of human equality" such as that 
of "redistributing wealth to the less able"—because such 
would be a "right" that is "negating the source of 
rights... the mind"    since "you cannot have wealth with- 
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out its source" and "You cannoC obtain the products of a 
mind except on the owner's terms, by trade and volitional 
consent"    (for if property really could be redistributed, 
or otherwise negated, then it would not be governed by 
the conceiver who so governed it, and the conceiver could 
not be a free, creative being—and there would be no 
wealth, no products by conceivers).  Were there even one 
violation, the source so negated would not be a wealth 
producer, and there would be no wealth; thus "redistribu- 
tion of wealth", and other "positive, distributive human 
rights" are mere absurdities.  "Material products can't 
be shared"   , just as concepts cannot be "had in common" , 
Rand knew.  "There are no conflicts•of interest among 
rational men", she also knew, inasmuch as they are free 
and deal with each other by way of trade according to 
objective political laws; "the interests of...men who... 
work and don't seek...the unearned" are uniformly inviol- 
9 f\ 1 
able.     There is only "mutual trade to mutual advantage" 
by the rational, productive humans.  When they identify 
(govern) one another, they do not violate rights; they 
cannot, in any processes of knowing one another, ever 
make one another's characters what they are not:  thus 
political governments (concepts of rational humans) cannot 
possibly be negations of rights, and cannot possibly alter 
their meanings' identities.  To suppose that whenever a 
rational is identified (governed) it is made not free 
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(and thus, not itself, not "a sovereign individual who 
owns his..work and its products") would be to claim to 
know that free beings as such are unknowable (while imply- 
ing knowledge that they exist, in the act of declaring 
them "unknowable"), whichis an absurdity.  If conceivers 
were being identified (conceivers being the subjects of 
at least one political government), and were resisting 
(moving against, and having motions that are effects of) 
their identifier, then they would not be free, unmoved 
movers (they would not be conceivers) at all, but irra- 
tional, reflex movers—their actions could not be con- 
cepts, and they could not be known as conceivers.  If 
political governments are measurements or discoveries of 
conceivers, and conceivers were unknowable, then there 
could be no polticial governments.  Instead, the truth is 
that there are:  (1) conceivers whose rights are inviol- 
able and irrefutable, and (2) political concepts (govern- 
ings of conceivers) that cannot be violations (or nega- 
tions) of their meanings.  Even conceivers that are means 
of concepts (such as political scientific concepts, all 
of which are "uses" of previously identified rationals) 
are never "used against their will", but remain free. 
Thus Rand held that political governments must not violate 
any rights, but must "resort to force only against" ir- 
rational humans "who start the use of force".  She believed 
that any government that initiated "the employment of 
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force against men who had forced no one"   would have to 
be "a killer acting on the premise of death...destroying 
O (1  c 
man's capacity to live"   .  She held that the "only 
proper purpose of a government is to protect man's rights, 
which means:  to protect him from violence" or to act 
"as an agent of man's self-defense" so as to "protect... 
property and contracts from breach or fraud...to settle 
9 f\f\ disputes by rational rules...objective law".     Now, it 
is true that political governments may involve restraint 
of the irrational humans who are resisting the subjects 
being so measured; political concepts involve "separa- 
tions" (or distinctions) of rational from irrational 
humans—and in such precisely controlling scientific ex- 
periments, the separation of the irrational parasites 
from their hosts may result in the parasites' destruction: 
the parasites must eventually perish when they are pre- 
vented from contact with the rationals (their ultimate 
sources of nourishment).  Yet, a political government is 
not essentially a "restraint of the irrational" nor even 
a "protection of the rational"—and cannot possibly be a 
"protection of the rights of the rational" because their 
rights, as attributes, are necessarily and inalienably 
theirs (and thus, need no protection). 
Rand noted the "nationalizations" of oil drill- 
ing and shipping equipment in certain "Third World" 
countries:  She held that the petroleum itself was and is 
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no one's right:  "It was there for centuries, and they 
didn't know what to do with it".267  (She added:  "We 
don't export our technology.  We export our minds and our 
knowledge, without which they couldn't exist, and they 
admit it.  They nationalize oil in a lot of those coun- 
tries, and they want the Americans...to come and help them 
run it.  They can't even run the oil in...after they 
copied everything from us."   )  The rights involved are 
the meaningful ideas and the embodiments thereof that are 
created by Americans.  The nationalizers have no rights 
at all; they are altruists, and they are irrational: 
"Altruism is the unearned, and this we earn, and they 
nationalized from us.  They have no right to their soil, 
269 if they do nothing with it."    "In a proper society, the 
270 government would never let it come that far".     Given a 
true political government, then, .the nationalizers would 
have been clearly distinguished and separated from the 
rationals (and therefore, necessarily from the rationals' 
properties also); the Altruists would have been unable to 
parasitize the productive Egos.  The nationalizers could 
not have been given any undeserved goods.  But, although 
a political government, as a precisely controlling experi- 
mental study of rational human/s, must involve separa- 
tions of any irrational, parasitic pseudo-conceiver/s 
resisting the subject/s, yet it cannot be defined as a 
restraining (or protecting) action (neither as a "punish- 
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merit" of the irrationals nor as a "banning" of them from 
the rationals).  Thus her notion of political governments 
as "agents of man's self-defense", making their actions 
protections or punishments, and making the governments 
themselves entities other than the humans defended and 
punished, is incorrect. 
She equated her governments with "objective con- 
trols" and "moral law", so that she supposed them to be 
entities putting "society" (or "might") under themselves 
(under "objective control/s", or, "moral law", or 
"right/s")—so that her political governments put irra- 
tionals/altruists/irrationality/altruism under political 
governments.  She also equated her governments with 
"rights", making her political governments rights that 
put mights under themselves—and she added to the con- 
fusion by claiming that the rights use rights to do so. 
Then she held that political governments are the means of 
doing so.  Thus, rights/objective controls/moral law/ 
political governments use rights/objective controls/moral 
law/political government to put society/mights/irrationals/ 
altruism/depravity/the depraved under rights/objective 
controls/moral law/political governments.  But, in addi- 
tion to being such "punishments", her governments are sup- 
posed to be protections of rights (or else, protections 
of the entities possessing the rights)—as well as the 
means of such protections, and also (since they are them- 
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selves rights) the things so protected.  But the only 
things that ever can, in truth, "use themselves" at all— 
the only things that can be means of their own actions— 
are conceivers; and political governments/rights cannot 
possibly be conceivers.  She wrote that "Rights" are 
"concepts" protecting "freedom of action in a social con- 
271 text"   ; then, if they are concepts, they cannot also be 
conceivers—and they cannot "restrain", "protect" or 
otherwise move.  Yet she wrote of "the whole unethical 
conception of a State" which has "extorted" (or expropri- 
ated) an inestimable "amount of time, of thought, of 
money, of effort... from", the productive, rational hu- 
272 
mans.    Not only does this statement seem contradictive 
of her earlier assertions that political states are ra- 
tionals' protection agents against expropriators, but it 
makes the protection agents the expropriators themselves. 
But, in truth, every government (concept) never acts at 
all—neither protects nor extorts wealth.  Such extortions 
she considered to be "violations of rights"; but if 
political governments/rights are violators of rights as 
well as protectors of rights and agents preventing viola- 
tors and violations of rights, her view is completely 
illogical.  If rights can be violated, and political 
governments are the same as her rights, then it is an 
absurd opinion to hold that they can protect against vio- 
lations of themselves.  If rights/political governments 
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are violable, then they are negated:  they "are both what 
they are and not what they are, in a process of 'becom- 
ing'". 
She accepted "The right of 'the self-determina- 
273 tion of nations'"   , and held that it is their right to 
"monopolize force" (to be the "exclusive protectors", the 
only "restraints of criminals") in their respective loca- 
tions; she even wrote of "public compulsion" as though 
political governments are entities that "compel" conceiv- 
ers (who she had already claimed cannot be compelled at 
all, insofar as they are volitional, conceptual beings). 
But then, she wrote that "the term 'individual rights' is 
a redundancy: there are no other...rights and no one 
else to possess them".     If she meant by "individuals" 
rational humans, then in order to hold her "rights of 
self-determination of nations" and "public compulsions by 
governments", she must have held that nations/political 
governments/rights are rational humans, because she did 
not admit of any rights other than "individual rights". 
But, in truth, political states/rights are not rational 
humans.  Rather, they are attributes of conceivers. 
Rand held that "Rights are a moral concept—the 
concept that provides a logical transition from the prin- 
ciples guiding an individual's actions to the principles 
guiding his relationship with others—the concept that 
preserves and protects individual morality in a social 
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context".    But concepts cannot produce {or "provide") 
anything; nor can they act so as to "preserve and pro- 
tect" anything.  Nor can there be any "guiding prin- 
ciples", because principles, as concepts, are themselves 
governing actions (and there cannot be any governing 
actions belonging to governing actions).  Political 
governments (or political concepts, or, political states 
of consciousness) are principles or "orders", and Rand 
knew that orders are not "natural", for there is no "order 
in the universe":  Order "is only in...minds of scientists 
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who are able to understand"    (though she also believed, 
inconsistently, that "the Order" is something outside, 
prior to, and independent of scientists, who are only 
"able to understand part of it"; she claimed it'Isn't an 
artificial order" after all, it is not by God or gods 
"and its not chance", but it is some super-thing  she 
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calls "Nature"   ).  If political orders are merely the 
attributes of rational minds, then they cannot be "guid- 
ing" the things to which they belong, nor "preserving in- 
dividual morality".  Political governments/rights she 
definitely considered to be concepts (which are actions) 
that are acting entities. 
Rights were for her "moral matters" (her politi- 
cal governments were for her a "moral issue"), and she 
proceeded not by way of identifying the rights that are 
facts, but to evaluate the rights that "ought to be". 
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She posited as the "first question" that anyone couLd 
reasonably ask about any moral issue:  "Does man need 
7 78 
values at all—and why?"   , whereas the true first pos- 
sible question (according to my understanding) would have 
to be:  "What thing/s are signified by your term 'values'? 
—is 'values' simply a meaningless notion, or is it an 
identification of some thing/s?".  She had admitted that 
only facts exist, yet she never identified what facts her 
expressions of "values", "rights", "virtues", "political 
governments" and other "oughts" signified.  She knew that 
the only true concepts are identifications of things, yet 
she considered her "Rights" and "political states" to be 
concepts—while she could not demonstrate their meanings. 
She called rights/political governments "the link between 
ethics and politics"; political governments/rights, in 
her opinion, join the "oughts" of personal behavior with 
the "oughts" of detailed, practical political (or social) 
behavior (join "ethics" with "philosophy of law"):  Her 
"political philosophy" was the result of "ethical theory", 
and had as its immediate product "legal philosophy" (de- 
tailed, practical politics); once the conception of poli- 
tical governments/rights appears, she held that there can 
be "principles.'. .governing men's social relationships" 
(because in her "understanding" ideas produce or "give 
birth" of themselves to ideas, and ideas "manifest them- 
selves" in human lives).  She had identified the form of 
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every rational inquiry to be: "What is it?"; but then she 
could only ask of her imaginary, non-factual "moral prin- 
ciples": "W.h.y do we need them?".  Her attempt at a defin- 
ition was:  "'Value' is that which one acts to gain and/or 
keep" and which "presupposes an entity" that "is acting 
280 to achieve a goal".    When an amoeba acts so as to en- 
gulf and ingest a yeast cell, then the yeast would be a 
value; but that is not what Rand "meant" exactly, for the 
amoeba is not "acting to achieve a goal" (or at least, not 
as a state of full consciousness, not rationally); what 
she meant was apparently that what a "Goal" directs a 
conceiver to gain is a value, and (implicitly) that what 
a Goal doesn't prescribe must be a non-value (which is 
either morally "neutral", or an evil thing).  Now, a value 
is not a meaning:  a meaning is that which one controls/ 
identifies, but a value is that which one gains/protects 
to keep.  A meaning is not "prescribed by a goal" to be 
identified; rather, it is identified freely, uncausedly. 
But a value is "dictated", not gained or protected or kept 
without cause.  Since values, according to her, pertain 
only to free, rational beings, and since free, rational 
beings do not have any caused actions (and thus, do not 
"behave teleologically") her notion of values is false. 
Her "values" are a mimicry of those who have identified 
"meanings".  Her question "Why do we need values?" is to 
be equated with "Why do we need meanings?" and with "Why 
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are things what they are, and not something else?" (which 
Aristotle once described as "doubtless a meaningless in- 
quiry").  Her definition of values (such as political 
governments) contradicts her knowledge of what meanings 
are and must be.  It was she who had rejected "most phi- 
losophers", who she learned "have now decided to declare 
that" moral matters are "outside the power of reason, that 
no rational ethics can ever be defined...that...in ethics 
...in the choice of...values, of...actions...pursuits... 
goals—man must be guided by something" utterly (blatantly) 
irrational such as "Faith—instinct—intuition—revelation 
—feeling—taste—urge—wish" or "'arbitrary postulate' or 
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'subjective choice' or 'emotional commitment'".     She did 
not decide to declare "oughts" to be irrational; instead, 
she made them appear to be rational.  She would not admit 
that in moral matters (such as political governments) "man 
must be guided by something", yet she held that "the 
pleasure-pain sensations of the human body" (or, in her 
words, "the pleasure-pain mechanism", or, "sensations of 
pleasure and pain") is that which guides men in moral mat- 
ters.  That hedonic mechanism is the great Ought of which 
all the others (such as the concepts which are political 
states/rights) are fragmentary manifestations.  But this 
mechanism or these sensations are, according to her, "in 
the body of man" (in a human's body); and she absolutely 
differentiated human beings from human bodies (rational 
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minds which are volitional beings, from their bodies which 
are biological and nonvolitional), so that the actions of 
the wholes (the rational minds) of which the bodies are 
components are supposed to be the effects of components of 
the bodies called "pleasure-pain mechanisms".  But parts 
cannot be causes of the wholes in which they are involved: 
.a galaxy does not cause the motion of the universe, nor 
does a dog bark because of its brain or because of its 
lungs.  A cause of the motion of something else must be 
neither involved in that something else, nor that in which 
that something else is involved.  Rand's attempt to "deve- 
lop" the actions of a sensory organ into the actions of 
the whole in which the organ is involved (into the actions 
of the rational human) is absurd; the actions of a part 
can never be attributed to the whole of which it is a part 
(nor to anything else, for attributes are such that each 
of them belongs to one and only one thing). 
She considered rationality to be a value, and 
thus, something one acts to gain and/or keep; now, one who 
is acting to gain rationality (to become a conceiver) is 
"acting to achieve a goal" and is guided "by his pleasure- 
pain sensations or organ"—so that the value rationality 
is "evolved" out of irrationality, and free action is 
caused by something unfree.  She elaborated that "the con- 
cept of a 'right' pertains only to action—specifically, 
282 to freedom of action"   ; since a "freedom" is a free 
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action, then a right is a free action of action, which is 
redundant or impossible.  She added that a right "means 
283 freedom from compulsion...by other men"   ; but if a free- 
dom is a free action, then "a free action from" does not 
make sense.  Her expressions of "freedoms from", "rights 
to", "liberties of", etc., are absurd.  There are no "free- 
doms to", but only freedoms; the prepositions are evidence 
that the meanings of true expressions have not been grasped 
by Rand.  She wrote that "the basic need of the creator is 
independence" and that "Reason requires freedom" which is 
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"the right to think and...to live"   ; but she had known 
that any "reasoning mind cannot work under any form of 
compulsion" and she knew that reasoning minds exist and 
are working (and hence, are not being "compelled"), and 
she knew that they are free and have freedoms not "poten- 
tially" but necessarily (because they are free, rational 
beings)—so that they cannot "need freedom" or "lack free- 
dom".  The freedoms that are the attributes of free beings 
are actions by and belonging to only them, and cannot be 
"provided" and "made possible" by other things (such as 
her "political governments" or "rights"); their freedoms 
(free actions) are not things they "ought to possess" and 
"may possess", but things theyabsolutely do possess. 
Rights are not potential, are not provided, and do not 
"manifest themselves" in free entities. 
She was also inconsistent in that she called a 
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right "only freedom from compulsion...by other men", and 
then added that a "Freedom...means freedom from the coer- 
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cive power of the state—and nothing else"    (and she 
considered "the State" to be "an impersonal robot", not a 
human being)—so that her freedoms are both only from com- 
pulsion by men and also from compulsion by things other 
than men.  But if freedom means freedom from political 
governments, then political governments cannot be (as she 
supposed) things protecting freedoms.  If political states 
violate rights, then political states/rights cannot be 
things that negate their own violations.  Her "definition" 
of freedom/right such that "Freedom...means freedom" is as 
improper as defining atoms as atomic things, or stones as 
rocks. 
She posited "only one fundamental right (all 
others...its consequences or corollaries): a. man's right 
O Q f. 
to his own life"   , but if the ultimate right (free 
action) of a conceiver is that conceivers ultimate com- 
posite action, and if that ultimate composite action is 
its life, then her notion of "a right to his life" means 
the human's free action to its own free action (its right 
to its right), which is a meaningless redundancy.  She in- 
sisted that "the right to life means the right to engage 
in self-sustaining and self-generated action—which means: 
the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature 
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of a rational being"   , and that only "Such is the meaning 
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of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happi- 
ness"   .  Thus she imagined that free beings "need to be 
made free"—that the mechanism or organ or sensations of 
pleasure and pain "provides" or "allows" the conceiver to 
"take the right actions" and to "engage in self-generated 
and self-sustaining action"; but, in truth, anything "made 
free" cannot but be a meaningless notion.  If freedoms/ 
rights require a "Ground of Free Being" to account for 
their being what they are, then the supposed Ground would 
also require a greater Ground of the Ground of Free Being, 
and so on—to an infinite regress.  Her "Supreme Good" is 
her ultimate Ought, her basic "Ground of Rational (Free) 
Being".  It is not a concept, but an imitative opinion: 
She claimed to admire Aristotle and natural 
sciences, but her various evaluative "concepts" (such as 
her "political scientific concepts") are imitations of 
Plato and similar to the occult "sciences" and religious 
notions.  Her political scientific concepts are evaluative 
"moral" intonations.  They arose not through perception 
of the attributes that are political governments, but 
through "intuition" of "what political governments/rights 
ought to be".  Her "rights" (and hence, also her "politi- 
cal states") are not the real, factual rights, but voids: 
her "rights to" and "freedoms from" are voids either of 
human or "government" coercion—they are negations of neg- 
ations of the identities of free beings.  Now, even she 
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admitted that "A zero does not exist"   —that any expres- 
sion "void" is not an identification of anything other 
than another expression "void".  For examples (to be ex- 
plained in detail), her notions "property rights" and 
"rights to life" may be given:  She often emphasized 
"property rights", claiming that "Without property rights, 
no other rights are possible" because a conceiver "who 
has to sustain his life by his own effort" but "who has no 
right to the product of his own effort" would have "no 
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means to sustain his life"   ; this "meant" that without 
a lack or void of interference in (or negation of) his 
having controlled things (his having already identified 
things), a conceiver cannot be continuing to identify 
more things (cannot be having concepts of which his prop- 
erties, the formerly controlled things, are used as 
means).  Without her "rights/"political governments", con- 
ceivers could perhaps have one concept each:  a concept 
of things as such (the first possible concept by any con- 
ceiver, which has no means—for which no property can be 
used); but conceivers could not even conceive of them- 
selves as conceivers, because a "self-conception" is not 
the first possible concept by any conceiver (and thus, 
involves use of property—has at least one means).  Then, 
she introduced "the right to life" as "the source of all 
rights", implicitly equating it with a "property rights" 
which is that without which "no other rights are pos- 
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sible".. She explained that if a rational is to be such it 
must be controlling things (governing the meanings being 
identified), which are its properties—so that if the 
rational being is to be living (or, "surviving") "qua 
rational being", it must be ruling property.  But, she 
considered that the rational, free beings are only 
"potentially" what they are—and she insisted that a void 
or lack of other people's or of "the State's" interference 
must be provided by the State (which means, by "Rights") 
—so that the rationals can become absolutely what they 
are.  But, I hold that a void is nothing, and cannot act. 
It is also absurd, according to my view, that a nature of 
a free entity should "require a void of interference" 
(need a negation of any possible negations of its nature); 
it is also false for her to suppose that a conceiver or 
anything else is not necessarily but "potentially" itself. 
No thing needs something else to be what it is; every 
thing, as the thing that it is, must be itself "entire- 
ly", not "potentially"—and itself only and not "also 
something else".  The rights that are free, rational 
actions are inviolably, necessarily what they are; there 
are no "interferences" or actual or possible negations of 
them; and therefore, there must be no supposed "political 
governments"/"rights" that are negations of the negations 
(or "restraints of the violations").  Insofar as Rand 
equated her supposed "rights" with her "political govern- 
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merits", her political governments must be the same voids. 
Thus, her notions of political governments as rights are 
refuted.  It is true, on the other hand, that real, factual 
political governments are real, factual rights (not the 
"rights" that are the imaginary voids—the "negative 
rights"—of Rand and other influential political theorists); 
all political governments are rights in the true sense, 
but not all rights are political governments (all political 
states of consciousness are concepts, but not all con- 
cepts are political states). 
Section VII:  "Refutation of Her Notions of Political 
Governments as Societies, Systems, and 
Economies" 
Her "definitions" of political governments that 
involve her expression "society" are not meaningful: 
She had written that "there is no such entity as 
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'society'"   —-and that every "society is only a number" 
292 that is a sum of "individual men"   ; she knew that there 
is no "Social Whole" (no society that is an entity, no 
"collectivity")—and that not even an ultimate society, a 
sum of all rational humans, a "Mankind is not an entity, 
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an organism, or a coral bush"  —and that "It is with the 
study of man" as the individual that he is (with the 
identifying of at least one of the only things that are 
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humans) and "not of the loose aggregate known as a ' com- 
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munity1 that... science has to begin"   .  She insisted 
that there necessarily "is no such entity as 'the public,' 
since the public is merely a number" {that is a sum "of 
295 individuals"—and that any supposed "social attribute" 
such as the "'common good' (or 'the public interest') is... 
undefined and undefinable" because "there is no such entity 
as 'the tribe' or 'the public1; the tribe (or the public 
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or society) is only a number"   .  But she also held, 
contradictorily, that all societies are not sums (which 
are attributes), but entities: 
She wrote that "a true society...is rational, 
productive, independent men", and that "An irrational 
society is...men paralyzed by the loss of moral... 
297 goals"  —so that, for her, any one thing that is a 
society is not (or is "not only") the one thing that it is, 
but the several or many things of which it is a sum (for 
her, the number is not really a number, but the things 
supposedly so numbered).  Or, if her societies are not sums 
at all, but mere synonyms of "men", they must be identified 
as linguistic superfluities:  To say "men" when one means 
men is all that is necessary; but she "meant" her socie- 
ties to be more than synonyms for "men" (she meant the 
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"concept" to be "conveniently undefinable"   just like 
"'The public,' 'the public interest,' 'service to the 
public'" and other false, evaluative "concepts" which "are 
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...the swinging pendulums of...self-hypnosis"   ).  She 
held that no society can be "studied directly", because 
societies are fundamentally indemonstrable "inter-rela- 
tionships" (and no one ever has, or can perceive or iden- 
tify an "Inter-Relationship"):  "A great deal may be 
learned about society by studying men; but this, process 
cannot be reversed...by studying society—by studying the 
inter-relationships of entities one has never identified" 
(so that the men that are societies cannot be known as 
societies, but only as men—not as one thing, but as 
,300 many). 
Then she added a third inconsistent "side" (or 
"facet") to her complex, obfuscative societal notion:  she 
wrote of "rational, productive, independent men in a ra- 
301 tional, productive, free society"  —as if her societies 
were neither numbers of men nor men, after all, but some 
entirely different things, which are free, rational, pro- 
ductive (but non-human) entities in the locations of which 
there are humans.  Now, since she did not admit fetuses to 
be free, rational humans (but only "potentially human" 
things), and the only cases of "rational, independent men 
in a rational, free human" would have to be fetuses in 
humans, she could not have "meant" her societies as human 
things.  Therefore they must be non-human rational enti- 
ties, in which rational humans are located (non-human, 
rational, free beings composed—partially or entirely—of 
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human rational free beings).  But since she had considered 
societies to be men, she contradicted herself to assume 
that they are not men but things composed of men.  But, 
if they are sums of men, they cannot also be the men so 
summed.  If they are sums, which are attributes (things 
not occupying locations), they cannot also be things in 
which men are located.  She was also inconsistent in her 
construction of "a society" as both singular and plural: 
if it is a reference to one thing it cannot possibly be a 
reference to more than one thing {just as "a man" is only 
singular, and the reference to more than one is another 
term: "men:").  Whereas she treated of individual humans 
as the only possible human beings, yet she also treated of 
her societies as the only really real humans, and called 
some of them "rational societies", "amoral societies", 
"sane societies", "productive societies", "'pacifist' 
societies", "slave  societies", "savage societies", "true 
societies", "proper societies", "cannibal societies" and, 
of course, "free societies".  She imagined "A society that 
robs an individual of the product of his effort, or en- 
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slaves him"   , and that "a society...would compel every 
citizen...to join a protective gang...and thus bring about 
the degeneration of that society... into...rule by brute 
303 force"   ; she even "identified" a society that "destroys 
all the values of human coexistence"  —as though socie- 
ties are acting entities.  She ascribed not only reflex 
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actions, but governments (free, rational actions) to them— 
making them the negations of the free human individuals, 
insofar as those individuals' actions belong not to them- 
selves but to "Societies".  Yet she insisted that a 
"society...has no rights" (and she defined rights such 
that "A 'right1 is a moral principle" or purpose), but 
also insisted that an "only moral purpose" or right "of a 
305 government is...protection".     Thus a political govern- 
ment has no free action but does have free action, which 
is to protect free actions of its individual citizens (who 
are the only things that have free actions, yet not the 
only things that have free actions).  She thus followed 
Hegeloid theorists—such as one who believed dialectically 
that "there is no happiness...except that experienced by 
individual men...and there is no common self submerging 
the soul of men", and also claimed simultaneously that 
"The happiness..-of society is the happiness...of human 
beings", and that "It will is their wills in the conjoint 
result"   ; she followed the very "liberals" she rejected 
(like Bosanquet, in The Philosophical Theory of the State) 
who supposed that a society has a "real will"—that a 
society acts and is free, and that any individual self is 
a mere "social self", only "free in society").  On the 
other hand, she thought of societies (or of some societies) 
as reflex movers, for she wrote of "an irrational society" 
that is "ready to be taken over by anyone willing to set 
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307 its direction"   .  But, if her societies are numbers, and 
numbers are attributes, then they cannot "be directed" or 
otherwise move. 
She equated her political governments with her 
societies and nations, when she wrote that "the United 
States was the first moral society in history"   .  She 
equated her nations/societies/political governments with 
rights when she wrote that "The most profoundly revolu- 
tionary achievement of the United States was the subordina- 
309 tion of society to moral law"    (for she had emphasized 
that her "rights are the means of subordinating society to 
moral law", and that a political "government is the means 
of subordinating 'might' to 'right'").  Moreover, she 
equated all of them with "groups" and "States" when she 
wrote "of the tribe (the state, the society, the collec- 
tive) that may dispose...in any way it pleases, that may 
dictate...convictions...control...work and expropriate... 
310 products".     She made some of her rights/political 
governments/states/societies/nations out to be "capitalisms" 
and economic and political "systems":  She wrote of "a 
free society—that is, capitalism", which is a "system", 
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and indeed, a "political system".    But.when she wished, 
she "differentiated" her governments/rights/nations, etc. 
(just like other theorists, such as one who could claim 
"government is...a national association acting on the 
312 principles of society"   , and that "a nation has...right 
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313 to abolish any...government"   ).  But she would not let 
them become "fully distinguished" (she could not rationally 
differentiate, them "as such"), like other theorists, such 
as one who admitted that "When...'state' and 'society' are 
confronted as two mutually exclusive...entities, the 
'tyranny of words' is complete" and there is complete 
"confusion"   .  Then she equated them all with "coun- 
tries", when she wrote that "for the first and only time 
in history, a country of money...America..-a country of 
reason, justice, freedom, production, achievement" 
315 appeared  —-and was "the first society...whose leaders 
were" rational humans ("a society led, dominated and 
created by the Producers was the United States of 
America")   ; thus, America is a country/Right/nation/ 
political state/society/government; it is a "means of 
putting itself under itself" and also "that which first 
did so, putting itself under itself"; it was its components 
and that of which they are components, and their sum as 
well as themselves as the summed.  She thought that it is 
an entity, but also an attribute; that it is both one and 
many; rational and irrational; concept and conceiver; it- 
self and not itself; existing and yet nonexistent, or 
else, "becoming".  She did not succeed in identifying 
political governments as societies, systems, and economies; 
her efforts must be refuted—identified as meaningless 
notions.  She did not resolve the issue of the United 
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States as a political government and a society b' re-naming 
it a "system" (both "social system" and "political 
system"; and also, an "economic system" and "legal 
system"): "all previous systems" which "were variants of 
an amoral society", she felt, had "held that man's life 
belongs to society"   —all previous societies/rights/ 
nations/governments/"systems had held man as a sacrificial 
means to the ends of others, and society as an end in it- 
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self"   .  Now, if a society/rights/government such as the 
United States can "regard itself" and "identify men", it 
must be a rational entity; but if it is rational, the 
United States would be the first to regard itself as not 
free (which would be a contradiction), and the first to 
place itself in a location under itself (in a location 
that is not its location, which is impossible).  She in- 
sisted that "the United States regarded man as an end in 
himself, and society as a means to the peaceful, orderly 
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coexistence of individuals"   , and that "the United States 
held that man's life is his by right (which means:  by 
moral principle and by his nature), and that a right is 
the property of an individual, that a society...has no 
rights, and that the only proper purpose of a government 
is the protection of individual rights"—making it 
clear that she considered political governments to be 
thinking, active beings.  Now, the political government/ 
society/nation that is the United States is distinguished 
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by her from the others by the fact that the others used 
humans as means (had concepts of which the humans already 
identified are means), but the United States did not have 
any concept/s of which the humans it identified are means 
(which difference may be put most simply as:  The United 
States did not have any concept/s subsequent to its con- 
cept/s of humans, whereas the other political govern- 
ments/societies/nations continued to identify things 
beyond humans and had concepts subsequent to their politi- 
cal concepts); she did not tell why she thought the 
United States cannot reason any further—why it is "con- 
ceptually retarded" in comparison to the others.  Thus, 
America, which seems "less intellectually developed" than 
other super-conceivers, is commended by Rand as the only 
"proper political government". 
All societies before the United States, she 
argued, were "amoral societies".  An "amoral society" she 
"identified" as "not strictly speaking,, a society, but a 
mob held together by institutionalized gang-rule"; "Such 
a society...represents...the deadliest threat to man's. 
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survival".    But, in truth, a mob as a concept cannot 
"be held together" or otherwise-move; it cannot "threaten"; 
nor can any "man's survival", which is a necessary thing, 
"be threatened" or otherwise change.  She supposed, also, 
that the United States, as the only "proper" (truly good) 
political state, is the only one that "allows man's 
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survival".  The other states violate men's rights, but 
America does not (although she also says that it does); 
America is the only "capitalism" (or "capitalist system", 
or, "capitalist society"), the others being mere "col- 
lectivisms" (such as "communisms", "monarchies", "feuda- 
lisms" and "fascisms", which are "improper" governments). 
"The basic issue is only:  Is man free?... capitalism is 
322 the only system that answers:  Yes."    She repeated 
that the United States (a nation or country) is "the 
first capitalist society", and a "social system"—and 
also a "political system" that she called "the American 
system" that she called "Capitalism":  "Capitalism is a 
social system based on the recognition of individual 
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rights...in which all property is privately owned"   — 
"the American system"   , which is. the "American political 
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system"   .  She elaborated that "No political system can 
establish universal rationality...by law (or by force)" 
but that one political system/state/goverriment called 
"capitalism is the only system that functions in a way 
which rewards rationality and penalizes all forms of ir- 
rationality, including racism"   .  Now, a system cannot 
be an entity—but is an idea; it cannot "function so as 
to reward or penalize" or otherwise act.  If it is "based 
on" (involves, or is composed of) its conceiver's "recogni- 
tion" (concept, or identification) of one or more rights, 
it must be a concept and cannot be an entity in which 
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there is property or any other entities.  She elaborated 
327 that every "Capitalism is a society of traders"   , and 
every "trader" she considered to be a "symbol" (an expres- 
sion) that rational humans are not violating each other's 
rights but must cooperate with each other's essential 
actions—so that for her a society/political state/ 
government/rights/nation is a sum of expressions (not of 
human entities).  She held every capitalism to be a "poli- 
tical concept", the only one "based on an objective 
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theory of values"  —so that all other societies (which 
she considered "mobs", "tyrannies" and "collectivisms") 
must also be "political concepts", but one not "based on 
the right Rights—the healthy pleasure-pain mechanism". 
She thus followed Bentham who claimed:  "Nature has placed 
mankind under the government of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure.  It is for them alone to point out 
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what we ought to do"   ; but she allowed only that the 
"hedonic Sovereignty" is possessed by the rationals (who 
enjoy thinking, who have rational eudaemonia). 
After insisting that America is a political 
government, and a capitalist economy, she re-named it a 
330 
"mixed economy"   , and contradictorily asserted that 
"our present system...is not capitalism, but...a pre- 
331 carious mixture of freedom and controls"   , she con- 
sidered it not a number of traders, after all, but a 
"civil war of pressure groups"—a violent "mob" (an im- 
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proper political government).  But then she considered 
that it is not a "war" either, but that "Injustice... the 
pressure group warfare of all against all, the amorality 
and futility of random, pragmatist, range-of-the-moment 
policies are the joint products of a mixed economy and of 
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a philosophical vacuum"   .  So she called it a "cynical 
fascism" sometimes, while at other moments she praised 
"the grace of the United States of America"; she con- 
sidered it to have been fraught with "internal contra- 
dictions" from its beginning (although she had regarded 
it as "axiomatic" that "a contradiction cannot exist in 
reality").  She wrote that "Laissez-faire capitalism is 
the only social system that bans force from social rela- 
tionships"—and is "the only system fundamentally opposed 
333 to war" (to both "internal" and "external" warfare). 
Now, it is true that a political government may involve 
protection of its subjects from any subhuman parasites 
(such as criminals, and tyrants' mercenaries); insofar as 
it is a precisely controlling scientific experiment, 
every true political state must involvera banning of any 
irrelevant factors in the vicinity of its subjects—but 
it cannot possibly be an acting entity that is "banning" 
or otherwise moving.  Nor can a "force", which must be a 
necessary thing, be "banned" or otherwise acting.  Fur- 
thermore, her expression "force from a social relation- 
ship" is absurd. 
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She attempted to explain that "the essence of 
capitalism" (its identity, supposing that a capitalism is 
an entity, a thing possessing an "essence"), which is 
"the fundamental principle of capitalism", is "the separa- 
■no/ 
tion of State and Economics".    Thus, every capitalism's 
"being-what-it-is" (as an entity) is its "banning itself 
from the 'Free Market'" (its separation of itself as a 
political system/state/government from itself as an eco- 
nomic system); thus, for Rand, a capitalism is an entity, 
and an action (because she held its existence/identity to 
be a "banning" or "separation" action)—and as an action, 
a "self-alienation" or negation of itself (insofar as it 
divides itself in two), which is an absurdity.  Whereas 
she had insisted that individual humans must "delegate" 
their free actions to society, she also claimed that "In 
a capitalist society, all...relationships are voluntary" 
(even though she had held that in every case, not only in 
a capitalist social entity, a free, rational individual 
must be voluntary and its ideas or relationships freely 
formed).  As a further inconsistency, she equated capit- 
alism with tyranny, for she held that the United States 
is "not a militant...fascism" but "a tired, worn, cynical 
335 fascism, fascism by default"   , and that "Tyranny is any 
political system (whether absolute monarchy, or fascism, 
or communism) that does not recognize individual rights 
(which necessarily include property rights)"  —she must 
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have held the United States to be a tyranny (an "irra- 
tional society" or "mob").  She wrote that "The overthrow 
of a political system by force is justified only when it 
is directed against tyranny:  It is an act of self-defense 
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against those who rule by force"   , and her novel Atlas 
Shrugged is a fictional portrayal of such a "just revolu- 
tion" to overthrow the "government of the United States" 
(the "American political state", or simply:  "the United 
States") and to establish (or, to "constitutionalize") a 
new, capitalist political government (to produce "Laissez- 
faire Capitalism", or "free economy"—a new, capitalist 
"Constitution" that she called the new "Atlantis").  (The 
rebels include one who writes a legal "foundation" for 
the new state, for Rand felt that "A...legal system, 
based on objectively valid principles, is required to 
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make a society free and to keep it free".    The re- 
mainder of the rebels give their personal "consents"—by 
way of oaths—to the written Constitution.  Thus, for 
Rand, as for many others, "Society is indeed a con- 
339 tract"  —each particular society/government being but 
one manifestation of the Ideal Form, and thus, "but a 
clause in the great primeval contract of eternal soci- 
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ety"   , a manifestation or phenomenon of the numeron, 
the external "concept of government".)  Yet, when her 
students interrogated her on whether it would be right 
for them to resist the draft to the Vietnam War, she in- 
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formed them that they ought to comply, instead, because 
(although "the military draft is the abrogation of all 
rights" according to her) it is still "the law of the 
land".  In her view, the United States is not, and never 
was "a full capitalism"  ; even though she believed that 
"the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution did not 
only identify the nature and needs of a free society, but 
...devised the means to translate it into practice"   , 
she refused to admit that if they did identify such a 
society that there must have already been such a society. 
She had rejected already in Petrograd the Platonic notion 
of a "realm of Ideas", so that she knew that "the universe 
is one" and that anything of which there is an idea must 
either be the universe, or a thing located in the same 
universe {and not in some other, imaginary "universe 
accessible only by 'intuition' divorced from factual per- 
ceptions—from sensory evidence").  Therefore', she con- 
tradicted her own true metaphysical and epistemological 
principles by her opinion that capitalisms both are and 
are not, that they are known to exist, but not as in 
"this universe".  So she spoke of political theory as a 
"translation into practice" of other-worldly "Values"— 
rather than as identifications of things that really 
exist and are really demonstrable.  Thus, she insisted 
that every capitalism "has not yet existed anywhere", 
being certain through her mystical "super-sense" that it 
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"could exist somewhere".  Yet she also held that "capi- 
talism gave to mankind the longest period of peace in 
history...from 1815 to...1914"342, and that the "capi- 
talism...was—damned from the start"   -'-so that she must 
have held it to have already existed in this universe. 
Yet, having admitted that it has "had a start", she called 
it "an untried system"—"the system of the future, if 
mankind is to have a future"; but then, she noted that 
during the nineteenth century "the opening of the world's 
trade routes to free international exchange and competi- 
tion among private citizens of all countries" was "capital- 
ism's foreign policy"   .  Therefore, it would seem that 
she held a "proper political government" (or "true 
society", or "Capitalism") to be that which "opens trade 
routes"—until she mentioned that the "only proper foreign 
policy" of a free country is "isolationism".  But then, 
she called "free trade" (trading itself) the "foreign 
policy of capitalism"—as though it were not the "facili-- 
tation of trading" that is a state's essential action. 
Then again, contradicting her denial of any existence of 
any capitalism to date, she argued that "If capitalism 
had never existed, any honest humanitarian should have 
been struggling to invent it"   , and that "Capitalism 
has created the highest standard of living ever known on 
earth" and even "wiped out slavery and serfdom in the... 
civilized world of the nineteenth century"   .  She added 
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that for her knowledge of capitalist states/societies/ 
economies the "evidence is incontrovertible".     Yet, in 
truth, if no such things have yet existed, there cannot 
be any evidence for her supposed knowledge of them. 
She elaborated that "The brute facts of a mixed 
economy" are:  "gang-rule, i.e., a scramble for power by 
various pressure groups—without any moral or political 
principles...or long-range goal—with the tacit belief in 
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rule by force...and...a fascist state as the...result" 
Therefore she found that not only in the capitalist 
society (America) but also in any irrational society the 
economy (which is, in the case of America, a "mixed 
economy") is distinct from its result, the state (which 
is, in the American case, a "fascism"); yet, she often 
equated them (treated them as the same).  She explicitly 
equated societies and economies when she wrote:  "If you 
doubt the power of philosophy to...shape the destiny of 
human societies, observe that our mixed economy is the... 
product of Pragmatism—and of the generation brought up 
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under its influence"   .  Thus, if a capitalist society 
which is an economy (meaning America, of course) is that 
which separates economy from state, it cannot also be a 
state (because then it would be supposed to distinguish 
itself from itself, which is an impossibility); but she 
considered it a state, too.  She considered her anomalous 
societies/economies/states/rights/systerns/nations/coun- 
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tries/political governments to be "products of Philosophy" 
(or, of philosophies); but a philosophy must be an attrib- 
ute, and cannot be the entity to which some political 
government/s belong/s.  She attempted to clarify her poli- 
tical scientific concepts by equating "human groups" and 
"cultures" with her political governments.  She wrote the 
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synonymy:  "group, culture, society"   —indicating that 
political governments, which are societies for her, are 
also groups and cultures.  She even considered them to be 
"institutions" (like the theorist who held "an institu- 
tion is a pattern composed of culture traits specialized 
351 to the shaping and distribution of...values"   ).  Fur- 
ther, she could divide her groups/cultures/societies 
(like the same theorist, who wrote:  "The culture of a 
group is the totality of its culture traits.  A society 
352 is a group with its culture"   ).  She considered such an 
"institution" or "social system" to be "a set of moral- 
political-economic principles embodied in a society's 
laws, institutions, and government, which determine the 
relationships, the terms of association, among...men liv- 
353 ing in a given geographical area"   ; but then, she added 
that "Any group or 'collective,' large or small, is only 
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a number" of humans living in a given location  --so that 
it is unclear whether she believed more strongly that the 
institutions/societies/governments are sets of "prin- 
ciples" (which must be ideas, concepts) or whether she 
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believed most fervently that they are sets of humans 
(which cannot "also be concepts", inasmuch as concepts 
are not humans, and vice versa).  She also thought that 
such "sets" or numbers "can evade reality and establish a 
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system of rule by...blind whims"   ; thus an institution/ 
system can produce (or establish, or, set up) a tyranny 
(so that a tyranny produces a tyranny, a system of rule 
sets up a system of rule), which is absurd.  She followed 
most other "political philosophers" (and "social theo- 
rists") with her acceptance of "collectives" (or col- 
lectivities") which are supposed to be such that each of 
them is one thing (an undefined and undefinable thing) 
and a thing that is a number (or set, or "collection") 
and the things so numbered; now, in truth, no such things 
can exist, for every thing that exists is being only one 
thing—that thing which it is—not several things, nor 
any thing that is not that thing which it is. 
In truth, a political government cannot be any 
imaginary thing such as a "collective".  It is not a 
"public group" or "Public" collective; nor can it be any 
action by, or product of, such a public "thing".  But, in 
contrast to truth, Rand believed in public collectivities 
—so that she was no different than other experts (like 
Dewey, who believed "the state is the organization of the 
public effected through officials for the protection of 
its interests shared by its members" : "the public is a poli- 
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tical state"   )—because one notion such that "e pluribus 
unum" is to be considered like any other "collectivist con- 
cept"; that is, to be identified as just another meaningless, 
pseudo-concept.  Rand would admit, on one hand, that a human 
group such as "a nation has no rights"—emphasizing that 
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every "group, as such, has no rights"   ; but then, on the 
other hand, she would grant them rights anyway—so that for 
her "A free nation has the right to invade Soviet Russia, 
358 Cuba or any other slave pen"   .  She believed that her col- 
lections of humans have "self-interest" and "choice": on 
the issue of engaging in war, she held that "Whether a 
nation chooses to do so or not is a matter of its own 
self-interest", though "It is not a...nation's duty to 
liberate other nations" yet still "a free nation has the 
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right" to fight and conquer others "if it so chooses". 
She even held that possession of rights {free actions, or 
"freedoms") is the case with even the smallest collectives/ 
institutions: it "is true of all legitimate groups... 
partnerships, businesses..-labor unions...political part- 
ies, etc."—and even of "all agency agreements" (contracts 
by collections, such as business agreements and political 
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directives).    That her societies are the same as her 
nations/political states/governments, and that they have 
the same rights, is evident:  "The right of 'the self- 
determination of nations' applies only to...societies... 
not to dictatorships"   .  To whatever collectivities 
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were "illegitimate", such as "mobs" and "gangs" (and 
tyrannies), she did not ascribe rights—but she did as- 
cribe irrational actions to them, such as that an improper 
"nation can enslave" human beings, though it cannot be 
said to "enslave" them "by right" (so that the illegiti- 
mate groups/societies/states necessarily act, even if 
"not legitimately").  Now, for her to suppose that poli- 
tical governments that are proper act legitimately is an 
opinion that they act rationally; rationality is for her 
"selfishness" and "a state of noncontradictory joy"— 
inasmuch as it is necessitated by the rational mover's 
hedonic mechanism/principle; therefore, her political 
governments' rationalities are their self-interests and 
joys, the products of their hedonic mechanisms/principles 
—for there must be hedonic mechanisms/principles belong- 
ing to her political governments.  The superior mechanisms/ 
principles of the collectivities must be different than 
the mechanisms/principles of the individual human beings. 
As compared to a mere individual human's pleasure mech- 
anism/principle, "the interest of the public" must be 
superior, "a more supreme guide and criterion of govern- 
mental activity"   .  At the bottom of the "political 
process", her views imply, is an irrational passion.  The 
passion of the collective must be superior to the pas- 
sions of the individuals "subsumed" in the collective. 
Just as the rationality of an individual is "objectifica- 
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tion of" its "self-value"   , so there must be some motion 
by a collective human being that is an "objectification" 
(or "out-working", or, "manifestation") of its superior 
Value (its superior Ought, or hedonic mechanism/prin- 
ciple); just as "the distinction of vice and virtue" by 
any specific person "is not...by reason" (according to 
Hume, but also for Rand),    and so the undefinable col- 
lective Persons must determine their oughts through sensa- 
tion rather than reason.  Her "opposite" David Hume also 
supposed sexual passion to be the ultimate source, or 
beginning, of ethical behavior; all subsequent socio- 
political "virtues" are learned through the familial life 
brought about by mating of men and women (as are all the 
"vices"); similarly, her "intellectual heir" Nathan Branden 
proposed that "sex is the highest form of selfishness in 
the noblest sense of that word", and that it is an "expe- 
rience" by the person "of being an end in himself"— 
and that it is "life...asserting itself within him, the 
principle that a human being is an end in himself assert- 
ing itself"—and that it is in sex that a person "escapes 
from any  malevolent feeling...or...of...senseless servi- 
tude to incomprehensible ends" and instead "experiences... 
o c c 
the feeling that the purpose of life is happiness". 
But this experience is apparently negated by the supposed 
fact that the Collectivity has its own great Ought—so 
that individuals subsumed in groups must be enslaved to 
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incomprehensible End, Che "happiness of society", after 
all.  The individual's "direct, immediate, sensory con- 
firmation" that it is free and rational, is "overridden" 
by the Group's superior confirmation of its "group 
rights".  But, in truth, there is no evidence of any 
"human collectivities"; since there is no evidence, it 
can be known that "human collectivities" is a pseudo- 
concept.  Rand knew that there are none, sometimes; but, 
at other times, she imagined that they exist.  She sought 
to "resolve the contradiction" by saying that a group 
"as such" has no rights—thereby implying that groups can 
be other than what they are as such (other than themselves 
as such), and in being what they are not are somehow able 
to have rights and other attributes that they themselves 
(that what they are as such), as attributes, cannot 
possess.  Her political governments "as such" lack rights 
or any other attributes; but when they are imaginatively 
"not themselves, not as such" they can be entities having 
attributes (even motions, and indeed free motions, which 
are "rights").  When she wished them to be something, she 
only needed to remove the phrase "as such", and she could 
suppose them to be societies, nations, economies, rights 
or anything. 
Section VIII:  "Refutation of Her Notions of Political 
Governments as Things Other Than Societies, 
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Nations, Countries, Rights, Systems, States 
and Economies" 
She wrote that most philosophers are "struggling 
to evade" knowing of the "existence of capitalism" (the 
identity of proper political government, of a political 
government as such), and are attempting to "misrepresent 
its nature and to destroy it".    But after her many 
positive "definitions" of political governments (capi- 
talisms), she too began negating her "nature of capital- 
ism":  After her multiple and complex identifications of 
political governments with societies, nations, countries, 
rights, systems (political/social/economic systems), 
states, economies, etc., she began to differentiate—to 
"draw subtle divisions"—between the things so equated. 
She argued that "If a society is-to be free, its govern- 
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ment has to be controlled"   , and that "a nation has a 
right to its government, its social system and its terri- 
tory"   .  But, after dividing her societies from her 
political governments and nations, she re-equated them: 
"It does not matter...whether a nation was enslaved by 
force or by vote"—"Whether a slave society was conquered 
or chose to be enslaved, it can claim no national 
369 
rights".     (Thus, for her, though nations may have 
"rights to societies", yet at least those nations that 
are not free are themselves societies—and such societies/ 
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nations are Che only societies that cannot possess "na- 
tional rights".  The opinion is absurd, because nations 
cannot both not be societies and also be societies—and 
societies cannot both be and not be nations.)  She divided 
political governments and their actions (which she called 
"governmental actions"):  "The nature of governmental 
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action is:  coercive action"   —even though she had 
treated of political governments as actions themselves. 
She split her Capitalism into capitalist states and capi- 
talist economies (or, into political actions and free 
tradings):  "A disastrous intellectual package-deal, put 
over on us by the theoreticians of statism, is the equa- 
371 tion of economic power with political power".     She 
distinguished countries, economies and "rule" (govern- 
ment) when she wrote that "When a statist ruler exhausts 
his own country's economy, he attacks his neighbors" who 
372 are "his only means of...prolonging his rule"  —even 
though she had previously treated of a state and an 
economy as the same thing, for she had held capitalisms, 
fascisms, feudalisms, socialisms and other political 
systems/governments to be economies/economic systems and 
political states:  "The world conflict of today is the 
conflict of the individual against the state, the same 
conflict that has been fought throughout...history"—the 
struggle that "is the individual against feudalism, or 
against monarchy,.or against communism or fascism or 
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socialism or the welfare state"   .  She went on dis- 
tinguishing political governments (or at least, those 
political governments that are "dictatorships") from 
countries:  "A dictatorship is a gang devoted to looting 
the effort of the productive citizens of its own coun- 
try"   .  She even contrasted political governments and 
their policies with "statisms" and their policies: 
"statism kept growing throughout the nineteenth century, 
and...blasted the world in 1914" because "the governments 
375 involved were dominated by statist policies"    (which 
"meant" that Statisms are things governing some political 
governments); but then, she equated them, since she had 
held immoral governments to be "gang-rules", and she de- 
clared that "Statism—in fact and principle—is...gang 
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rule" . Now, she had described tyrannical governments 
as wars, conflicts, gang-struggles ("pressure group war- 
fare"), and therefore implied that they are economies 
when she wrote that "A mixed economy is...a civil war of 
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...groups looting and devouring"   ; but then she divided 
statisms, which she considered to be wars (gang-rules) 
from themselves when she claimed that a "Statism needs 
378 
war"   .  She divided statisms/wars from political 
systems, and both of these from countries, when she noted 
"The degree of statism in a country's political sys- 
379 tern",   whereas she had also considered statisms to be 
political systems/governments and both of them to be 
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countries.  She divided Tyranny from nation when she held 
that "this savage ideology now rules nations armed with 
380 
nuclear weapons"   .  (Of course, it is impossible for 
any attribute such as ideology to be an entity that rules 
or otherwise acts—it is impossible for Tyranny/Statism/ 
improper political government, since she considered them 
to be ideologies, to be entities at all.  It is also 
absurd for an ideology to rule a nation, if a nation is 
armed with weapons, making it seem to necessarily be an 
entity—because attributes do not "dominate" entities.) 
She attempted an explanation, and began by considering a 
statism to be a "collectivism", of which one typical form 
("the most primitive form") is "racism" (racist tyranny, 
or racist culture or society):  "Like every form of col- 
lectivism, racism is a quest for the unearned", "a quest 
for automatic knowledge—for an automatic evaluation of 
men's characters that bypasses the responsibility of 
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exercising rational...judgement"  —so that every statism 
is an action that is a "quest for the unearned" (a resis- 
tance to at least one rational, productive human by an 
irrational human).  She continued that "the...root of 
statism (or collectivism) is the tribal premise of 
primordial savages who, unable to conceive of...rights, 
believed that the tribe is a supreme, omnipotent ruler, 
that...owns the lives of its members and may sacrifice 
them whenever... to whatever it deems to be its own 
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'good'",    whereas her own, non-tribal premise was that 
tribes are not entities and cannot rule or otherwise act 
—and she declared that "there is no such entity as 'the 
tribe' or 'the public'; the tribe (or the public or 
society) is only a number"   .  But contradictorily, she 
asserted that there is a "ruling tribal premise" behind 
"statisms" which are behind "tyrannies"; to the hierachial 
tribal premises, statisms and improper political govern- 
ments, she even ascribed an "evolutionary development"— 
so that, for her, a "Racism is the most primitive form of 
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collectivism"   and the "Marxian class consciousness" 
would be, apparently, an advanced form of tribal premise 
or statism.  But, in truth, premises are attributes; 
attributes do not "evolve over centuries of mass selec- 
tion and trial-and-error by millions"—and they are not 
acting entities, because they are not entities; true 
premises are concepts, concepts are actions, and actions 
do not "evolve" (or "become") or otherwise act.  Thus, 
what Rand "identified" by her term "Statism" (and by her 
expressions "collectivism", "tribal premise", etc.) is 
not a premise (concept) at all, nor any other attribute 
nor any entity; in fact, it is not an identification of 
anything, but is a meaningless notion. 
Whereas she had equated political governments/ 
systems with social systems (societies), and she also 
distinguished them by noting that the "difference between 
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political power and any other kind of social 'power', 
between a government and any" other "organization" is 
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that "only political power is...coercion"   —that only 
political systems are coercive actions/entities.  But, 
if other powers are not forces, then they are not power- 
ful (not forceful), and cannot really be powers—so that, 
for her, the "other social powers" are not powers at all. 
Now, she had made political power and society (and social 
system) appear to be the same thing when she "identified" 
the United States as both a political power/system/state/ 
government and a society/social system and power—so 
that, if a political government is a power but a social 
power not a power, then the United States is a thing that 
is what it is but not really what it is.  She had written 
that "The free market represents the social application 
of an objective theory of values", whereas America is its 
"political application"   —even though for her the 
"American system" is "capitalism"—so that the United 
States is both one thing and several non-identical things, 
a thing that is a coercion and a thing that is not a 
coercion "as such". 
She "synthesized" the various natures of the 
United States by invoking "Rights", and treating economy 
or society and political state or government as twin 
effects (as the twin products or manifestations) of the 
dominant Principle (which is "Rights"):  On the one hand, 
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in the case of a "free market", "the economic value of a 
man's work is determined...by a single principle: by the 
voluntary consent of those who are willing to trade him 
387 their work or products in return"   ; on the other hand, 
in the case of the American society as a political system, 
"It was the concept of individual rights that had given 
birth to a free society"   .  But, in truth, concepts 
cannot act so as to "give birth", just as they cannot 
"dominate their meanings" and "determine the value of a 
man's work"; they are simply actions that are attributes 
of conceivers.  Neither is there, in truth, any such 
single, one and only "Basic Principle" ("Rights") that is 
supposed to be that which "all humans, or at least, all 
rational humans, can or must participate in, be deter- 
mined by, and commonly possess". 
She had other names for this "Rights" (her one 
Basic Principle/mechanism/premise): (1) "the voluntary 
consent of those willing to trade"; (2) "the concept of 
man as a free, independent individual" (which is plainly 
inconsistent with her assertion that "the concept of a 
right pertains only to action" rather than to the free 
beings to which the rights belong); (3) the "basic social 
principle"; (4) "the principle of renouncing the use of 
force and delegating to the government...physical self- 
389 defense"   ; and (5) "the conditions required by man's 
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nature for his proper survival"   .  She held that this 
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imaginary Rights Principle is most fully objectified in 
the American culture/society/state, inasmuch as it was 
the United States (and only the United States) that 
recognized the Principle, while all other cultures re- 
mained ignorant of it: Rights "was profoundly alien to 
the culture of Europe" which "was a tribal culture down 
391 to its roots"   ; she dubbed it "The American philosophy . 
of the Rights of Man", and insisted that the American 
Principle "was never grasped fully by European intel- 
392 lectuals"    (even though there cannot be any "partial, 
or semi-grasping of an idea"—there are no "semi-con- 
cepts", so that either all the intellectuals in Europe 
did not identify the supposed principle, or else they all 
did, or some of them did and the others did not).  She 
considered this "philosophy of the United States" to be 
"only one basic principle...the principle of renouncing 
393 the use of force and delegating to the government", 
and "the basic social principle without which no moral 
society is possible: 'the principle of individual 
394 
rights".   .  She believed, moreover, that "If men are to 
live...in a peaceful, productive, rational society... they 
must accept the basic social principle", the recognition 
of which "means to...accept the conditions required by 
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man's nature for his proper survival".     Since she held 
that "man's mind is his basic tool of knowledge", the 
tool that must be employed by his hedonic mechanism/ 
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principle, then "the basic condition he requires is the 
freedom to think and act according to his rational judge- 
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ment"  —so'that, in order for the individual thinker to 
be thinking (for the mind to possess any knowledge) there 
must be some Basic Condition/Principle that "allows" the 
thinker to be what he is (that makes the thinker be free 
—that makes the entity have rational attribute/s—that 
"explains" why the thing is what it is and "protects it 
from negation").  Thus, according to her view, a rational 
human requires a "Freedom to" (the great overall "Rights 
to" Principle/mechanism of his body—the hedonic Ground 
of Rational Being) in order to be what it is; but, for 
her, the Freedom-to Principle is not only "positive" 
(supposedly, a thing, sometimes entity and sometimes 
action, and sometimes several entities and many actions), 
but also "negative" (a "void of interference", which 
would be a "negation of any actual or possible negation/s 
of the being-what-it-is of a free, rational thing") so 
that it may be considered a nothing rather than a thing; 
if it is really nothing, then a rational human that re- 
quires Rights requires a nothing—which is absurd.  Yet 
she called the Nothing (Rights) "The source of the govern- 
ment's authority", "the consent of the governed", and even 
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"the principle of delegation",    and sometimes, the 
"right of representation", "the service of representa- 
tion", and "political power".  She explained that "A 
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398 proper government is...Che servant...of its citizens"   ; 
and it is really only "a few men armed with political 
399 power"   , which "power" is simply "the right...to repre- 
sent .. .derived from the rights of those" individuals who 
are represented, and who had to "delegate" their rights 
to the few; the many who are the "represented" must have 
delegated their rights to the political government/state/ 
system "by their voluntary choice, for a specific, de- 
limited purpose".    Thus, the Basic Social Principle is 
that of the necessity of the movement of individual right 
from the many to the few: the Rights principle/mechanism 
is the "service of representation", "the principle of 
delegation": moreover, it is "the Principle of Individual 
Rights" (the American philosophy of the Rights of Man, 
or, "the basic social premise", the "link between Ethics 
and Politics"), the principle that the rights are not 
really individual, but social after all.  But, in truth, 
rights are attributes, and cannot "be delegated" or other- 
wise move. 
Miss Rand held that not only political govern- 
ments but also businesses are "based on the recognition 
of rights": "the right of an industrial concern to engage 
in business is derived from the right of its owners"   ; 
and she held that every other "group which no one was 
forced to join" (which is "'legitimate'...noncriminal and 
freely formed") necessarily has its own rights (free 
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actions) "based on the principle of individual rights" 
("the principle of delegation", "the basic social prin- 
ciple").  She did not hold that every member of such a 
group must recognize Rights, but that Rights must have 
been recognized "by the group" in order for any "social 
organization" (social power/system) such as a business or 
a club or a family or a political government to exist. 
But, if her groups are numbers, or if they are individuals 
who have been numbered (persons for which there are num- 
bers), then they either cannot "recognize" (if they are 
numbers) or else, if they are numbered humans (if the 
groups are men) then the "members of the groups" cannot 
be humans. 
Now, although Rand's various groups (ranging 
from clubs and families to political states and cultures) 
have rights delegated to them, they do not really receive 
the rights (the rights not-being-really delegated to 
them): "only an individual can possess rights"   .  The 
apparent explanation is that the rights delegated are 
transformed in the processes of delegation into non- 
rights (rights that are not rights "as such") called 
"collective rights"; her "national rights" are some 
examples of her collective rights.    As a further 
"explanation" of the mystery, she suggested that "the 
source of all rights" (the "only Basic Right") is "the 
right to life"404, but also held that "property rights" 
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are those without which "no other rights can be prac- 
ticed"   ; thus, she divided rights/political governments 
into: (1) one basic Right (the right to life, without 
which there cannot be any other rights—"the source of 
all rights) that precedes any others "in theory"; (2) 
several, or many, "property rights" basic rights (without 
which no other rights can be practiced) that precede any 
others "in practice"; and (3) "other rights" that follow 
the basic Right in theory and the basic Rights in practice 
(and apparently also in theory).  On the other hand, she 
seemed to equate her right to life and her property: 
"Since man has to sustain his life by his own effort, the 
man who has no right to the product of his own effort has 
no means to sustain his life", whereas an irrational, un- 
free "man who produces while others dispose...is a 
slave".     But, in truth, a "survival" of a living entity 
is its essential motion (its "ultimate composite action", 
or its "life" or living—its moving as it moves at all 
times—its entire motion that is composed of all its other 
motions)—so that a living entity's life cannot be said 
to be a thing distinct from its survival.  A human there- 
fore cannot "sustain its life by its own effort" (cannot 
"make itself move in every way it does by an additional 
motion 'other than' its entire motion and the components 
thereof"); nor can a man "live by living" (use its essen- 
tial action in order to produce the same essential action 
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and the components thereof) because the supposed "use of 
living" would necessarily be a part of the living itself 
(and the supposed living/life would not be the man's 
living/life unless it were composed of every other action 
by the man).  (If her "rights" are to be considered 
"recognitions" that a rational being must "use its ration- 
ality", or, "choose to be rational", or "choose to think", 
in order to be rational—in order for there to be the 
rationality that is so "used"—then her "rights" must be 
considered "recognitions" that the rationality of a 
rational being both exists and does not exist—that the 
rationality must be "used" before it exists in order to 
make it exist—that the rationality does not exist when 
the being to which it will belong perceives it, identifies 
it, and "chooses it".  The opinion is false and meaning- 
less.)  She propounded another view: that "to violate 
man's rights means to compel him to act against his own 
judgement"—which could be interpreted as "meaning" either 
that the "rights" so violated are the actions that the 
man would have had in accordance with his concept (judge- 
ment), or else, that the violated "rights" is the judge- 
ment (concept) that is supposedly acted against; but, in 
either interpretation, the violation of rights is a "mak- 
ing of free action to be not what it is—not free action". 
If a right is violable, then it is not necessarily what 
it is; if it is violated, then it necessarily is not what 
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it is; buC, since every thing necessarily is only that 
one thing that it is, therefore the rights Rand imagined 
are not things at all.  She worried that "a man's rights" 
might be "left at the mercy of the unilateral decision, 
the arbitrary choice, the irrationality, the whim of 
another man"    (although rights are not entities to be 
"left in" or otherwise occupy locations, and even though 
she had held rights to be "inalienable"), and therefore, 
she imagined an "impersonal robot", an entity "composed 
of laws, not men" called "Government" that would enforce 
her view that "use of physical force—even its retaliatory 
use—cannot be left at the discretion of individual citi- 
zens"    (an imaginary robot that ensures that no one can 
violate rights often or at all, for she believed that 
"rights can be violated only by force"—by "the use of 
physical force" by other men).  "Citizens", she believed, 
must not attempt to govern themselves; they must not 
oppose those criminals and foreign invaders who would, or 
actually do, violate rights.  She argued that such opposi- 
tion or "retaliation" (or retaliatory force or power) 
must be solely by, and belonging only to, political 
government, which is nothing but "an impersonal robot, 
with the laws as its only motive power" and with all "its 
actions...rigidly defined, delimited and circum- 
scribed"   ; such unfree political government is required 
to make men free and keep them free: the caused causes 
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the uncaused to be the uncaused.  Rand claimed that "If a 
society is to be free, its government has to be con- 
trolled"    {thus dividing societies from political 
governments, even though she had equated them), yet she 
also admitted that a political government can "act on its 
own": "we are fast approaching the...ultimate inversion... 
where the government is free to do anything it pleases, 
while...citizens may act only by permission"    (though 
the "inversion" of the nature of political governments 
seems to exist, for her, in an "Ideal World'of conven- 
tional thought", for she advised her readers to "Now con- 
sider the extent of the...inversion in today's prevalent 
view of government"   ).  She then supposed that most 
political governments—and, probably, all political 
governments—are not robots after all, but free beings 
whose actions negate (or violate, or alienate) the rights 
of individual humans: she wrote that "if one considers 
the monstrous...inversion of the governments under which 
mankind has had to live through most of its history, one 
begins to wonder how men have managed to preserve...a 
semblance of civilization, and what...has kept them walk- 
ing upright on two feet"   .  Thus, she saw political 
governments not as things enforcing the Basic Social 
Premise, not as the "social good", but as things "destroy- 
ing societies".  Thus, she considered political govern- 
ments to be things "other than" the things she had pre- 
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viously imagined them to be; she did not "re-define" 
them, but rather, supposed that the things that were them 
(the things as which she had defined them) are not what 
they are.  Whereas she had described political govern- 
ments/states/systems/powers as things protecting indivi- 
duals or individuals' rights, and had emphasized that 
"the function of rights" (since she equated political 
governments and rights) "is to protect" even "the smallest 
/   "1 / 
minority...the individual",   yet she also claimed that 
they are not protectors/protections "as such" (not really 
what they are, after all), but "protection-rackets": 
"Progress cannot be planned by government, and...cannot 
be restricted or retarded; it can only be stopped" 
(so that, since "Progress" was for her "Free Market/ing" 
and "A free market is...an upward process that demands 
the best (the most rational) of every man and rewards him 
accordingly"   , government cannot cause itself, nor 
restrict or retard itself—but only stop itself, negate 
itself).  Thus, the political governments of Rand are 
"other than" economies that are free markets.  They are 
also things other than free societies, insofar as she 
equated free markets and free societies:  "In a free 
society, men are not forced to deal with one another" but 
"do so only by voluntary agreement...by contract" 
Political governments, insofar as they are 
"rackets", which are capable only of negating themselves, 
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must be "limited" or "controlled" in order for them to 
exist at all.  Political governments are limited by their 
being-not-what-they are: by the "fact" that they are not 
things other than humans, but humans who are "police", 
"soldiers" and "judicial authorities":.."The functions of 
a government fall into three broad categories, all of 
them involving issues of physical force and...protection 
of...rights: the police...the armed services...the law 
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courts"   .  Thus, a political government's actions 
(functions) are not by and belonging to itself—but by 
and belonging to policemen, soldiers and judges; yet, are 
also belonging only to itself, and not to the individual 
police, soldiers and judges at all.  To resolve the ir- 
resolveable contradictions of her opinion, she added that 
the citizens acting to protect rights (to "secure rights") 
act as automatons—as "robots" moved by laws; the caused 
"government officials" ("a few men armed with political 
power") she considered to be the political government/ 
system itself; yet, she also distinguished political 
governments as things other than the humans that they are. 
The humans that are political governments cannot be them- 
selves as such: "A private individual may do anything 
except that which is legally forbidden; a government 
official may do nothing except that which is permit- 
419 ted".     If proper governmental officials are rational, 
free beings, their actions must not be effects, and thus, 
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cannot be "prescribed", "limited" or "controlled".  But, 
such humans, as governmental officials (as "the Govern- 
ment"), are not what they are as such; since Rand allowed 
them to also be political governments, she had to suppose 
that they are not rational, free, human beings.  But, if 
political governments are humans, then, they must also be 
things other than the humans that they are. 
She again "resolved" the issues by claiming 
that "A complex legal system is required to make a 
society free and to keep it free—a system that does not 
depend on" any individual or on "the motives...moral 
character or... intentions of any given official"   ; com- 
plex "Laws" are supposed to limit political governments 
from destroying themselves, and to account for political 
governments protecting rights as well as violating them, 
and to make them unfree as well as free things.  But she 
did not explain how "Laws" do the ultimate permitting and 
forbidding, nor if anything can permit or forbid laws, 
nor what creates or directs them; she believed that laws 
are things "aimed at protection", and that are "objective" 
(but, a rational being, products of rational beings, or 
anything else is "objective", for her), which is not a 
proper definition of laws or anything else.  To be truly 
free, she supposed, humans need the laws:  "men must know 
clearly, and in advance of taking an action, what consti- 
tutes a crime and what penalty they will incur if they 
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commit it"   ; nor can they be "legislating", making and 
amending the laws, issuing "directives" and otherwise 
doing the governing of themselves for themselves: thus, 
Rand's close follower told me that the only thing left to 
vote on would be the color of the policemen's uni- 
forms    (also, since voting,.and legislation, are so 
limited and inconsequential, the "buying of votes" would 
be a legal, not criminal, practice) because the political 
powers would be laws, not men.  Miss Rand told of an 
actual instance of "a government of laws": "The American 
system...was just such an achievement"—an action not by 
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men, but by laws.   ' The prime example of "Laws govern- 
ing political systems/governments/states" that she gave 
was: the "Constitution of the United States": "It cannot 
be repeated too often that the Constitution is a limita- 
tion on the government, not on private individuals"   ; 
"it does not prescribe...conduct of private individuals, 
only the conduct of the government", for "it is...a 
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charter of...protection against the government"   .  When 
she wrote that "it is a limit on the government, not on 
private individuals", she "meant" both that it is a limit 
on the state as government officials, and also, that it 
is a limit on government as a thing other than the state 
officials—implying that a political government is a thing 
other that what it is (other than rational, governing 
humans).  Now, when she wrote that a Constitution (Laws) 
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is "a charter" that is "protection against the govern- 
ment", she also meant that it is the government's pro- 
tection against itself; it is, for her, that which negates 
the state's otherwise certain negation of itself by it- 
self.  But, insofar as her political states/systems/ 
governments are themselves Constitutions, they must be 
"self-limitations" (paradoxical "things" that negate their 
negations of themselves, whose actions are self-negations 
of their self-negations); by such dialectical somersaults 
they become societies, nations, countries, rights, 
systems, states, economies and many other things (state 
officials, police, judges, laws, constitutions, etc.), 
and they also become things other than societies, nations, 
countries, rights, systems, states, economies and all 
other things; as such, they are always "in flux", they 
are beyond logical grasp, conveniently undefinable.  She 
kept telling that political governments are "not this" 
and "not that"—kept telling what they are not, but never 
what they are.  A properly "defined" political govern- 
ment, for her, is one that is "a system that leaves no 
opportunity...no loophole for... tyranny"   —a thought 
that always binds itself, not allowing itself to be a free 
action, because to be free would be to negate itself, to 
violate itself as rights or as protection of rights (to 
negate itself as free humans or as their protector/pro- 
tection, to obliterate itself as society or as the maker 
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of society, and so on).  In truth, however, an uncaused 
thing cannot "make itself not free", nor in doing so 
"make itself truly free, truly able to do what it does— 
to protect rights, make society, etc."; a political 
government must then be, in truth, either a free, rational 
entity or else, not a free thing.  Furthermore, there is, 
in truth, no "potentially free thing"; and there is no 
"thing that is able to be some thing/s other than what it 
is"; and insofar as Rand treated of her political govern- 
ments as things having actions that are not by political 
governments it is implicit that political governments are 
able to be things other than what they are—which is 
absurd and indemonstrable: a meaningless notion. 
In summary, then, Ayn Rand's views of political 
governments as things other than societies, nations, 
countries, rights, systems, states and economies must be 
identified as meaningless notions.  She failed to identify 
what real, tangible things are the political governments 
about which she denied the various predicates; since 
denials without any contextual affirmation (not involving 
any definition of the thing/s of which predicates are 
being denied)must be refuted as meaningless intonations, 
because one cannot judge a given predicate as inapplicable 
to a given thing unless one has already identified that 
thing (unless one already possesses at least an essential 
definition of the thing from which the meaning/s of which 
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the predicate being identified as inapplicable is an 
identification is/are distinguished).  Her notion is also 
false because many of the things she considered the 
political governments to be "other than" were also never 
identified by her; nor can many of them be identified at 
all, since they are nothings (such as her "social sys- 
tems", which she could not identify, because there cannot 
be any real extra-mental, non-expressional social systems 
—nor any "unreal" ones).  The Randian political scienti- 
fic concepts of political governments as things other 
than societies, nations, countries, rights, systems, 
states and economies must be considered "foggy metaphors, 
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sloppy images, unfocused poetry, and equivocations"   ; 
they are not scientific distinctions and clearly demon- 
strated statements of denial involving any true knowledge 
by Rand of political governments. 
PART D:  "CONCLUSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS" 
Section I:  "A Causal Explanation of the Randian Political 
Scientific Concepts" 
Ayn Rand wrote that "no political discussion 
can be meaningful or intelligible without a clear under- 
standing of two crucial concepts: 'rights' and 'govern- 
ment'—yet these are the two most strenuously evaded in 
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today's technique of obfuscation"   ; yet her own apparent 
concepts of political governments (as well as her apparent 
concepts of rights) are obfuscations.  She did not con- 
ceive of any of the real, tangible things that are poli- 
tical governments because she did not begin by way of 
perceiving those things; instead, she began by way of 
perceiving other humans to whom genuine and/or false 
political scientific ideas belonged—and she ended by 
imitating them: 
According to her own explanation of the origins 
of false, meaningless concepts (that they are meaningless 
mimicries, irrational "mouthings" of sounds), and given 
that her own "political scientific concepts" are not 
meaningful (and thus, are not concepts as judged by her 
own explicit epistemological standards), it is necessary 
to conclude that they are meaningless imitations of other 
humans (or of at least one other human, whether rational 
or irrational).  As imitations (even if they are imita- 
tions of other imitators, rather than of rational holders 
of political scientific concepts) they must be to some 
extent similar to the true political scientific concept/s 
they ultimately presuppose; some of the Randian political 
scientific concepts are most distorted than others; some 
are very similar to some true political scientific con- 
cept/s, but regardless of the degree of distortion (the 
"level of inconsistency") they necessarily must remain 
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what they are: meaningless notions (so that none of them 
is "more true" than others).  That she began nonconcep- 
tually and imitatively is evident from her admission that 
"those who may be interested in the chronological pro- 
gression of my thinking" may "observe the progression 
429 from a political theme...to a metaphysical theme"   , and 
her insistence that she is a "radical for capitalism" who 
is "fighting for" and trying to establish or create "that 
philosophical base which capitalism did not have and 
without which it was doomed to perish"   .  She held that 
she simply "sought to create" or "discover" a "moral 
justification of capitalism...that it is the only system 
consonant with man's moral nature, that it protects man's 
survival qua man, and that its ruling principle is jus- 
tice".    She began by assuming her borrowed, unconceived 
(imitational, rather than learned).political scientific 
concepts were correct—and by feeling that the imagined 
political governments so "identified" are "good" and 
"possible" and "ought to exist"; thus she worked back- 
wards, skipping over political conception (bypassing any 
real political government/s) believing that she could 
leave actual governing of men—the "working-out of mun- 
dane, practical details"—the implementation of her ab- 
stract generalities—to "political officials" (states- 
men) ; she leaped by way of "pure deductive reasoning" 
(or, mystical intuition) into creating or "finding a moral 
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base" (fabricating an Ethics, a notion of Ought/End/Value/ 
the Good), and eventually also into conceiving true meta- 
physical and epistemological concepts to "undergird" her 
view of political governments.  But, in truth, any real 
political scientific concepts necessarily involve (neces- 
sarily are based on) political concepts previously con- 
ceived by the same individual, and both political and 
political scientific concepts on the logically prior meta- 
physical and epistemological concepts by the same con- 
ceiver; now, since any political scientific concepts by 
anyone must be subsequent (temporally, as well as lin- 
guistically) to some metaphysical and epistemological 
concepts by the same individual, then in order for any 
individual to have any true political scientific con- 
cepts, it must first have had some true metaphysical and 
epistemological concepts.  Rand did not, but apparently 
began with the subsequent; but she could not have had the 
subsequent without the prior, so that she only apparently 
had the subsequent—and this analysis is a denial that 
she really had the subsequent: a proof that she did not 
have true political scientific concepts (that she did not 
identify any political governments).  A concept of a 
prior, but nonexistent concept cannot be created first, 
and then "subsumed under the prior concept as soon as the 
prior concept is discovered and brought into being"; such 
action would be to make a nothing become something. 
188 
If her "base" of her political scientific 
concepts was arrived at later than her political scien- 
tific concepts, then it is certain that her political 
scientific concepts are not concepts, and that their 
alleged "base" is really not their basis.  She argued 
that her "Politics is based on three other philosophical 
disciplines: metaphysics, epistemology and ethics" and 
that "It is only on such a base that one can formulate a 
consistent political theory and achieve it in prac- 
432 tice"   ; she insisted that her "primary interest is not 
politics...as such" and that her notion of "capitalism" 
merely happens to be "the only system geared to the life 
of a rational being"   .  She stated that she "does not 
regard politics as a...primary goal", and that she merely 
"advocates certain political principles—specifically, 
those of laissez faire capitalism—as the consequence and 
the ultimate practical application of" her "fundamental 
philosophical principles"   ; she firmly believed that 
any true "politics" (concepts of political governments) 
is necessarily "based on...other philosophical discip- 
lines"; and that all identifications of political govern- 
ments have "necessarily always been a branch of philo- 
sophy"   .  Yet, her own "subsequent" view she allowed to 
have "come into existence" before its supposed base—to 
have been not a part of her philosophy before becoming a 
part.  She admitted that before she "became a philosopher" 
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her "basic view...was in conflict with most of the exist- 
ing philosophical theories"   , so that "In order to de- 
fine, explain and present my concept...I had to become a 
philosopher in the specific meaning of the term"   .  But 
such an "explanation" of her "approach" is as absurd as 
some boast that: "Before I became an astronomer, my theory 
of the red shift was in conflict with most of the exist- 
ing explanations", or some tale that "In order to write 
my history of Atlantis (the one I had already decided to 
write), I had to become an archaeologist (and go out and 
discover Atlantis)".  A true approach to political govern- 
ments is not prejudicial; it is a discovery that neces- 
sarily follows all logically prior discoveries: a true 
understanding of the things that are political govern- 
ments is dependent upon, and necessarily subsequent to, 
the identifications by the same conceiver (that under- 
stands the political governments) of things as such, 
entities, attributes, concepts, conceivers and many other 
things.  One cannot take an "intuitive leap of know- 
ledge", ignoring the necessary steps; one cannot have an 
"intuition" because of which one "has to" become a con- 
ceiver (philosopher) in order to express the idea (the 
intuition) possessed before becoming a thinking being. 
Rand's main interest (the "reason why she 
wrote", lectured and debated) was the fomentation of a 
Capitalist "political revolution", which must begin, she 
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emphasized, as a "moral revolution" (or, as she also be- 
lieved, "through a philosophical revolution"—by way of a 
radical, new philosophical "movement").  She wrote that 
"What this country needs is a philosophical revolution", 
and that "This means a reassertion of the supremacy of 
reason, with its consequences: individualism, freedom, 
progress, civilization"—and that "What political system 
would it lead to? An untried one: full, laissez-faire 
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capitalism".     "A revolution is the climax of a long 
439 philosophical development",   and she believed that she 
had initiated such a process with the completion of Atlas 
Shrugged.  But, if she had followed her own epistemologi- 
cal principles, she would have begun by identifying funda- 
mental facts and, perhaps, have eventually achieved some 
true political scientific concepts; she would not have 
"set out" to foment a "revolution" (she would have had no 
a priori "political Goal" in mind).  Yet, rather than 
acting in accord with her fundamental principles, she 
acted in accord with the medieval cosmologists, who be- 
gan by assuming that the earth "must be" the centre of all 
other astronomical objects, and so conducted their "dis- 
coveries" of the motions of the stars and planets (they 
"undergirded" their theological views with true and/or 
false scientific "bases").  Similarly Rand felt that 
though "Capitalism is not the system of the past", yet it 
"is the system of the future".440 
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She constantly referred to "the power of Phi- 
losophy" to create, change and direct human cultures and 
conditions; she felt, moreover, that it is only through 
or by Philosophy that "Society" can exist, that the "good 
of Mankind" can be realized, and that any "social change" 
happen:  She wrote: "What or who determines the trends of 
the world? (The answer is: philosophy)"   but, inasmuch 
as the phenomena of Philosophy's process are unpredict- 
able (since the philosophers are totally free, uncondi- 
tionable beings of "volitional consciousness" or "in- 
explicable alchemy"), the "course of mankind's progress 
is not a straight... line, but a tortuous struggle, with 
long detours or relapses into...the irrational"   ; 
"social systems" (or "political governments", or, "human 
collectivities" and their "developments") are simply 
phenomena of Philosophy: "The power that determines the 
establishment, the changes, the evolution, and the des- 
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truction of social systems is philosophy"   .  She empha- 
sized that Philosophical power is the "common root" of 
"man's knowledge", and that it leads to (not from) such 
diverse fields as "abstract science", "engineering" and 
"art".     Furthermore, it provides men with their 
Values, and every rational human must "survive by shaping 
the world and himself in the image of his values"   ; 
likewise, the Values of Society (or the ends of political 
government—Rights) are provided: "Just as a man's actions 
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are preceded and determined by some idea in his mind, so 
a society's existential conditions are preceded and deter- 
mined by the ascendancy of a certain philosophy among 
those whose job it is to deal with ideas", and all the 
"events of any given period of history are the result of 
the thinking of the preceding period" (as, for example, 
the "nineteenth century...was the result...of the in- 
tellectual power released by the Renaissance").     She 
considered that the "power of the pen" is greater, and 
even that it causes "the Sword" to move: "there is only 
one...discipline which enables...to deal with large-scale 
problems, which has the power to integrate and unify human 
activities—and that...discipline is philosophy".     The 
humans who are most powerful (who are the "greatest 
authorities", the ultimate "sources of change", the most 
valuable "Unmoved Movers") are the philosophers: among 
occupations "the...commander-in-chief is the philosopher" 
—Rand declared—and "the...lieutenant-commander-in-chief 
is the scientist"   ; by contrast, any tyrant who apparent- 
ly rules millions is no "commander", but mere "chance 
scum", for the great oppressor's supposed tyrannical power 
(or "political authority") over his subjects is nothing 
but "the most helpless state of impotence", irrationality, 
according to Rand.  True societies are the products ex- 
clusively of intellectual power; any tyrannical, pseudo- 
societies (improper political governments, or irrational 
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"rights") are mere states of social disintegration, phenom- 
ena of "the vacuum of Philosophy".  A society that is 
really a society "as such" must, in Rand's view, be guided 
by the Power of Reason: it "has to be an informed 
society", and "The intellectual is the eyes, ears and 
voice of a free society: it is his...to observe the 
events of the world, to evaluate their meaning and to 
inform the men in all other fields".     As the only 
example she could find of a society "founded on Reason" 
{created by Philosophy as such), she mentioned the "un- 
precedented social system...established by the Founding 
Fathers" of the American Revolution (which "was capital- 
is m")—and as examples of truly philosophical intel- 
lectuals, she could only mention "The Founding Fathers", 
who "were a phenomenon unprecedented in history: they were 
thinkers who were also men of action", "efficacious men" 
(men able to produce as well as teach, men who were creat- 
ing wealth rather than "rationalizing its distribution", 
men who both "work and know what they are doing", genuine- 
ly rational intellectuals).     They were unprecedented 
and never matched: "The Founding Fathers were America's 
first intellectuals and, so far, her last"; yet, she 
noticed that their philosophical knowledge was only 
"implicit", and that "in the political philosophy of the 
Founding Fathers, in the social system...in...capitalism" 
there are "other implications" which could "undercut 
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America"—so that the right "moral premises implicit" 
in their thought "must now be recognized and accepted in 
the form of an explicit" knowledge by "New Intellectuals" 
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who, apparently, have yet to appear.     Thus, the Found- 
ing Fathers both were and were not philosophers (both had 
and had not philosophical power), just as America both is 
and is not a true society (proper political government), 
in her opinion; philosophers and societies that unequi- 
vocally are what they are "have yet to appear".  "The best 
among the present intellectuals should consider the tre- 
mendous power...they are holding, but have never fully 
exercised", for "ideas are...not a hobby for 'dis- 
interested' neurotics in ivory towers, but the most 
452 crucial and practical power in human existence"   ; yet, 
even if they realized their power, without Rights they 
could not "fully exercise" it: "Reason requires freedom.... 
It requires the right to think and...to live by one own 
independent judgement.  Intellectual freedom cannot exist 
without political freedom; political freedom cannot exist 
without economic freedom; a free mind and a free market 
are corollaries".     So far, there has been no laissez- 
faire capitalism, no full freedom and no explicit recogni- 
tion of the Rights of Man—so that the philosophical 
power remains submerged; what Rand "saw" was a "vision of 
the future", a "possibility" that full Reason, true 
philosophers, political governments and freedom may ap- 
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pear.  "Freedom is the fundamental requirement of man's 
mind"  —so that without freedom, intellectuals cannot 
exist: "knowledge, thinking, and rational actions are 
properties of the individual... survival requires that 
those who think be free of the interference of those who 
don't"; "A rational mind does not work under compulsion; 
it does not subordinate its grasp of reality to anyone's 
orders, directions, or controls; it does not sacrifice its 
knowledge...to anyone's opinions, threats, wishes...or 
'welfare'"; "Such a mind...cannot be forced". 
Yet, if no men have been rational because none 
has yet had freedom, she nevertheless supposed that she 
perceived rational men: she wrote confidently of "the 
inviolate integrity of such minds"—and knew that "Man's 
essential characteristic is his rational faculty"   ; she 
"began by looking at Man, not men", her "intellectual 
heir" Leonard Peikoff explained   ; she held that "If 
some men do not...think or...work, they can survive 
(temporarily) only by looting the goods produced by 
others"—that "by imitating and repeating a routine of 
work discovered by others—but those others had to dis- 
cover it, or none would have survived"—and that "those 
others had to produce...or none would have survived"   ; 
she looked at the skyline of Manhattan and at the Apollo 
space vehicles, and deduced that "It is to such minds 
459 that mankind owes its survival"  ■—she admitted that the 
196 
free beings do exist and have existed ("An example of 
this...is Galileo"   ), and saw that "Man moves forward 
by" their "grace"   .  She deduced that there has to be 
freedom, since there have to be rationals, each of which 
is "a sovereign individual who owns his...work and its 
products"   ; yet, she also deduced the contradictions: 
"There are two potential violators of man's rights: the 
criminals and the government"   .  Whereas she saw that 
the present state of the world is proof of the power of 
philosophy, she also saw that the current state is a 
"vacuum of philosophy"; the possible, future state of a 
world in which there is true philosophy is the only ulti- 
mate proof of philosophical power—so that it is by ratio- 
cination that the power of philosophy is recognized (it 
is by pure deductive thought that one can "prove" what 
Philosophy does), in her opinion.  By the same "reason- 
ing" process, she identified the irrationals, who are 
divided into "men of faith" and "men of force", or some- 
times , into "tyrants" and "slaves"; an irrational human, 
for her, must be either "the crude material parasite who 
clamors for government handouts in the name of a 'public' 
need", or else "his leader, the spiritual parasite...a 
fence receiving stolen goods" who "derives his illusion 
of 'greatness'...from...power to dispose of what he has 
not earned and from the mystic view of himself as the em- 
bodied voice of 'the public1"   .  She deduced that "when 
197 
men are free, reason wins", but that tyranny results in 
mysticism, for "every period of history dominated by 
mysticism was a period of statism, of dictatorship, of 
lift s tyranny"   ; since all the political governments that 
have existed thus far have been tyrannies, "All previous 
philosophies" have been "irrational, mystical 'philos- 
ophies'"—while hers was supposedly the exception, the 
first fully rational system, the first "proper approach 
to political economy", the first knowledge not involving 
or "based on the tribal premise" (mysticism) "inherited 
from prehistorical traditions"   ; she was an exceptional 
case in which, despite her lack of freedom, reason won. 
Going from a communist state/society/culture to a fascist 
one, she nevertheless discovered the true "moral base" 
that capitalism (a social system that, she admitted, has 
not yet existed) never had: she rejected the "prehistoric 
code" (the "tribal premise") of "social good" as the basis 
of America, and realized that capitalism does not have 
any "pragmatic, utilitarian justification" that "it 
effects the greatest good for the majority" (that it ful- 
fills the wishes of 'the tribe1").  Remaining in a rights- 
violating country, she somehow had the free thought that 
"This greatest of countries was built on my morality—on 
the inviolate supremacy of man's right to exist" (and 
that America is "the product of reason")   ; she pro- 
claimed her vision "the system of the future", while she 
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rejected those mystics who "claim that they perceive a 
mode of being superior to...existence", and who "call it 
'another dimension,'" and sometimes also "call it 'the 
f. CO 
future,' which consists of denying the present"   ; she 
declared that the "freedom" that irrationals "seek is 
freedom from the fact that an A will remain A, no matter 
what their tears or tantrums"   , while she proposed that 
Freedom is that which is required in order for a free, 
rational thing to be itself (so that her Rights are 
"freedoms from" actual and/or possible negations of what 
the rationals are) so that she must have imagined that 
it is at least possible that A can be non-A (or, that A 
is not necessarily A), that the freedoms of a rational 
being (its free actions) can not be as well as be what 
they are.  (Thus, given her notion of "Rights/social 
systems/political governments" her view must be that a. 
free being is not necessarily what it is—that the A 
might not, or won't be A unless it is "forced to be A" 
(unless it has "rights to" what it is), or unless it is 
"protected against being non-A" (has "freedoms from" 
what it isn't)).  While enjoying her inviolate integrity, 
in a cynical, fascist, pluralist, welfare-statist, "Guild 
Socialist" society of rights violations/violators, she 
had a free thought (a free action, or, right) that Philos- 
ophy is the ultimate, insurmountable, unchallenged "power 
in human existence"—yet, she nevertheless felt the need 
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for the monopolisation and employment of physical force 
by rationals as the only means to match and abolish the 
use of physical force by those "thugs" who "initiate the 
use of physical force in violation of rights"; she 
advocated not pure Reason or the "power of Philosophy" 
after all, but instead, recommended the monopolisation 
and employment by the State of physical power (or 
"political power") against the "impotent" irrational 
parasites (so that, it is evident, she believed "brute 
force", or "manipulative authority", or, "Might" to be 
required for rights to exist). 
Though she would not "doubt the power of 
philosophy to...shape the destiny of human societies", 
she had to "struggle fiercely to evade" such doubt: she 
considered that only a few, semi-rational philosophers 
and no explicitly, perfectly rational systems (except her 
own) have yet existed (so that there has been virtually 
no Philosophy, and therefore, that its "power", if any, 
would be difficult to identify, measure and demonstrate) 
—but she took the historical and contemporary "void of 
Philosophy", along with the degraded, depraved "condition 
of Mankind", as "proof" that philosophy is powerful 
("proving" that if any philosophy had existed there 
would not be "all this evil": by "reasoning" that (1) 
there is all this evil and (2) there is no Philosophy, 
and therefore (3) Philosophy must be capable of negating 
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such evil, because the culture of two thousand years, 
always beset by evils, has always lacked true Philosophy). 
"The present state of the world is not the proof of 
philosophy's impotence, but the proof of philosophy's 
power.  It is philosophy that has brought men to this 
state...."  . "Socialism", for example "is not a move- 
ment of the people" but "a movement of the intellectuals" 
(or a "philosophical movement", or a "philosophy" and its 
influence)   ; for another example, she mentioned that 
"our mixed economy is the literal, faithfully carried-out 
product of Pragmatism" (the result of the belief "that 
there is no objective reality, or permanent truth, that 
there are no absolute principles, no valid abstractions, 
no firm concepts, that anything may tried rule-of-thumb, 
that objectivity consists of collective subjectivism, 
that whatever people wish to be true, is true...provided 
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a consensus says so")   ; "The ultimate monument to Kant 
...is Soviet Russia", and "The Nineteenth Century was the 
ultimate product and expression of the intellectual trend 
of the Renaissance and the Age of Reason, which means: 
of a predominantly Aristotelian philosophy"   ; "In 
Western civilization, the period ruled by mysticism is... 
the Dark Ages and the Middle Ages"   , but "Western 
civilization was the...product of reason—via ancient 
Greece" (by way of the classical philosophers, especially, 
Plato and Aristotle)   .  But for Rand "Socialism", 
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"Catholic Christianity", "Pragmatism" and all other 
philosophies (except Objectivism) are species of "Mys- 
ticism" (though they may be involving "Reason" as a 
"menial servant"—though they may even be explicit recog- 
nitions of Logic as Aristotle's philosophy is); whereas 
"Reason is the perception of reality, and rests on a 
single axiom: the Law of Identity", "Mysticism is... 
acceptance...without evidence or proof, either apart from 
' or against the evidence of one's senses.... Mysticism is 
...claim to some non-sensory, non-rational, non-definable, 
non-identifiable means of knowledge" and "claim to per- 
ception of some...reality—other than the one in which we 
live"—so that Philosophy (Reason) is not to be equated 
with any pseudo-philosophy (Mysticism).     If the phi- 
losophers that have heretofore existed (except Rand) and 
their philosophies are pseudo-rational (non-philosophical), 
mystical things, then, the various historical states and 
periods are not products of Philosophy, but of Mysticism; 
therefore, there can be no evidence of her "power of 
Reason" except any influence Objectivism might have— 
and it certainly cannot be "proven" that Reason is more 
powerful than physical force.  She admitted that, in the 
case of America, at least, there is "a philosophical 
vacuum"—that Americans lack any dominant or explicit 
philosophical position, so that their political system is 
"not a militant" but a "tired, worn, cynical" government 
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"by default" led (moved) by only a few "aging, graying 
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'liberals', who had been the 'idealists' of the 30's" 
the only intellectuals remaining among "contemporary 
humanity" are the Dialectical Materialists (the only 
"stale exception" to the masses who are "passive sup- 
4-78 porters of the status quo")    she argued.  But then, 
the Marxists are not intellectuals either.  She saw that 
it is not by the "passive...that the trends of a nation 
are set", and that since there is such a void of rationa- 
lity "Anyone...who has the intellectual ammunition to win 
on the battlefield of ideas" (anyone who can "give the 
reasons" for their position/s) can produce social/cul- 
479 tural/economic/moral/political "trends".    Yet, there 
can be no "battlefield of ideas"—no philosophical 
struggle against the mystics (the pseudo-philosophers): 
"They will encounter no opposition, since...an opposition 
would have to possess intellectual weapons"   .  Everyone 
who is not truly rational is mere "social ballast", 
necessarily caused and conditionable, beyond rational 
persuasion. 
Yet, contrarily, Rand wrote that her "goal...is 
4-81 to enlighten the vast, helpless bewildered majority" 
as though they are not beyond rational persuasion—and 
she saw herself as a combatant in an ideological war: 
She emphasized that "Ideas cannot be fought except by... 
better ideas", and that "A political ideology" such as 
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hers "is a set of principles aimed at establishing or 
maintaining a certain social system; it is a program of 
long-range action".     "The battle consists, not of 
opposing" however "but of exposing; not of denouncing, 
but of disproving; not of evading, but.of proclaiming a 
full, consistent and radical alternative"   ; but then, 
there is nothing to expose, disprove or announce an 
"alternative" to: this "country without a political 
philosophy is...drifting at random"    (even though she 
also believed that no "nation can exist without some... 
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ideology"   and that America is an existing nation, yet 
she identified the United States as a culture that "lacks 
philosophy", a "neurotic culture" that believes its "des- 
perate need of political principles and concepts will 
vanish"   ).  "Professional intellectuals are the voice 
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of a culture", and "today there are no intellectuals" 
—even though she considered herself to be an intellectual 
(and indeed, a philosopher), and every "culture is to be 
judged by its...philosophy... its intellectual life"   . 
She elaborated that "there are no professional intel- 
lectuals in primitive, savage societies"; but, in the 
past two thousand years there have been "two exceptions": 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas (yet even these were not 
intellectuals "as such", because they lacked Freedom—so 
that, until Capitalism comes all "men of the intellect— 
the philosophers...teachers...writers...scientists...were 
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men without a...socially recognized position, without a 
market", without Rights to be what they are (freedom from 
being non-A),     In order for there to be philosophical 
power as such, there would have had to be political power, 
in her view; she considered them "corollaries", but did 
not explain clearly which is to appear first when she 
implied that one must appear in order for the other to 
develop (so that she proposed a "chicken or the egg" 
dilem, a).  Her political program therefore had to combine 
practical action with the development of a "philosophical 
base" for capitalism/America. 
She held that "Something is obviously wrong 
with mankind's political ideas"    (with the political 
ideas belonging to the Collective Human Entity), and she 
diagnosed the fatal flaw (the root of evil) as "the Tribal 
Premise" (opinion that there is such an entity as "Man- 
kind" , "Society", "the Public", "the nation", "race", 
"the Tribe", etc.—which is a meaningless notion, a 
"pseudo-premise" that cannot be demonstrated); such a 
false concept (or pseudo-premise), which she both accepted 
and denied, "denies the existence of" individual "intel- 
ligence and...its role in the production of wealth" 
and implies that the individual is "less real than" and 
subservient to "the tribe" in which he is subsumed. 
Thus, she came to identify "Altruism", the "morality of 
sacrifice" of the individual for the "social good"—the 
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"religion of Humanity", as imagined by Auguste Comte—the 
principle of "from each according to...ability, to each 
according to...need", in the Marxian view—the "positive 
freedom" of Thomas Hill Green—as the negation of Capi- 
talism: "Capitalism and altruism are...philosophical op- 
posites; they cannot exist in the same man or in the same 
492 
society"   .  She considered that, since "The social 
system based on and consonant with the altruist morality 
—with the code of self-sacrifice—is socialism, in any 
of its variants: fascism,...communism" (for all such 
societies/political governments/states "treat man as a 
sacrifical animal to be immolated for...the group, the 
493 tribe, the society, the state"),    it is Altruism "that 
has to be attacked" and supplanted as the "ascendant 
Ethics" in order to guarantee (and indeed, even to estab- 
lish) the Rights of Man.  (Society's negation of its mem- 
bers, insofar as it would be a negation of Society it- 
self, must be negated, in order for Society to become 
absolute, objectified, moral.) 
She radically "undercut" the usual course of 
political discussion:  "The fraudulent issue of fascism 
versus communism...sets up, as opposites, two variants of 
the same political system...thus establishing dictator- 
ship as an inevitable fact and offering only a choice of 
rulers" (a "choice" between "a dictatorship of the rich 
...or a dictatorship of the poor")   —whereas, according 
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Co her, every tyranny or "mob" is the same: "a regression 
495 to primitive barbarism"    (not a progressive social pro- 
cess of trade, but a negative, de-evolutionary process of 
destruction of human civilization, life and values); 
"Soviet Union is the full, consistent embodiment of the 
altruist morality in practice"   for its leaders have 
"logic on their side" insofar as they believe that "the 
collective sacrifice of all to all is the moral ideal" 
and they are willing "to establish this ideal in practice, 
497 here and on this earth"   , Rand opined (in contradiction 
of her thesis that the Russians are mystics, are not 
philosophical and do not observe Logic).  She portrayed 
the barbarians as thinkers reasoning from their funda- 
mental philosophical principles to practical political 
conclusions—in contradiction of her claim that they 
reject reason (or that they cannot grasp the meaning of 
"rationality").  On the one hand, she treated "the masses" 
as fundamentally irrational—as "not open to reason"; but, 
on the other hand, she proposed Philosophy as the cure 
for their "desperate search" for "meaning": "It is poli- 
tical philosophy that...determines the course of...practi- 
cal politics"   —so that she considered philosophies 
such as Objectivism to be the determinants of political 
governments (through rational search, examination, judge- 
ment and convinced acceptance by the masses).  She noted 
that the United States is, or was, chosen by the masses— 
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that in the case of America, the masses accepted the 
premise of individual rights and rejected the tribal pre- 
mise—and that unlike other governments "The American 
political system was based on a different...principle: on 
...man's inalienable right to exist for his own sake 
neither sacrificing himself...nor...others to himself 
but then, she considered it only an "implicit" exception, 
a mystery to its citizens, the "impotent savages who 
never discovered its nature, its meaning, its splen- 
dor"    {it is "implicit" also because its "system is not 
501 
capitalism"   , since "capitalist system has not yet 
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existed anywhere" as such  —even though "It is capi- 
talism that gave mankind its first steps toward...a ra- 
tional way of life"503). 
She supposed that she was the first to challenge 
the reigning Altruist morality (the tribal premise, the 
false notion of "Group rights"), and thus, the first 
"champion of Capitalism" who did not implicitly "damn 
capitalism": "On the basis of the altruist morality" (on 
"dialectical viewpoints" such as those of Plato, Kant and 
Hegel) "capitalism had to be...damned"   .  The renowned 
defenders of freedom, such as Smith, Bentham, J. S. Mill 
and Spencer "had to regard capitalism as immoral"—as no 
more than "a vulgar, uninspiring, materialist necessity 
of this earth" while they "continued to long for their 
505 
unearthly moral ideal".    "Jeremy Bentham", she noted 
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"defended...by proclaiming 'the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number' as...moral justification", and "Herbert 
Spencer, another champion...declared that the...justifica- 
tion. . .was the survival of the species...that...morality 
consisted of adapting oneself to one's social environment 
...seeking one's...happiness in the welfare of soci- 
ety"   ; Mill's students and admirers—his intellectuals 
507 heirs—were "the British socialists, the Fabians"   ; the 
ethical view of Adam Smith was explicitly altruistic; 
thus, the liberal political philosophy was self-contra- 
dictory, self-damning absurdity.  Even Nietzsche did not 
challenge the "morality of human sacrifice and hatred for 
Reason" (Altruism/tyranny/collectivism) with his subtilely 
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anti-rational, pseudo-individualism, according to Rand. 
Therefore, she concluded that Americans were altruistic 
just like Russia or any other culture, and she deduced 
that "When men share the same basic premise, it is the 
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most consistent ones who win"—and the Russians (the 
"most consistent manifestation") are winning: their more 
logical, "creeping, bloody ooze of Communism" keeps 
spreading across the globe.  She noted that whatever 
opposition Karl Marx, "the most consistent translator of 
the altruist morality into practical action and political 
theory" ever "did encounter, nobody opposed him on moral 
grounds" (except, or until, Ayn Rand). 
Americans are mostly "conservatives", she 
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realized (and not capitalists, after all); though they 
"have always rejected" blatant opportunities to engage in 
outright collectivism whenever "an election has offered 
them a clear-cut choice" between that alternative and 
conservatism (as in the Presidential elections of 1972 
and 1980), yet they cannot choose capitalism either, 
since "They are paralyzed by the profound conflict between 
capitalism and thie moral code" of "Altruism...that man 
has no right...that service to others is the only justi- 
fication of his existence, and that sacrifice is his 
511 highest moral duty, virtue and value".     As Tocqueville 
found, on his famous expedition, they are divided between 
"Equality" and "Liberty"—but leaning toward the former. 
They expect to keep the benefits of freedom, while serv- 
ing the interests of the state—by a process of evasion, 
by "attempting to obliterate all...concepts", so that 
Rand asked rhetorically:  "What is the rationality of 
those who expect to trick" one another "into freedom, 
cheat...into justice, fool...into progress, con...into 
preserving...rights, and while indoctrinating...with 
statism, put one over" on everyone "and let them wake up 
in a perfect capitalist society some morning? These are 
512 the 'conservatives'".    The conservative American masses 
express such "anti-concepts" (devices to evade knowledge, 
to obliterate or "wipe out" true concepts) as "the public 
interest" (or, "'The common good'...a meaningless con- 
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cept" and "an undefined and undefinable concept"   ); an 
anti-concept is, according to her, "accepted precisely 
for its elastic, undefinable, mystical character...as an 
escape" from the real issue of tyranny versus true politi- 
cal government.     Likewise "'the good of the majority,' 
515 too, is only a sham and a delusion".     Conservatives, 
like any other irrationals, cannot possibly identify such 
things as "political governments", "rights", "justice", 
"crime", "ownership" and "wealth"—because they lack the 
Basic Social Premise/Rights/political freedom/economic 
freedom: the irrational Americans, she saw, can only 
"understand" wealth as "the result of some undifferenti- 
ated, collective process" in which "all did something and 
it's impossible to tell who did what"—even though it 
should be obvious to them (supposing that they were ra- 
tional) that "To hold that view in an industrial 
society...is...crass...evasion" (and indeed, "is... 
obscene")   ; they imagine "Ownership without a market", 
which "means 'property1, without the right to use or dis- 
pose of it", which is "a contradiction in terms"   , they 
have even begun to accept "a distinction between political 
and non-political criminals,...the notion of political 
crimes"—even though such a notion "supports the use of 
force in violation of rights—and crosses the borderline 
51 R into political despotism"    (and despite the fact that 
"It is only in the initiation of physical force against 
211 
others... the recourse to violence—that can be classified 
as a crime"—for "There can be no such thing as a poli- 
tical crime", no such thing as a "violation of rights of 
519 political state", in logic and reality   ); a few have 
even become explicitly anarchic and "think that govern- 
ment as such is evil" (and, for Rand, every variant of 
520 
"Anarchism" is "a naive floating abstraction")   ; others 
"renounce the use of physical force" (renounce political 
government) and dream of a "pacifist society" that "would 
be left helplessly at the mercy of the first thug who 
decided to be immoral", and which "would...instead of 
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abolishing evil...encourage and reward it"   ; a handful 
of "Libertarian" conservatives believe in a "wierd absur- 
dity, called 'competing governments'" or other "market- 
522 place versions" of political governments   ; she was cer- 
tain that without the right philosophical base, the 
Americans could never recognize the ideal Capitalism 
"implied" by their Constitution.  She feared that con- 
servative "solutions" to stave off full tyranny would run 
out before Objectivism is promulgated; "It is too late 
for them", she wrote of the conservatives (but, perhaps, 
not too late for the Objectivists). 
The Randian political scientific concepts are 
causally explained as being effects of her "mystical, 
altruistic, collectivistic" Russian persecutors, and of 
her "scientific, individualistic" American trading part- 
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ners.  She had suffered ("was suffocating") in Russia, 
but in America she had great pleasure.  She wrote that "I 
had a difficult struggle...until I could make a success 
of my writing", and that, through all her struggle to 
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success "No one helped me".    The outcome of her unaided 
effort was pleasant, so she felt the effort (and its 
"independence", its "unaided-ness") to be right.  In 
Russia, individuals were arbitrarily rewarded or deprived 
of the fruits of their labor; almost nothing could be 
"earned", and her literary career had been impossible. 
In America she was not discriminated against.  Now, she 
held that "The pleasure-pain mechanism in the body of 
man" is the ultimate "automatic guardian of...life", and 
that "the physical sensations of pleasure and pain" are 
the "first step of the development of a human conscious- 
ness" (the basis of rationality, the Ground of Rational 
Being) and the "first step...in...evaluation" (the basis 
of values, the ultimate Ought   ; she held that "the 
capacity to experience pleasure or pain is innate in 
man's body", and that one "has no choice about the stan- 
dard that determines what will make him experience" joy 
525 or hatred   ; it is, for her, the primary requisite for 
the survival of a rational being—and thus, is the Right 
to Life, the source of all Rights—a thing beyond choice 
that is the "ground" of all volitional (rational) acts, 
the Freedom to all other freedoms (free actions).  It is 
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an individual's "volitional capacity", a nonvolitional 
thing producing the individual as such, the "being of 
volitional consciousness"; an individual's "physical 
sensation of pleasure" is "a signal indicating that the" 
conceiver "is pursuing the right course of action", 
whereas any "pain is a warning...of... the wrong" or the 
evil.    A rational "has no choice about" what is "the 
issue of 'good or evil'"—about what to love and what to 
loathe.  Thus, her rationality appears to be a "success- 
ful state of reaction to undistorted, undiluted, healthy 
perceptual organs"—so that any human who "honestly faces 
its feelings", does not "repress" them, and is happy (at 
least most of the time) must be an identifier—a being 
that "focuses on reality" and is "fully aware" and "wor- 
ships joy"—a fully "selfish being1'—a being possessing 
true selfishness, the virtue of selfishness: "rational 
selfishness".  Thus, when she was in Russia and "wor- 
shipped joy" she must have been right (rational), and 
when she felt hatred among the Russians she must have 
been right; when she experienced love among Americans she 
must have been right—and the Americans, and their system, 
must be right.  She was repelled from collective culture, 
by her unerring, inescapable, inviolable Mechanism; she 
was attracted to the capitalist culture (though not neces- 
sarily to the "contradictory elements" of collectivism 
within it).  She won her success "through the free mar- 
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ket", just like "Horatio Alger", producing and competing 
as a capitalist—as "the greatest salesman philosophy 
ever had 
America she found to be based ("implicitly", or 
esoterically) on a morality of individuals' "pursuit of 
happiness" (on "the concept of Man as an end in himself", 
on "Man-worship" or true individualism); thus it had an 
"atmosphere of joy", unlike the "gloomy atmosphere" of 
Russia.  She constantly marvelled at the "American sense 
of life", and its vast difference for the "servile" and 
"morbid" senses of life of foreigners.  Yet, she feared 
that "This country" might "not survive on the morality of 
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sacrifice"    (she admitted that its sense of life was 
not so individualistic, after all—and that it was 
explicitly altruistic); she was determined to "rebuild 
America's system on the moral premise...that man's life, 
529 his freedom...is his by inalienable right"   ; she was 
moved to write that the United States, like every other 
"paradise that men had once possessed, the city of Atlan- 
tis or the Garden of Eden" is now "perishing from an orgy 
of self-sacrificing"; she was pained at the "similarity" 
between the course of events she had witnessed in Russia 
(from conservative irrationalism to total "unity") and 
the course of events in America from the subtilely col- 
lectivistic Hoover to the outright Roosevelt—she saw the 
same "programs" enacted, and she pronounced it all evil 
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and began Co teach, through her novels, plays, movies, 
lectures, journals and debates, that rational men 
everywhere must "recognize the nature of their right", 
that they must pursue their own pleasures openly and 
reject the parasites' anti-concepts of "duty" and "obliga- 
tion" (they must stop "sanctioning their destruction" by 
the otherwise-impotent irrationals—so that they must, 
above all, withdraw their moral and financial support 
from the "neo-mystics", the "'disinterested1 neurotics in 
ivory towers", the "soft, safe assassins" of academia who 
will "run like rats" when their money supply by capitalist 
producers who realize what they are doing is cut off); 
she knew that the capitalists already knew "that theirs 
was the power" (economic power), but she had to teach 
them "that theirs was the glory"    (that they had the . 
Right—morally and politically—to be what they are, to 
dispose of what they produce, and to produce, as they see 
fit).  She felt need to initiate a new, truly radical 
philosophical "movement" to "constitutionalize" (and to 
"secure") the Rights of the conceivers—in America first, 
and then to the rest of the world: "The political system 
we will build is contained in a single moral premise: no 
man may obtain any values from others by resorting to 
531 physical force"   .  In the perfect society she projected 
"Every man will stand or fall, live or die by his rational 
judgement"—so that the weak, irrational, intellectually- 
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disabled "will not be given a gun" (will not receive 
political power, the sanction of the State) to improve 
their chance.of survival; their will be no "distributive 
rights", no "welfare" and no "affirmative action"; true 
Rights will be secure, for "hordes of savages have never 
been an obstacle to those who carried the banner of the 
mind" (so that just as the American Indians were overrun 
by the European colonists, she was sure "no one will be 
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able to stop us").     She called her visionary Atlantis 
"a sanctuary for a vanishing species: the rational being", 
a "new world" where conceivers will always "be able to 
rise...with the...spirit of eagerness, adventure and 
certainty which comes from dealing with a rational uni- 
verse" and "fear of men...will vanish" because it is "a 
world of responsible beings, who will be...consistent and 
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reliable"   ; what will be received by every individual 
from others will be "only justice" not "aims, or pity, or 
mercy"—and what every conceiver will feel is "not dis- 
gust, suspicion and guilt" but "a single constant: res- 
pect".  (There will be no "social net" to catch the 
botched and evil, nor any "public property" for them to 
administer; there will be no taxes, only fees for the 
protection of contracts by courts and police; there will 
not be any "business monopolies" created by government 
intervention, nor any "anti-trust legislation", nor any 
government support of labor unions, nor any government 
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limitations on "excessive demands by unions"—so that no 
one will be able to "pull" the government to his side to 
"gain a strangle-hold" on others; there will be no "demo- 
cratic decision-making", nor any "political arbitration": 
"no meeting ground, no middle, no compromise"—and "no 
C O / 
such thing as 'moderation'"   ; there cannot logically be 
any "economic injustice" (nor political injustice) since 
"all human relationships are voluntary" in Atlantis, and 
no one is politically "aided, protected or prevented from" 
trading anything with anyone; all education will be 
private, not "public"—contractual and earned, not "free" 
and compulsory; all money will be privately minted, pri- 
vately banked; the only state officials will be the 
police, judges and soldiers (and perhaps, there will be 
no soldiers, when all the foreign tyrannies and their 
armies have been destroyed).)  Thus Rand prophesied that 
"the day will come when I shall break all the chains of 
the earth, and raze the cities of the enslaved, and my 
home" (by which she could have meant her "only home", New 
York) "will become the capital of a world where each man 
535 
will be free to exist for his own sake"   ; "We will open 
the gates of our city" (a world-wide "city", her ultimate 
cosmopolitan State/society/system/government) "to those 
who deserve to enter"    (only those who are genuine 
citizens, "men who are honorable in their ideas", those 
judged to be rational humans by judges who are themselves 
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rational).  She declared that "For the coming of that day 
shall I fight"—"For the freedom of Man"—and for "his 
537 Life"   ; she admitted that the struggle gave her pleasure 
and seemed to her to be right.  In her opinion, humans 
have no choice about what is right: their Rights are in- 
alienable and "will not die" (their Rights, the "nature 
of Man" "can never die on this earth, for it is the heart 
CIO 
of it and the meaning and the glory"   ):  "Through all 
the darkness...all the shame of which men are capable, 
the spirit of man will remain alive"—"it will" awaken"— 
"it will break through"—"And man will go on" ("Man, not 
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men").     The teleological progress seemed unstoppable. 
She "had to do" what she did; she had to 
imagine a sanctuary of "the best of the human species", 
her idealized Americans.  The components of that attempt 
that are called the Randian political scientific con- 
cepts in this thesis are the effects primarily of her 
Russian persecutors and American trading partners.  By 
her own epistemological and metaphysical standards, they 
must be considered reflex motions (not concepts): since 
she held concepts to be identifications of things, and 
since her "political scientific concepts" are not identi- 
fications of anything, they must—according to her divi- 
sion of apparent concepts into: (1) true concepts, and (2) 
meaningless, imitative reflex motions—be meaningless, 
imitative reflex motions.  As reflex motions, they are 
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effects; as effects, they presuppose some cause/s.  There- 
fore the Randian political scientific concepts may be 
causally explained. 
Section II:  "Judgement of the Randian Political Scientif- 
ic Concepts by Aristotelian Standards" 
Miss Rand once wrote: "The evolution of the 
concept of 'government* has had a long, tortuous history. 
Some glimmer of the government's proper function seems 
to have existed in every organized society, manifesting 
itself in such phenomena as...recognition of some... 
difference between a government and a robber gang". 
But, in truth, a concept cannot "evolve" or otherwise 
move.  In truth, moreover, there is not only one political 
government (not "The" Ideal Government) but many politi- 
cal concepts (political governments).  There is no 
"government's function", either; nor does anything "exist 
in a society" or "manifest itself in a recognition".  A 
political scientific concept is a truth created by, and 
belonging only to, that conceiver who so identified the 
political government/s that is/are its meaning/s.  A 
political scientific concept cannot possibly be "a 
phenomenon of the constantly evolving, self-manifesting 
heavenly Concept of Government".  Rand also held that: 
"In mankind's history, the understanding of government's 
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proper function is a very recent achievement:...only two 
hundred years old"    (she felt that the first true poli- 
tical scientific concepts were by, and belonged to, the 
"Founding Fathers of the American Revolution"); thus she 
believed that political governments had existed before, 
but no one knew what they were—no one had ever had the 
"Concept of Government" manifesting itself to them—yet 
even the Founding Fathers did not grasp it "fully" (their 
views being "implicit", and their Constitution fraught 
with "contradictions").  Unless political governments are 
fully understood, they cannot properly "exist in practice" 
—so that, for her, the ideas of political governments 
"become one" with their meanings (with the political 
governments themselves)—so that the ideas make the mean- 
ings , even though the ideas depend upon there being 
meanings at all (so that they are "corollaries" and 
neither the political governments being understood nor 
the understandings of the political governments are prior 
or subsequent, for they all "develop and appear toget- 
her").  But, in truth, every true concept's meaning/s is/ 
are prior to the concept; every concept of a thing must 
necessarily be subsequent to its meaning.  The subject of 
a given concept may be called A, and the concept must be 
non-A; there is no "concept of itself", no "nexus of the 
knowledge and the known", no "self-manifesting Idea". 
It is "that principle which is the most certain of all" 
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—that A is A—that "a thing cannot both be and not be at 
the same time and in the same respect"—that Aristotle 
expressed; Rand claimed to follow the Aristotelian logi- 
cal standards, and as a "tribute to him" (to Aristotle) 
she entitled the three main parts of Atlas Shrugged: 
"NON-CONTRADICTION", "EITHER-OR" and "A IS A"542—but 
she really did not follow his true standards or, in fact, 
she followed his false standards instead, insofar as her 
"identification" of political governments is concerned. 
She wrote that her views are valid according to 
the Aristotelian principles of knowledge: "The only phi- 
losophical debt I can acknowledge is to Aristotle.  I... 
disagree with...parts of his philosophy—but his defini- 
tion of...logic and of...human knowledge is so great an 
achievement that his errors are irrelevant by compari- 
son".     ("John Gait", the chief hero of Atlas Shrugged, 
was portrayed as having studied both Physics and Aristote- 
lian philosophy.  At the end of the novel, the philos- 
ophical pirate "Ragnar Danneskjold is shown "reading a 
volume of the works of Aristotle".  After Rand's first 
payment for The Fountainhead, she immediately purchased 
an expensive, complete set of the works of Aristotle). 
She called his philosophy "the intellect's Declaration of 
Independence", and held that Aristotle was himself "the 
world's first intellectual, in the purest...sense of that 
r / / 
word"   ; she argued that "everything that makes us 
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civilized beings, every rational value...we possess... 
is the result of Aristotle's influence" 545—so that "the 
birth of science, the industrial revolution, the creation 
of the United States, even the structure of our language11 
is by his grace, for "never have so many owed so much to 
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one man"   .  She summarized his "incomparable achieve- 
ment" as being that "he defined the...rational view of 
existence and of...consciousness: that there is only one 
reality, the one which man perceives—that it exists as 
an objective absolute...that the task of...consciousness 
is to perceive, not to create, reality—that abstractions 
are man's method of integrating...sensory" data, and that 
547 
"A is A".     She saw the "Dark Ages" as his concealment, 
and that the "prelude to the Renaissance was the return 
C A Q 
of Aristotle via Thomas Aquinas"   ; the United States 
she judged to be based on an "Aristotelian foundation" 
(in accord with Aristotelian standards) and yet, also on 
Platonic dictums (and even, on Christian Platonic notions). 
She considered that "Plato's system was...two realities... 
the physical world as a semi-illusory, inferior realm, sub- 
ordinated to a realm of abstractions...with reason in the 
position of an inferior" servant to the masterly Reason, 
which is "mystic revelation which discloses a 'superior' 
549 truth"   ; she also knew that Aristotle's philosophy was 
vitiated by Platonism (so that Platonism and Aristotelianism 
are not "opposites", after all, and so that—inasmuch as 
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Plato was a "mystic", an "altruist" and a "collectivist"— 
Aristotle's views are also mystical, altruistic and col- 
lectivistic).  Aristotle accepted the conventional Greek 
notions of "Polis", of the many who are mystically "One" 
(the Athenians who become Pallas Athena's people, Athenai, 
one constitution of the Mystery of the wise "Many-goddess", 
the unsearchable Minerva); he claimed to be scientific, to 
acknowledge only things that exist—that are perceivable and 
demonstrable—as the only real things, yet he "identified 
constitutions", claimed to perceive and examine "cities", 
"villages" and "households" (which are, in truth, nothing but 
meaningless notions).  He accepted the theistic, telic, moral 
notions of "the good" and even "the Supreme Good", which are 
Ideal and immeasureable super-things.  He propounded a queer 
"concept" of numenous "Essences inhering in existing things" 
that is a variant imitation of his teacher.  The political 
collectivity (the koinonian/polis/ekklesia) "while it comes 
into existence for life,...exists for the sake of the good 
550 life" (or, "best life")    according to him; all human groups 
"aim at some good", and the political Group "which is...most 
supreme of all, and includes all the rest, will pursue this 
551 
aim most, aims at the most supreme of all goods"   ; thus, 
Aristotle—despite his claims to be examining real, existing 
things in his political theory (for he claimed that every 
true student of politics studies any given consi(tution "just 
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as it stands"—by perceiving and measuring it as a real 
object), yet his actual approach was "to consider which is 
the best constitution" of his imagination.  He pretended that 
"It is evident that the polis belongs to the class of things 
that exist by nature" and that it is evident that a "man is 
by nature an animal suited to live in a polis" that "is prior 
552 in nature to...each of us individually"   ; he repeated that 
"It is clear...that the state is...prior in nature to the 
553 ' individual",    but he did not offer any evidence (and could 
not offer any, of course, because there isn't any).  While he 
claimed to accept that "Induction is a principle" which is the 
"starting-point which knowledge even of the universal presup- 
poses, while syllogism proceeds from universals"; and claimed 
to hold that "the starting-points" or inductions "from which 
syllogism proceeds...are not reached by syllogism; it is there- 
554 fore by induction that they are acquired"   ; he wrote that 
"induction is impossible" for those who have not sense-percep- 
tion; he held that "Clearly, if there is a loss of...the 
senses, there must be...failure in knowledge, which cannot now 
555 be acquired"   ; he even admitted that a knower's observation 
of the facts of which his ideas are identifications is that 
knower's only basis of that knowledge {the only "criterion of 
truth" for those ideas), for "Popular acceptance or rejection 
5 5fi is no criterion of a basic truth"    (and neither extra-percep- 
tual intuition nor "received opinion is...our starting point"). 
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He claimed to know that "All...facts are in harmony with... 
truth; whereas, when "there is a false view, the discord 
between it and the facts is soon apparent", for "if a proposi- 
tion be true, all the facts harmonize with it, but if it is 
false, it is soon found to be discordant with them"   , since 
all concepts are perceptually-based (all true knowledge in- 
volves perception/s of that which is known) and "If someone 
does not have knowledge of a fact now, although he has an 
explanation"—if his concept/s are not demonstrations of that 
which is apparently identified—he does not really have know- 
ledge, and the apparent concept/s is/are not really concepts. 
Not only must there be real objects {perceivable, demonstrable 
facts of reality) for all true concepts, since every true 
concept is an identification of at least one object.  Now, 
Aristotle also admitted that every true, factual demonstration— 
every real concept—must involve valid definitional expression 
(at least one meaningful, identificatory expression—a linguis- 
tic, written and/or oral symbolisation of'the identified 
object/s) that is necessarily linguistically consistent with 
(and noncontradictive of) every other concept by the same 
conceiver.  But not only are his (and Rand's) political scien- 
tific concepts not demonstrations (and thus, discorrespondent 
with their supposed meanings), they are also linguistically 
inconsistent (invalid as definitions): 
Aristotle knew that genuine knowledge of a thing is 
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"when we know what it is", and knowing what some thing is, is not 
to define it inconsistently or inadequately (such as: to 
"define" a stone as a rock, expressing that "The stone is a 
rock", substituting one name for another, but never telling 
what the rock is, never really defining—measuring—identifying 
it); for Aristotle, every true definition must be a "logos and 
not a single word"—not a meaningless act of re-naming and 
obfuscation, but a telling-what-it/they-is/are, an identifica- 
tory expression.  According to his professed epistemological 
position, one cannot really define/identify a society as "a 
group of humans with its culture", because such supposed defini- 
tion is not a demonstration of any real, perceivable object: 
no one, including whoever so supposedly defines, can ever ac- 
tually point to the thing that is the society so supposedly 
identified (the meaning of the notion cannot be proved, because 
the notion is meaningless).  Nor does such a "definition" 
not contradict other language by the same "conceiver", for its 
language does not accord with any definitions of groups or 
collections—for the "society" so "defined is neither a com- 
posite entity like a coral bush, nor a denominate number such 
as a mathematical set of "seven eggs" or "12 dollars" (it is 
like neither kind of "group" that the supposed conceiver has 
previously defined).  Aristotle eschewed metaphorical "con- 
cepts", but when he "studied" political governments, he was 
metaphorical (just as when he "studied" other imaginary, 
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ethical "objects").     He held that definitions must be 
literal, and that therefore any apparent "definition may or 
may not be satisfactory" (and "This now seemingly elementary 
notion, original with Aristotle, at the time was a profound 
s fin discovery")   ; yet, his own evaluative ideas (such as his 
political scientific concepts) are not literal at all—-so 
that he had even to admit them to be "inexact science" (though 
he did not admit that they involve pseudo-definitions, and are 
really meaningless).  Protestations that language must be 
literal, science certain, definitions noncontradictory and 
linguistically consistent, and so on, are not able to change 
the facts that his political scientific language, science and 
definitions are non-literal, uncertain, contradictory and in- 
consistent nonsense; likewise, when Ayn Rand insisted that "The 
truth or falsehood of all...thought...rests on...truth or 
falsehood of...definitions"   —and when she noted that "There 
are such things as invalid concepts...attempts to integrate 
errors, contradictions...without specific definitions, without 
referents", and that "An invalid concept invalidates every 
proposition or process of thought in which it is used as a cog- 
c c n 
nitive assertion"   —it did not change her "political scien- 
tific concepts" into being true political scientific concepts. 
She knew that every true concept necessarily is "based in per- 
ceptual reality" (since there is no "other reality"): "When in 
doubt about the...definition of a concept, the best method of 
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clarification is to look for its referents—i.e., to ask 
oneself: What fact or facts of reality gave rise to this 
ceo 
concept?"   , but she apparently never asked that about 
her own "political scientific concepts".  She emphasized that 
"It is Aristotle who first formulated the principles of correct 
definition" (though she added that "Aristotle held that defini- 
tions refer to metaphysical essences, which exist in concretes 
as...formative power, and he held that...concept-formation" 
is really a "direct intuition by which...mind grasps these 
essences"—so that Aristotle equivocated, his "concept of 
definition" being contradicted, invalidated),    yet she also 
avoided correct definition and reserved a place in her scheme, 
too, for "intuition" (though she did not dare to name it—nor 
did she mention the "Essences" that she "intuitively grasped") . 
Judged by Aristotle's directions for correct, true knowledge, 
Rand gave similar directions; judged by Aristotle's failures 
to carry out his own directions. Rand may be identified as 
having failed very similarly:  Her evaluative ("Moral") 
notions are, like his, suppositions that things (or at least, 
some things, the "ethical" things) are not necessarily what 
they are but depend upon some "formative power" such as Reason 
in order to "fully exist" and be wholly that which they are. 
Much less perverted was Marx's statement (in his early manu- 
scripts):  "A being only regards himself as independent when 
he stands on his own feet...when he owes his existence to him- 
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self"—so that there necessarily is no "external ground" of 
being, no formative "source", no "creation" by "alien being 
above man and nature...which is...avowal of the unreality of 
man and nature"   .  Many other philosophers have paid lip- 
service to "Objectivity". 
At the close of Atlas Shrugged, Rand approvingly 
quoted Aristotle's "most certain principle" that "the same 
attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the 
same subject in the same respect"—which is "a principle which 
everyone must have who understands anything that is".     But, 
she both predicated and separated the same attributes in the 
same respects of her supposed "political governments"—so that 
her "A"s we're also "non-A"s, absurdly.  She followed Aristotle 
in that "All actions are...by entities", and that any acting 
thing (any mover) "cannot act in contradiction to its 
c f. 7 
nature"   ; she wrote that "change presupposes...what changes 
from what to what", and thus "without the concept of entity, 
there can be no such concept as 'motion'"   ; yet, she treated, 
of her "political governments" as though they were both en- 
tities and actions (in contradiction of her knowledge that 
"An action not caused by an entity would be caused by a zero, 
569 
which would mean...a non-entity...which is absurdity") 
Therefore, her political scientific concepts must 
be judged invalid by the Aristotelian principles she professed 
to accept (by the true epistemological principles professed by 
Aristotle, not by his pseudo-concepts, which she professed to 
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reject).  She did follow Aristotle., though, since his "lead" 
in political science was inconsistency; she repeated it.  But 
by his meaningful fundamental standards, her "subsequent con- 
cepts" are doubly refuted. 
Section III:  '"Uses' of the Randian Political Scientific 
Concepts" 
Now, even though the subjects of which this thesis 
is an identification are meaningless, they may yet have—and 
indeed, have had—some "practical political applications": 
Margaret Thatcher has noted that her "think tank of intellec- 
tuals" study, among many other things, the works of Ayn Rand; 
Anders Lange, founder of a vigorous new libertarian party in 
the Norwegian Parliament, has said that "our principle is 
that of Ayn Rand and Milton Friedman" (though Friedman and 
Rand are quite dissimilar); and also, Malcolm Fraser who 
became Prime Minister in the biggest electoral landslide in 
Australian history, has declared that his favorite author is 
570 Ayn Rand (and his favorite book: Atlas Shrugged). '   There 
have been more ambitious undertakings (with which Rand happened 
to dissociate herself, thinking them foolish acts, but which 
can nevertheless be identified as practical consequences of 
her):  In 1972, the "Republic of Minerva" was established in 
the South Pacific (and its declaration of sovereignty sent to 
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more than 100 countries), until its defeat by the King of 
Tonga.  Then the "Abaco Independence Movement" was initiated 
in the Bahamas, aided by the student of Objectivism (and a 
former Libertarian candidate for President of the United States) 
and present Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at U.C.L.A., 
John Hospers; after several years, the capitalistic rebels were 
defeated (during which time Libertarian!sm, a book by Hospers, 
was banned by Pindling).  From 1975 to 1981 the "Na-Griamel 
Federation" ruled all or most of the New Hebrides (having 
declared independence against the British-French condominium 
government by December, 1975, with its own police force, radio 
station, metallic currency standard monetary system, medical 
facilities, written constitution, military education and air- 
port); this radical capitalist "minimal state" won every popular 
election (and received informal French recognition as the de 
jure authority in the islands) until 1981, when the collectiv- 
ism priest Walter Lini (a protege of the World Council of 
• Churches), who is now Premier of Vanuatu, somehow persuaded the 
authorities of Papua New Guinea to fly in troops to establish 
his rule and wipe out the popularly-elected Na-Griamel state. 
(Of particular interest about the Hebridean Atlantis was the 
capitalist constitution designed by an American, David Sutton, 
which precisely expressed, on a simple "non-academic" level, 
without ambiguity and in the mongrel New Hebridean British- 
French language, basic Capitalist notions.  It is also interes- 
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ting that the tribal chiefs supported the capitalist theory, 
and the leader of Na-Griamel—one of the chiefs—was educating 
the populace   serial radio broadcasts.)  Associated with Na- 
Griamel were John Hospers, Nathaniel Branden, and Robert Poole 
(editor of Reason, a radical capitalist journal). 
Other applications of the Randian political scien- 
tific concepts include successful "public demonstrations" by 
Objectivists, such as their repulse of an attempted "student 
rebellion" at Brooklyn College in 1967, when "some students of 
Objectivism quickly organized themselves into an ad hoc Com- 
mittee Against Student Terrorism (CAST). With the intellectual 
assistance of some Objectivist professors...CAST issued a state- 
ment (printing thousands of copies virtually overnight) that 
condemned the violence, named the philosophical issues involved" 
and that "statement attracted the respectful attention of... 
members of the faculty and of the press (including...even... 
571 The New York Times)".     In addition to. these phenomena, the 
effects of Rand may include: the "swing to'the right" in the 
United States and several other Western nations during the 
last decade, the moral trend of "the Me Generation" (newly 
popular acceptance of selfishness, self-interest as an unexcep- 
tionable behavioral motive), and the discussion of "Rational 
Egoism" among professional philosophers; furthermore, the 
Randian emphasis on true money as having intrinsic value has 
been widely echoed, her "voluntary per capita fee" and "govern- 
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merit lottery" methods of taxation have received attention, 
and her opinions that governments can be instituted only by 
explicit (written) "constitutionalization" and that there are 
"only three functions" of a true political government" have 
been studied by politicians (as well as academic theorists) 
in many countries. 
Therefore, however inconsistent and logically fal- 
lacious the Randian political scientific concepts may be, they 
are not "matters irrelevant to the pursuit of political power": 
Miss Rand has "inspired" millions worldwide—especially, in 
North America and Western Europe—so that she is to be consider- 
ed a "significant causal factor" for some "aspects of contem- 
porary political processes": to understand the phenomena that 
are contemporary Western cultural and political actions and 
opinions, it is therefore helpful to have identified the Randlani 
political scientific concepts.  Yet, it must be remembered that 
since her "political scientific concepts" are not concepts at 
all, Rand cannot be identified as a Prime-Mover at the head 
of any political "chain of causality"; any ultimate source 
(any first causal factor) must be someone who did identify 
572 political governments.     But most "government officials" 
(those who "hold political power") are not able to identify 
anything (they are "not open to reason"); they are reflex mov- 
ers even though they may be clever and "successful (popularly, 
politically, financially, pragmatically 'viable' and 'winning')" 
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and apparently rational.  Their actions are unconscious effects 
("range-of-the-moment" decisions, as Rand put it)—so that 
they can "profitably" imagine Randian political scientific 
concepts to be "pragmatically 'true' or 'false1":  The interest 
of such an official with the subjects of this thesis might be: 
(1) if the official is a conservative "capitalist", to promul- 
gate and embellish, or plagiarise, Rand's political scientific 
ideas; (2) if the offical is a full collectivist, to use the 
Randian notions as a caricature of the essentially selfish 
("evil"), dangerous, anti-proletarian, "utopian" (impractical), 
and "extreme" (formally logical, or, "tautologous", verbal and 
arbitrary rather than factual and scientific) "nature of Capi- 
talism". .Conservatives cannot resist Marxists without "taking 
seriously" Marxian ideology; it is in the same sense that the 
Randian "political scientific" notions are "relevant to the 
pursuit of power" for both conservatives and full collectivists 
in their respective "struggles": they must "treat Rand's poli- 
tical scientific concepts 'as if they were concepts", and 
must "pronounce them 'good' or 'evil'" (begging the question 
of whether they are true concepts or not—negating the "task 
of identification" of them, which is necessary because those 
who so evaluate and "use" the Randian notions are irrational 
and can neither form such a question nor answer it).  In truth, 
since they are not abstract thinkers (not 'conceivers), they do 
not even perceive the notions they apparently "use"; thus, 
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their evaluative "employments" and "disapprovals" can be 
nothing but direct or mediate resistances of Ayn Rand herself. 
The irrational are "concerned with people", and are not "men 
of ideas"; ideas are attributes, attributes are abstract things 
—things perceivable only by those who think abstractly, who do 
identify things.  Therefore, also, there are in truth no real 
political uses of the subjects of this thesis. 
Section IV:  "A Note on the Identification of the Randian 
Political Scientific Concepts" 
Aside from any nonconceptual "uses", what is certain 
is that the subjects really are meaningless, and that they re- 
main what they are (they remain meaningless notions) regardless 
of the degree of their "cultural influence" or "popular accep- 
tance".  This thesis is not an "arbitrary, personal value- 
judgement"; no praise or blame of the subjects or their author 
is involved here.  Rather, the thesis is a refutation, which 
is (in the true sense) a dispassionate, scientific discovery— 
a non-evaluative, impersonal measurement—of the subjects as 
being meaningless pseudo-concepts.  To identify the subjects 
as "meaningless" is not to censure their author as "evil", nor 
to make her seem "worse than other influential political the- 
orists" (for indeed, most theorists that everyone admires would 
have to be, by the standards of this analysis, judged similarly 
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—their authoritative, apparently true political scientific 
concepts being refuted just as Rand's have been).  Anyone who 
would consider this analysis to be a moral judgement does not 
understand the issue being addressed:  Rand has often been 
ridiculed and derided (and is called an extremely "controver- 
sial public figure" in America, and among many academics an 
anathematic "embarrassment"); by Objectivists and their close 
political relatives, she has been lavishly praised and slavish- 
ly emulated.  But neither "approach" is so radical and rational 
as to formulate and answer the question: "What did Ayn Rand 
mean by her expression/s of 'political governments', if any- 
thing?".  Both the "negative" and "positive" evaluative ap- 
proaches are to assume, without any evidence, that she really 
meant "something/s" by her expression—and to proceed at once 
to "attack" or else "justify" that unidentified, undemonstrated 
but blindly believed-in meaning. (Evaluators suppose that they 
can "feel" what she meant; then, they react to it:  Her notion 
that "With the sign of the dollar as our symbol—the sign of... 
free minds—we will move to reclaim this country once more 
from...impotent savages who never discovered its nature, its 
meaning, its splendor" would be unconsciously judged by a 
negative critic (an opponent of "elitist, monopoly capitalism" 
and of the '"manifest destiny' view of America") as an elitist, 
monopoly-capitalist concept; such an evaluative "analyst" would 
not begin by considering what she meant, if anything (whether 
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indeed, she really meant anything, and if so, what thing/s) 
by her expressions of "moving to reclaim this country", "the 
holding of this country by savages", "the nature of a country", 
"its meaning", "glory", etc.—nor would the critic consider 
whether by Rand's own metaphysical and epistemological prin- 
ciples (or by anyone else's—by whatever are true metaphysical 
and epistemological principles) a country can possess a meaning 
or a nature.  A "pro-capitalist" evaluative analyst would en- 
counter the same Rand and judge her from "his own, conservative 
political viewpoint" (from behind the rigid and consciously- 
unbreachable wall of his "perceptual filter"—his "social 
background", his inescapable "categories of thought"—from 
within his "group paradigm", his peculiar collective solipsism) 
insofar as (it is supposed) "all observations are theory-laden" 
and "things-in-themselves cannot be rationally grasped" except 
through the distortive barriers ("filters") of "use of language 
which is 'arbitrary' and 'powerful11' (inasmuch as an irrational 
mimic cannot truly learn language and feels mysterious, arbi- 
trary 'force' in encountering any other expressive entity). 
Such an "analyst" cannot identify the Randian political scien- 
tific concepts, but merely repeat and alter them. ' A rational 
approach must be to know if she meant anything, and if she did 
not, to know that her political scientific concepts are mean- 
ingless.  Then, a causal explanation is possible (since all 
pseudo-concepts are effects); but any evaluative "analysis" or 
any treatment of the subjects as causes can only be opinion. 
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political power is national right, which is a might that makes 
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supposed that governments are "social controls"; now it is held 
that a "Social control consists of the means by which people 
are induced to act in accordance with norms".  "Law"; in Op. 
cit., p. 821.  It is notable that certain Pre-Socratic Sophists 
knew that law (Nomos), in contrast to reality, or Nature 
(Phusis), is an arbitrary expedient designed to "legitimate" 
and empower the mighty over the weak.  Thus, it is a "folly" 
that is nevertheless considered "useful"; it is an expedient 
surd, profitable nonsense.  But, in truth, a false notion is 
not a governing action at all, nor a component thereof; every 
meaningless notion of "power" is a reflex motion, an uncon- 
scious, non-governing effect by an impotent, unconscious 
reflex mover.  Power notions normally involve notions of 
"Free will", so that subjects can be said to freely delegate 
their free wills and in so doing get really free freedom in- 
Society.  Rand, of course, followed the "Indeterminists" (the 
theorists of volition):  Aristotle's view of volition is not 
different from Rand's:  In the Eudemian Ethics is the fullest 
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account, where it is argued that "the spirit" of a human 
being "as a whole both in the uncontrolled and in the self- 
controlled man" (whether the human be virtuous or evil) "acts 
voluntarily, and in neither case does the man act under com- 
pulsion".  "Eudemian Ethics", Bk. n, Ch.VII, sec. 14, Rackham, trans.; 
in Aristotle, Vol. XX; p. 245.  He held "all that a man does 
voluntarily he wishes to do, and what he wishes to do, and 
what he wishes to do he does voluntarily".  "Eudemian Ethics", 
Bk. II, Ch. VII, sec. 6; in Op. cit., p. 269:  Even "un- 
righteous action is voluntary", and for him "both goodness and 
badness have to do with things where a man is himself the cause 
and origin of his actions".  Bk. II. Ch. VI, 10; in Op. cit., 
p. 267.  He wrote "of things which it depends on" an individual 
human "to do or  not to do"—"the kind of actions of which a 
man is himself the cause and origin".  II, VI, 10; p. 267. 
Finally, he cashed in on his free will notions:  "It is clear 
...that both goodness and'badness will be in the class of 
things voluntary" (II, VI, 11; p. 267); and "goodness... is • 
the sort of disposition that is created by the best movements 
in the spirit and is also the source of the production of the 
spirit's best actions...and...is in one way produced and in 
another way" that which produces that by which it is produced 
(which also destroys it, so that, in another way, goodness 
destroys itself)—so'that goodness (which is a voluntary, free 
and uncaused action) is really caused and "has its growth from 
habit" (II, II, 1; p. 247).  Thus, only in the Political state 
can a man be free to be moral—only by delegating his power 
to an official can real freedom be acquired, freedom to be 
purposive for the Good, liberty to live the Best Life.  Indeed 
it is only in the sovereign State that a man can be truly 
happy:  "It is clear...that Moral Goodness has to do with 
pleasures and pains"—"goodness and badness have to do with 
things pleasant and painful" (I, I, 25; p. 247); and it is 
only in the unnatural, political condition (not as a "beast" 
in extra^.social nature) that "moral character" can grow "from 
habit... by...often moving in a certain way" (II, II, 1; p. 
247).  Thus, by means of political government (social control) 
"a habit is trained to operative in that way".  Bk. II, Ch. 
II, sec. 1; p. 247.  This will be voluntary, necessarily; and 
therefore all individuals must be considered as having given 
(or "ought" to have given) their consent, even if the ruler/s 
seize their rights by brute force rather than by vote, since 
delegation is goodness and goodness is voluntary action.  A 
man's "good" is the G.ood of Community.  For a few to hold the 
powers/rights of the many is "Justice" for "All", but, in 
truth, an absurdity-.'  Therefore, if it is true that "The 
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concept of power is perhaps the most fundamental in the 
whole of political science", and if all supposed "political 
process is the shaping, distribution, and exercise of power" 
(Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society; Yale University Press: 
1950; p. 74), then the said "political science" and "political 
process" are unscientific and not rational processes. 
OQ Q 
Capitalism, p. 329.  This "monopoly of force" 
notion by Rand is strikingly unoriginal. 
209T,.'      ' , Ibid., p. 46. 
210T, . ,      ,, Ibid., p. 46. 
211 Binswanger, "Question & Answer Department"; 
in The Objectivist Forum, Vol. 2, No. 4; p. 11. 
212 Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society; Yale 
University Press: 1950; p. 47.  Rand's views of "institutions" 
and "cultures" are virtually identical to these quoted views. 
In her social and political theory, she simply followed the 
orthodox. 
213 Ibid., p. 75. 
0*1/ 
Ibid., p. 14.  The "power" and "decision" with 
which Rand and other authoritative political scientists are 
concerned is "a right of inflicting punishment"—a "physical 
kind of force". 
215 Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 17. 
Ibid., p. 17. 
217 Power and Society, p. 50.  This book and the one 
by Friedrich are quoted as randomly-selected but epitomical 
examples.  No "special sympathy" with their views is implied. 
218 Capitalism, p. 46. 
262 
Ibid., p. 46. 
220T,,,     ., Ibid., p. 46. 
221 Ibid., p. 47.  There are no "legislators" 
and "regulatory bureaucrats", nor any "custodians and 
overseers of public property" in her ideal of a political 
state.  "State and Economy" are "separated" like "Church 
and State"; there is no "public property"; and all laws, or 
all important laws, are involved in the written Constitution 
of her ideal political government.  There is nothing to 
regulate, nothing to own or administrate, and nothing left 
to be decreed or voted about.  She is no "democrat". 
Ibid., p. 47. 
223 Atlas Shrugged, p. 987. 
224 
"Question & Answer Department"; in The 
Objectivist Forum, Vol. 2, No. 4; p. 11. 
225 Binswanger, Harry, in a tutorial session; 
New York City: May 3, 1982. 
p. 14. 
11. 
"Question and Answer Department"; in Op. cit., 
227 
"Question and Answer Department"; in Op. cit., 
228, Capitalism, p. 332.  By her notion of "delegation" 
she imitated the mythologists of a "Social Contract";' there 
is nothing original about her opinion. 
229 
The New Left, p. 110.  Thus she imitated the 
"Natural Rights" viewers. 
230      - iJUIbid., p. 110. 
263 
231 We the Living, p. 72. 
232 Ibid., p. 72,  Her statement is unclear, insofar 
as plumbing material is an entity/entities while a political 
government is an attribute; the analogy is improper. 
233 Capitalism, p. 335. 
234 Ibid., p. 332.  This notion seems an imitation 
of Locke, St. Augustine* and various medieval political theorists 
who supposed political governments to be, or to be concerned 
with, "power" in the "sense" of "Authority", or, "sovereignty". 
235, 
'Ibid., p. 334.  If she believes that political 
action is that which "makes social existence" possible, her view 
is not unlike the opinion "of political science as...that which 
studies influence and power as instruments of...integration" 
(Power and Society, p. xiii), going back beyond Plato, who 
imagined a "Republic" in which men are as much "One" as possible 
(and indeed, more than is possible)—and forward beyond the 
authors of the "Federalist Papers" (who posited "Union" as the 
palliative for "faction", and as the protector of Liberty) to 
"New Leftists" who would also "integrate" humans. 
236 
237 
The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 109. 
Capitalism, p. 320. 
238 
239 
Ibid., p. 321. 
The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 22. 
240 
241 
Ibid., p. 17. 
Atlas Shrugged, pp. 985-986. 
242 Ibid., p. 986. 
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243 
^
JIbid., p. 986. 
244 z
^Ibid., p. 944. 
245 Ibid., p. 943.  Yet she considered sexual 
intercourse to be the highest form of the "virtue of selfish- 
ness", and thus, to be a cognitive activity.  Which is prior— 
rationality or pleasure—she did not specify.  As Nietzsche 
put it, she believed in "those to whom thinking is a delight, 
nothing else".  Nietzsche, "Draft for a Preface to 'The Will 
to Power'", Kaufmann, trans.; in The Portable Nietzsche, 
Kaufmann, ed. ; N.Y.: Penguin Books'^ 1979; p.. 442.  Rand herself 
did not engage in the unfulfilling, life-consuming "task of 
philosophical system-building"; similarly, Nietzsche whom she 
often admired had (in his adult years, and would have had even 
if he had kept his health) no desire for scientific tedium. 
Therefore Rand did not unqualifiedly "endorse" all thinking 
as virtuous. 
246Ibid., p. 944. 
247Ibid., p. 943. 
248 The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 31. 
249 Atlas Shrugged, p. 986. 
250 Capitalism, p. 226. 
251Ibid., p. 226. 
252 
Atlas Shrugged, p. 949. 
253 The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 68.  "To interpose 
destruction between a man and his perception of reality" is 
absurd, because a perception by a perceiving entity cannot 
exist "apart from" that entity; attributes are abstracted 
epistemologically, not physically.  Her phrase "to negate... 
means of survival" is a confusion of negation as a denial 
265 
(a negative premise) with some supposed "metaphysical negation" 
(a "making of A to become non-A", a reversing of reality). 
254 
^
JHIbid., p. 986. 
255The Fountainhead, p. 108. 
Atlas Shrugged, p. 986.  It may be argued that 
Rand's critique of "social manipulation" is an attack on 
a "straw man" example of the "use of power"; it may be argued 
that only a naive boss expects to make men think and produce 
by brute force—and that a successful leader merely "guides" 
others.  But Rand also rejected the notion of "social guidance", 
A mind cannot be forced (if it is truly a rational, free being) 
and likewise, cannot be "guided", "led" or "conditioned". 
237Ibid., p. 985. 
258Ibid., p. 986. 
259Ibid., p. 949. 
260Ibid., p. 986. 
261 ZD Ibid., p. 988 
262Ibid., p. 989. 
Ibid., p. 987.  Robert Nozick explained that 
"Miss Rand falls in the optimistic or Platonic tradition in 
ethics, believing that there are no objective conflicts of 
interest among persons".  Nozick, "On the Randian Argument"; 
in The Personalist, Vol. 52, No. 2; p. 295.  She would have 
amended Nozick's interpretation to read: "among rational 
persons"—for only the rational experience similar joys. 
264 HAtlas Shrugged, p. 949. 
266 
265Ibid., p. 987. 
266The Fountainhead, p. 108. 
267
"Ayn Rand", Donahue Transcript #04290; p. 9. 
n c o 
Ibid., p. 9.  Rand's notion of ownership by 
use is no different than the Thomistic opinion of things 
"public in ownership, private in use", except that for her 
what is public is not owned as well as not used. 
269,,. ,     o Ibid., p. o. 
270TU. ,     Q Ibid., p. 8. 
271 Rand, "Value and Rights"; in Readings in 
Introductory Philosophical Analysis, Hospers, ed.; Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968; p. 381.  This is one case 
of Randian material in a college text (not the only case). 
272 The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 104. 
273Ibid., p. 100. 
274 Capitalism, p. 321. 
275
"Value and Rights"; in Op. cit., p. 381. 
276
"Ayn Rand", Donahue Transcript #04290; p. 11. 
277 Ibid., p. 11.  Her "Nature" is an undeniably 
theistic belief.  But, God is properly conceived as the 
immortaliser of the "just man" (even though common notions 
are that "God is that than which nothing greater can be con- 
ceived", the "Ground of Being", etc.); "Nature" is not a 
"substitute" for the true concept of God as an immortaliser, 
since a Nature cannot immortalise (cannot be the solution to 
the "death problem"). 
267 
070 
The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 15.  One might as 
well begin a "scientific examination of 'the Cosmic ether'" 
by asking "Why is the study of the ether so valuable to us?" 
(rather than by asking "Is there really any ether, and if so, 
what is it?") . 
279Ibid., p. 104. 
280 Ibid., p. 15.  her opinion is similar to that 
"Life without a Purpose is not worth living, and is not true 
life"; she had so many teleologists to mimic that her notion 
is undeniably borrowed.  Most people have purposive beliefs. 
9 81 
Capitalism, p. 322. 
Ibid., p. 322. 
283Ibid., p. 322. 
For the New Intellectual, p. 25. 
Capitalism, p. 194. 
286Ibid., p. 322. 
287Ibid., p. 322. 
288
"Value and Rights"; in Op. cit., p. 382. 
289 
"Ayn Rand", Donahue Transcript #04290; p. 11. 
She explained that "you're not called upon, and I cannot be 
called upon to know a negative", and "you can't tell me you 
can't know that there isn't" something of which there is no 
evidence.  Ibid., p. 10.  By this explanation of hers, the 
"political governments" of which she opined cannot be proved- 
can be known not to exist.  Her "rights" and "political 
268 
tl ) 
states/governments" must be identified as "Voids".  She 
held that her freedoms (Rights) are strictly "negative" 
that they are voids "by which free human beings are able to 
be what they are, or to remain what they are".  Oriental 
philosophers have often openly admitted their beliefs in 
such Voids:  One who is "perhaps the most outstanding 
modern Chinese philosopher" wrote that: "Things cannot but 
exist. Those things which exist cannot but be able to exist. 
Those things which are able to exist cannot but have that by 
which they are able to exist" which is called "the ch'i... 
something about which we cannot say what it is...for it is 
not in the sphere of...things" ("It is not a 'what,' but is 
unnameable 'non-being'", or "only a potentiality of exis- 
tence"): every real, existing object "cannot actualize itself" 
but must have "that by which" it exists—a right to be what 
it is, a freedom from being not itself.  Yu-lan, Fung, 
"The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy", Chapter 10, Proposition 
Set II; in Philosophers of China, Day, ed.; Secaucus, N.J.: 
Citadel Press, 1978; p. 340.  Such "Rights/natures/freedoms/ 
voids" cannot be defined literally, for "transmission of 
'void' cannot be...through words and any...concrete terms" 
(Philosophers of China, p. 153).  That freedom fighters are 
irrational may be judged from their "understandings" of what 
they supposedly are acquiring. 
290 
Capitalism, p. 320. 
291 
Ibid., p. 320. 
292 The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 15. 
293 
Capitalism, p. 15. 
294 Ibid., p. 15. 
? 9 S 
^
JThe Virtue of Selfishness, p. 88. 
Capitalism, p. 20. 
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9Q 7 
^
?/The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 74.  The "moi 
commun" of Rousseau (a somewhat lecherous, paranoid parasite, 
afraid of intelligence but nevertheless an authority on "social 
matters") was supposed, in Emile, to be such masses: "It is the 
common people who compose the human race; what is not the peop- 
le is hardly worth taking into account" for "Man is the same 
in all ranks" and "the ranks which are most numerous deserve 
the most respect": "I hate books. They only teach us to talk 
about what we do not know." "Emile", Book III, Boyd, trans.; 
in The Emile of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Boyd, ed.; N.Y.: Colum- 
bia Univ. Teachers College Bureau of Publications, 1962; p. 83. 
Rand imagined an opposite society "composed of the uncommon". 
298 V
 Ibid., p. 88. 
299 Ibid., p. 88.  The statement is false because if 
irrationals were deceiving themselves that what is true is not 
true, they would have to know the true, and would not be 
irrational; a rational mind cannot be hypnotised by itself or 
anything else (insofar as a hypnosis is an attribute of an 
organic brain, and no rational mind is a biological organ). 
Capitalism, p. 15,  Yet, if Rand had followed her 
own advice and begun with the entities, she would not have 
accepted societal notions at all.  If she began with entities 
in order to examine "through the entities" the Society she 
imagined was composed of the entities—then her identification 
of the entities was but an "objective, scientific veneer" to 
cover her indulgence in intuitions about "Society". 
301Ibid., p. 329. 
302 u
^Ibid., p. 330. 
303 Ibid., p. 330. 
304 Ibid., p. 330.  Similarly Augustine opined that 
aside from the Divine City "what are kingdoms but great rob- 
beries?".  The Marxian view is that "Political power, properly 
so called, is...the organized power of once class oppressing 
another",  Marx and Engels, "The Communist Manifesto", Ch. II; 
in Marx & Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, 
Feuer, ed, ; N.Y.: Doubleday, 19i>9; p. 29.  For them "the state 
is antagonistic to man"; many people agree, but Machiavelli 
blamed the Papacy. 
270 
305 Ibid., p. 321.  Even in the Marxian utopia 
property will be guaranteed (and only the "class character" 
of property—the primitive, Capitalistic "accumulation by 
force" will be abolished).  Rand's view of political govern- 
ments as protectors is not original. 
Hobhouse, Leonard, The Metaphysical Theory 
of the State; London: Allen & Unwin, 1960; p. 133. 
'The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 74. 
Capitalism, p. 3 21. 
309 For the New Intellectual, p. 24. 
Capitalism, p. 18. 
311Ibid., p. 320. 
312 Foner, ed., The Complete Writings of Thomas 
Paine, Vol. I; Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel PressT 1945; p. 359. 
This is offered as a typical example, among thousands or 
millions of others—for nearly every authority divides the 
various "senses" of the Collectivity whenever convenient. 
313Ibid., p. 341. 
314 Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 33. 
315 For the New Intellectual, p. 24. 
Capitalism, p. 321. 
Ibid., p. 321. 
318Ibid., p. 321. 
271 
319Ibid., p. 321. 
320Ibid., p. 321. 
321 Ibid., p. 330.  This attack on socialist society 
seems identical to the socialist critique of "In place of 
the old bourgeois society, with its...antagonisms, we shall 
have an association in which the free development of each 
is the condition for the free development of all."  In "The 
Communist Manifesto"; in Marx & Engels, Feuer, ed.; p. 29. 
Hers is but another variant Utopian social notion. 
322Ibid., p. 19. 
Ibid., p. 19. 
Ibid., p. 336. 
325Ibid.,. p. 195. 
326The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 129. 
Capitalism, p. 38. 
Ibid., p. 23. 
329 Bentham, "Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation", Chapter I, sec. i; in The English 
Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, Burtt, ed.; p~ 791. 
330 Capitalism, p. 220. 
331The New Left, p. 97. 
332 Ibid., p. 97.  A vacuum is a void, a nothing; 
it cannot "produce" or otherwise move.  In contrast is the 
German Existentialist notion that "Nothing nothings". 
272 
333 Capitalism, p. 38. 
334Rand, "The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Our Age"; 
N.Y.: Nathaniel Branden Institute, 1962; p. 7. 
335 
336 
Capitalism, p. 220. 
The New Left, p. 96 
337 Ibid. 96 
338 Capitalism, p. 336. 
339 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 
Bohn, ed.; London: 1861; Vol. II, p~.   368.  Hobbes similarly 
held "From this institution of a commonwealth" (as "when a 
multitide of men do agree and covenant, everyone with everyone" 
—when they give their "consents") "are derived all the rights 
and faculties of him, or them, on whom sovereign power is 
conferred". "Leviathan", Chapter XVII; in The English Philos-- 
ophers from Bacon to Mill, p. 177.  Notions of political 
compacts and consents are not peculiar to Objectivism. 
340 
341 
The New Left, p. 96. 
Capitalism, p. 335. 
342 
343 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
344 Ibid. 
345 
346 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
> p- 38. 
> p- 31. 
> p- 39. 
1 p* 137. 
» p- 136. 
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347Ibid., p. 136. 
Ibid., p. 221. 
349 Ibid., p. 220.  Pragmatism is the best-known, 
"original American philosophy"; it is "not an imported view"; 
thus, Rand sees the American system as largely a product of 
the primary American world-view. 
35QThe New Left, p. 52. 
351 Power and Society, p. 47. 
352 Ibid., p. 47.  She never defined culture, just 
as she never defined institutions.  Since she did not define 
them, she must have expected her readers to interpret her 
expressions "culture" and "institution" similarly to typical 
definitions by Lasswell and Kaplan.  Many other typical 
"definitions" of cultures and institutions might be given. 
353 Capitalism, p. 18. 
354 J
    The  Virtue  of  Selfishness,   p.   102. 
355 Capitalism, p. 101.  She makes it appear as 
though groups can act, by her equivocation on groups as 
"numbers of men": as both the numbers and the men.  At least 
thousands of other political scientific authorities have 
equivocated similarly. 
Dewey, The Public and Its Problems; Chicago: 
Gateway Books, 1946; p. 35.  Roman political philosophers, such 
as Cicero, also had notions of "publics".  Randian "public" 
expressions are meaningless imitations. 
357The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 102. 
274 
358Ibid., p. 103. 
359Ibid., p. 103. 
360Ibid., p. 104. 
o c. -I 
Ibid., p. 104.  Grotius held, like Rand, that 
"an individual can alienate his liberty"—and that therefore 
a whole "people can give itself" in the same way.  Once a 
political government/state/system has been so elected, the 
rights of the founders have been conferred upon the new 
creation; the creation, according to the Objectivist, has 
"determined itself".  Hence "the right of the self-determina- 
tion of nations".  "First of all, an abstraction is made from 
a fact, then it is declared that the fact is based upon the 
abstraction. That is how to proceed is you want to appear 
German, profound, and speculative."  See in "The German 
Ideology"; in Marx & Engels, Feuer, ed.; p. 261.  But, the 
initial abstraction, which is "the right of individuals to 
form a government" is itself not an abstraction from any 
fact/s. 
•j c. n 
The Public and Its Problems, p. 146. 
363 
Branden, Nathaniel, "Self-esteem and Romantic 
Love", Part II; in The Objectivist, Rand and Branden, eds., 
Vol. 7, No. 1; p. 3~  "Object if i cat ion" as quoted is an 
undeniably Hegeloid expression; it is also like the Platonic 
Idealist expressions of "manifestations of Forms/ends/objects", 
364 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Chapter 
i, sec. 1, Selby-Bigge, ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1896.  It is 
noteworthy that Rand called her husband (or her relationship 
with him) "my top value".  Through the co-existence of hus- 
band and wife comes the family, with its own virtues and vices 
(and with the eventual division of the family into other 
individuals and families there suddenly develops "a society", 
and the society becomes "the State", with its virtues and 
vices defined as legal and illegal behaviors). 
275 
"Self-esteem and Romantic Love", in Op. cit., 
p. 5.  His notion of "life asserting itself within" is a 
mystical, Bergson-like opinion.  It has been written that 
"there is no question that often Rand's style of philosophiz- 
ing is literary, hyperbolic, and emotional. This always makes 
interpreting her difficult".  Den Uyl and Rasmussen, "Nozick 
on the Randian Argument"; in The Personalist, Vo. 59, No. 2; 
p. 203.  But even if some writings are metaphorical (or 
"analogical"), some metaphors are true and others false; 
to hold that she can be allowed inconsistency "because she 
writes metaphorically (literarily)" and still be "somewhat 
true" is incorrect.  "Life asserting itself within", as her 
disciple writes, for example, is false even though it is 
metaphorical.  In fact, no false metaphor is truly a metaphor. 
Capitalism, p. 137. 
Ibid., p. 331. 
368The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 104. 
369 Ibid., p. 104.  To speak of a society as. (even 
possibly) claiming national rights, is to imply that a soci- 
ety is a nation; it is like holding that a "person" can claim 
"individual" rights, implying that persons are individuals. 
370TK. .     /A " Ibid., p. 46. 
371 Ibid., p. 46.  Rand does not follow the Dialec- 
tical Materialists and others who consider that "the nature 
of economic action (trade), as well as political action, is 
coercive action"—but she "saves a place" in her system for 
coercion (she agrees with them that political action must be 
coercive—that political power is, ultimately, physical). 
372 Capitalism, p. 37. 
373Ibid., pp. 192-193. 
276 
374Ibid., p. 37.  Thus, for her an "evil" state/ 
government/nation is an evil group (a "gang", or "pack as a 
whole": Ibid., p. 18); as a gang-group, she supposed it to be 
both a number (of men) and also several or many other things: 
the men so numbered.  By implication, a political government 
that is "virtuous"—a true, laissez-faire Capitalism—must 
also be both a number (of men) and also various men so numbered. 
Ibid., p. 38. 
Ibid., p. 37.  If the gangs/dictatorships were 
"dominated by statisms" (according to Rand)i then if a 
statism is a "gang rule", the gangs were dominated by their 
actions (their "rules"—their ruling actions).  But, in truth, 
an attribute such as a ruling cannot be an entity that con- 
trols the entity to which it belongs.  Other fallacies in her 
statement could also be listed. 
377Ibid., p. 185. 
Ibid., p. 37. 
379 Ibid., p. 37. 
Ibid., p. 36. 
381The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 127. 
Capitalism, p. 36. 
383Ibid., p. 20. 
384 The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 126. 
Capitalism, p. 46. 
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Ibid., p. 25. 
107 
Ibid., p. 26.  But there is not only one ("The") 
Consent by traders, since every trader has its own consenting 
action/s.  Such a consent does not determine "the value of a 
product", but is itself such a detertninational action: as an 
action it cannot act (though belonging to a determinant entity 
it cannot be determinative or determinant, but only determina- 
tional).  Rand had admired "Ockham's Razor" (that "plurality 
is not to be multiplied without necessity"), yet she multiplied 
a consent/economic determination/purchase/trading action into: 
(1) a consent, and (2) an evaluative determination.  See in 
Ockham, "Sumrna Totius Logice", Book I, sec. 12, Loux, trans.; 
in Ockham"1 s Theory of Terms, Loux, ed.; Notre Dame, Indiana: 
Univl of Notre Dame Press, 1974.  Miss Rand constantly 
ly "multiplied beyond necessity"; thus she followed the 
Realists more than the Nominalists. 
Ibid., p. 323. 
389Ibid., p. 332. 
390 Ibid., p. 330.  It might be argued, against her 
view that "absolute rationality" is "man's proper survival", 
that humans live, eat and die "in the short run" (rather than 
by the "long view") as Keynes the inflationist felt—and that 
whatever method allows men* to "muddle through" on the "range- 
of-the-moment" is as "proper" a survival as any.  Rand made 
an Ethical (evaluative) statement, "meaning", in effect, that: 
"I like rationality and rational men, and I like them to 
survive that way".  An opposite evaluator holds that "I like 
men, unless they are too perfectly rational—and I prefer to 
see them survive by 'muddling through'".  Now, an absolutely 
rational being would not evaluate at all—but would identify 
humans as they are. 
Ibid., p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 24. 
Ibid., p. 332 
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394 
Ibid., p. 330. 
395 ' Ibid.j p. 330. 
396 Ibid., p. 329. 
Ibid., p. 332. 
398 Ibid., p. 332. 
399Ibid., p. 107.  She explicitly followed the 
theorists of power. 
400Ibid., p. 102. 
401Ibid., p. 102. 
402 The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 101. 
403Ibid., p. 104. 
Capitalism, p. 18. 
Ibid., p. 18. 
"Value and Rights"; in Readings in Introductory 
Philosophical Analysis, p. 382. 
Capitalism, pp. 333-334. 
408TU. .     „, Ibid., p. 331. 
409Ibid., p. 331. 
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to 
410 
411 
412 
413 
Ibid., p. 331. 
Ibid., p. 336. 
Ibid., p. 336. 
Ibid., pp. 336-337. 
414, The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 104. 
The New Left, p. 140.  Thus, rights are 
alienable, and "free and unhindered action" (conceptualisa- 
tion) is not necessarily free and unhindered. 
416 Capitalism, p. 25. 
417 
418 
Ibid., p. 332. 
Ibid. 334. 
419, Ibid., p. 332.  Thus, an individual can only be 
free and "private" when it is not being "official" and 
restricted.  But, in truth, a free being cannot be restricted 
even "temporarily". 
Ibid., p. 336.  Yet, it does belong to an individ- 
ual: the system is an attribute of the ultimate human Judge 
who created it, if it is really a system and not merely a 
meaningless notion (and even if it were a notion, it would 
depend upon some individual—the irrational pseudo-judge who 
created it).  Again Rand did not follow Ockham who she profes- 
sed to admire (and who argued that what is explained by 
natural causes is sufficiently explained and "supernatural 
causes may be dismissed")—for she imagined a system that 
"does not depend on any individual" and must (by implication) 
depend upon Nature or some other such deity. 
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421Ibid., p. 332. 
422 Binswanger, tutorial session.  In such a 
'•system", the "buying of votes" and other irregularities 
of legislation would not be prohibited (so Objectivists 
opine, since so little would be left to "vote on"). 
423 Capitalism, p. 336. 
424 Ibid., p. 336.  She implies a hierarchy of 
Laws (Constitution) governing government, which in turn 
governs "private individuals".  But, in truth, laws are 
attributes and cannot govern or otherwise move. 
Ibid., p. 336.  It is a Montesqieuan opinion 
of "separation of powers" for her to suppose that some laws 
protect citizens by protecting the citizens from other laws 
that protect the same citizens.  Yet laws, as concepts, do 
not protect or otherwise act. 
Ibid., p. 336.  Here "tyranny" appears to be 
a deadly malaise that must be carefully prevented; she must 
have been in contact, with those who treat of Communism as 
a "contagion" spreading over unprotected areas. 
Ibid., p. 46. 
428 
Ibid., p. ix.  It is false for her to assert 
that a clear understanding is evaded; for one to have a 
clear understanding is ,to understand what is understood— 
and the one who so understands cannot-also, at the same time, 
"proceed to ignore" and to alienate the attribute from belong- 
ing to itself. 
429 Ibid., p. vii.  On the other hand, she once 
wrote that she had "always held" the same philosophical 
system "for as far back as I can remember", and that "it 
has always worked for me".  In childhood, apparently, she 
"implicitly" held the system—the concepts she later created. 
But, if an expression is the completion of a concept, she 
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could not have possessed the concepts before their completion. 
Or perhaps she meant by "implicitly holding the same philos- 
ophy" that the beginning of the process of philosophy- 
formation was as far back as she could remember.  But even if 
she "meant" the latter, her view is false, because her concept 
of metaphysical concepts being necessarily completed before 
political concepts conflicts with her assertion that she 
started by completing the logically posterior and proceeded 
backwards. 
Ibid., p. vii. 
431 Ibid., p. 20.  Rand resembled other Russian-born 
philosophers:  "Russian speculation has always been decidedly 
man-centered. From the beginnings...certain themes have 
remained constant: the problem of good and evil in individual 
and social life, the meaning of individual existence, the 
nature of history. Russian thinkers turned late, and hesitant- 
ly, to such technical disciplines as logic, theory of know- 
ledge, and philosophy of science. Even metaphysics...as 
practiced in Russia...intimately linked to ethics, social 
philosophy, and philosophy of history."  Edie, et al, eds., 
Russian Philosophy, Vol. Ill; Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1965; p~.   ix.  In the same place it is noted that "In Russia 
...the original and influential thinkers...have almost 
without exception been non-academic".  Also, "In Russia, 
more than elsewhere, the major literary figures have been 
concerned with-philosophical problems".  Ibid., p. x.  Thus, 
Rand's strange difference from most American literatists, who 
have been less than philosophically systematic, is to be 
explained by her similarity to the great Russian novelists; 
furthermore, she resembled other influential Russian-born 
intellectuals in her emphasis on "the social and evaluative 
(moral)", and in her belated "undergirding" of her primary 
notions with epistemology and metaphysics. 
Ibid., p. vii. 
433 Ibid., p. vii.  She had many analogies of en- 
gineering: she called Plato a "transmission belt" of mysticism 
into Western Culture, and "John Gait" was to "stop the motor 
of the world", and so on. 
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434TK., Ibid. , p. vn . 
435 The New Left, p. 107. 
For the New Intellectual, pp. vii-viii. 
437 Ibid., p. viii.  Thus, she believed she was 
a philosopher before, but not "as such", "not exactly". 
438The New Left, p.. 98. 
439 Ibid., p. 96.  Thus, her "revolutions" are like 
mushrooms, which are the sudden climaxes of weeks or months 
of growth of hidden mycelia: only when her disciples have 
matured can there begin to appear cultural effects of Objec- 
tivism.  Moreover, the Objectivists must first find places in 
academia, for every "country...is a mirror of its universities" 
and the "practical result" of the academic predominance of 
anti-rational, pragmatic "modern philosophy" is "today's 
mixed economy with its moral nihilism, its range-of-the- 
moment pragmatism, its anti-ideological ideology and its... 
notion of 'Government by Consensus'".  Ibid., p. 36.  Political 
revolutions are due to metaphysical and epistemological revolu- 
tions : Kant's "neo-Ptolemaic" metaphysico-epistemological 
putsch was, in her view, ultimately or primarily responsible 
for contemporary tyrannies (for, despite the fact that "Kant... 
is not a full-fledged statist", a "philosopher's political 
views,, to the extent that they contradict the essentials of 
his system, have...little historical significance"—and Kant 
could not control, and is responsible for, even though he 
"did not grasp the political implications, of his own meta- 
physics and epistemology").  Peikoff, "Nazi Politics", Part 
III; in The Objectiyist, Vol. 8, No. 4; p. .1.  Above all, 
then, students of Objectivism must become professional philos- 
ophers—and thus, "commander-ih-chief"s of the cultural 
process.  Rand wrote that: "It does not matter that only a few 
in each generation will grasp and acheive the...reality of 
man's proper stature—and that the rest will betray it.  It 
is those few that move the world and give life its meaning— 
and it is those few...I have always sought to address." 
The Fountainhead, p. xi.  The masses cannot participate in 
the Renaissance of Reason, nor be able to resist it.  Even 
renowned tyrants will be "chance scum" swept by its irresis- 
table Logic. 
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The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 33.  This is 
little different than Karl Marx's description of Communism 
as "the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate 
future".  "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts", Third 
Manuscript, Bottomore, trans.; in Marx's Concept of Man, 
Fromm, ed.; N.Y.: Frederick Ungar, 1961; p. 140. 
441 The Romantic Manifesto, p. viii.  She believed 
that the reason why contemporary political processes seem so 
"autonomous" and divorced from philosophy is that "for many 
decades past, there has been no interest in political theory 
among academic philosophers; there has been no such thing as 
political philosophy".  The New Left, p. 109.  Thus, for her, 
Philosophy has divorced itself from political governments— 
so that it is not the governments, but the Philosophy that is 
autonomous.  Yet, she admitted that though some (probably 
most) philosophers hold "that politics is not philosophy's 
concern" there is also a formidable "other side" of academic 
philosophical community that holds "that philosophy must deal 
with the issues of the day" (which necessarily include pol- 
itical issues); she resolved her inconsistency by claiming 
that even those philosophers who are "doing Politics (in 
regard to 'today's critical needs')" are not creating "Politics 
—in the full, exact, philosophical meaning of the term." 
The New Left, p. 106. 
442 * The Romantic Manifesto, p. vii. 
443 Capitalism, p. 19. 
444 The Romantic Manifesto, p. 169. 
445Ibid., p. 169. 
446 For the New Intellectual, p. 28. 
447 Ibid., p. 33. 
Ibid. , pp. 26-27. 
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449 
450 
Ibid 
Ibid. 
451 
452 
453 
Ibid 
Ibid. 
Ibid, 
26 
25. 
53. 
52. 
p. 25.  But, if they are both "corollaries" 
then some other freedom must come before them, or if there is 
no such "prior freedom" (prior even to intellectual freedom, 
the freedom to think) then freedom is not really free (insofar 
as it is subsequent to something else). 
454 Capitalism, p. 17. 
455 Ibid 17 
Ibid., p. 17.  But if rationality is a "faculty" 
which is an attribute belonging to the human being, then it 
is not the essential attribute of the entity (insofar as the 
entity "uses the faculty", and that which 
is the essential characteristic—the full 
that is the human being itself). 
uses the faculty 
"being-what-it-is" 
457 Peikoff, Leonard, "The Philosophy of Objectivism" 
1976: one cassette tape of excerpts from the twelve-lecture 
course by the same title.  This course is the major recorded 
lecture course on Objectivism that had received full sanction 
by Ayn Rand, and has been presented in dozens of countries to 
thousands over nearly two decades. 
458 
459 
460 
Capitalism, p. 17. 
Ibid., p. 17. 
Ibid., p. 17. 
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461 The Romantic Manifesto, p. vii. 
462 Capitalism, p. 18. 
Ibid., p. 323.  It is notable that she does not, 
at this point, tell whether she believes there can be any 
"actual violators" (any violators "as such"—that really do 
violate). 
464 The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 89. 
465 Faith and Force, p. 8. 
Capitalism, p. 20. 
467 
Atlas Shrugged, p. 984. 
468Ibid., p. 960. 
469Ibid., p. 961. 
470 For the New Intellectual, p. 50.  But, in truth, 
it does not follow from her assertion of "a philosophical 
vacuum" that "It is philosophy that has brought men to this 
state"—for if there has been no philosophy, then philosophy 
cannot be "bringing down" humanity.  Her view is also false 
because a philosophy is an attribute of an entity, and cannot 
"bring something down" or otherwise act. 
471 The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 88. 
472 Capitalism, p. 220. 
473 Faith and Force, p. 8. 
Ibid., p. 6. 
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Ibid., p. 5.  She respected Plato's "Forms". 
Ibid., p. 6. 
477 Capitalism, p. 220. 
478The New Left, p. 54. 
479Ibid., p. 52. 
For the New Intellectual, pp. 54-55.  Thus, she 
considered that "Evil is impotent"—a mere void of virtue. 
She believed that the "world is perishing from an orgy of 
selflessness", however—so that an orgy of void of virtue is 
potent after all (so that Evil is why the world is perishing). 
481The New Left, p. 54. 
482 Capitalism, p. 222.  She did not make the 
disparaging separation of "ideology" from science; for her 
any valid science is an ideology (though, apparently, some 
ideologies may not be valid sciences). 
483The New Left, p. 54. 
Capitalism, p. 203. 
485Ibid.,   p.   203. 
486Ibid.,   p.   203. 
487 For  the  New  Intellectual,   p,   10.     This is hyperbole, 
488 
Ibid., p. 10.  But a culture is not an entity, 
let alone a rational entity. 
489Ibid., p. 12. 
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490The New Left, p. 108.  Mankind is an idea, and 
therefore cannot have political ideas or any other ideas. 
491 Capitalism, p. 30. 
492 Ibid., p. 195.  Capitalisms and altruisms are 
attributes, and do not "exist in men"—but rather, must 
belong to individual men (and no attribute can belong to 
more than one man); since societies are attributes, no 
capitalism or altruism can belong to a society.  Only things 
that are entities (and not the entity that is the universe) 
can "exist in" other entities. 
493Ibid., p. 195. 
494Ibid,, p. 180. 
495Ibid., p. 188. 
496Ibid., p. 195. 
497 Faith and Force, p. 8.  If she believed that 
the Soviet Union is an "embodiment of a morality", which is 
an "establishment of an Ideal in Practice on this earth", 
then she admitted that for her mental forms are temporally 
prior to the things of which they are identifications (so 
that, in her view, after something is created "in the intellect" 
it subsequently "comes to be" in actuality, on "this earth"— 
in "this universe").  Her opinion is absurd. 
498 
The New Left, p. 109.  Thus, she felt that ideas 
of political governments are temporally prior to actual, 
"practical" political governments (so that political philos- 
ophy "has as its necessary consequence" the coming-to-be of 
practical politics "in this universe").  It is clear that 
she had many Rationalist masters to follow, and that this 
opinion of hers is not at all unique.  Stalin quoted Lenin's 
dictum that "Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no 
revolutionary movement" (see in Foundations of Leninism; N.Y.: 
International Pub., 1933; or in Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. II; 
International Pub., 1943; p. 47)—and,'therefore an idea comes 
before that of which the idea is supposed to be an idea. 
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£99 
^
77Capitalism, p. 499. 
Atlas Shrugged, p. 991.  Here she again calls 
the evil "impotent": "impotent savages".  Even the most 
"powerful" tyrants are, for her, mere flotsam borne along 
by the ideological currents of their ages; only rational 
Fountainheads (or "Atlases") are "efficacious". 
501 The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 129. . 
502 3U
*Ibid., p. 129. 
503 Capitalism, p. 31. 
Faith and Force, p. 9. 
505For the New Intellectual, pp. 36-37. 
Faith and Force, p. 9. 
For the New Intellectual, p. 36. 
50R 
Ibid., p. 36.  Rand for some time admired 
Nietzsche, although she does not admit any'"intellectual debt" 
to him.  She approvingly quoted'his statement that "The noble 
soul has reference for itself".  See in "Beyond Good and Evil", 
Chapter 9, section 287, Zimmern, trans., Vol. 12 in The 
plete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Levy, ed.; N.Y.: Russell & 
RusseXT^ 1964; p~I 256.  Rand often claimed "pride" in herself 
and her works, being "conceited".  She wrote: "Philosophically, 
Nietzsche is a mystic and an irrationalist. His metaphysics 
consists of a...'Byronic' ...'malevolent' universe; his 
epistemology subordinates reason to 'will,' or feeling or 
instinct or blood.... But, as a poet, he projects at times 
(not consistently) a magnificent feeling for man's greatness 
...in emotional, not intellectual terms".  The Fountainhead, 
p. x. 
509Cap_italism, p. 145. 
289 
510 For the New Intellectual, p. 37. 
511 Capitalism, p. 195. 
512 
Ibid., p. 194.  Yet she also held that the 
conservatives, as "blatantly irrational" reflex movers, 
do not know what freedom, justice and a perfect capitalist 
society are.  Therefore, they cannot be "deceiving others 
into" what they do not know; nor is it possible for a rational 
to deceive anyone (for, according to her, to deceive is to 
"fake reality" for the sake of some other person/s, and to 
serve others is to be "enslaved" to them, which is to unfree, 
and thus, irrational).  She insisted that rationality is 
absolute honesty, come what may. 
513 Ibid., p. 20.  Then she proceeded to "define" it. 
514 Ibid., p. 21.  Thus she assumed that deceivers 
are fully conscious and able to "select" notions for their 
utility in deception. 
515 Ibid., p. 21. 
51 fi 
Ibid., p. 30.  A proper refutation does not 
involve such terminology as "obscene" and "wicked"; a valid 
identification of nonsense does not involve "evaluation" of 
the "moral quality" of the nonsense. 
517 Ibid., p. 203.  For her, in contrast to many 
philosophers1 views, contradictions are only "in terms", 
and "cannot exist in reality"—are never things .other than 
meaningless notions. 
518The New Left, p. 101. 
519 Ibid., p. 99.  This meant that every "political 
crime" is nothing but the meaningless notion that it is. 
There are no political crimes identified by any supposed 
identifiers of political crimes. 
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520 Capitalism,, p. 334.  She liked to describe 
false concepts as "floating" information—as "ungrounded" 
mentations; Thoreau, like many others, employed similar 
metaphors of ideological "flotation":  "The information 
floating in the atmosphere of society is evanescent and 
unserviceable...as gossamer for clubs of Hercules".  See in 
"Paradise (to be) Regained"; in Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers; 
Montreal: Harvest House, 1963; p~ 9TT! According to Rand, 
some meaningless notions float more freely than others: anar- 
chic political notions float more than socialist notions, and 
Libertarian notions are for her "utterly groundless". 
521Ibid., p. 330. 
522 Ibid., p. 334.  She reserved her utmost derision 
for those who many analysts consider her nearest political 
relatives: the radical anarcho-libertarians.  Some of her for- 
mer followers have become libertarians, or are associated with 
them. 
523 
Atlas Shrugged, p. 1085.  She did not seek charity. 
524 
The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 17. 
525 
Ibid., p. 17. 
526Ibid., pp. 17-18, 
527 See in Peikoff's Introduction to Rand's posthumous 
work: Philosophy; N.Y.: N.A.L., 1982.  Perhaps the piecemeal 
character of Objectivist literature is a "sales tactic". 
528Atlas Shrugged, p. 985. 
529 Ibid., p. 985.  There is nothing new about her 
statement, for many others have echoed Kant (and his predeces- 
sors) who considered a proper State to be "a Kingdom of ends". 
She thus echoed Marx, whose Utopia "produces man in this entire 
wealth of his being"—a withered-state world in which all men's 
potentials are actualised, in which truly "human life" is "ap- 
propriated".  Likewise, Aristotle envisioned city not merely 
for the sake of survival, but for the "best life". 
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530Ibid., p. 976. 
531Ibid., p. 992. 
532 JJ
^Ibid., p. 991. 
533Ibid., pp. 991-992. 
534 Capitalism, p. 206.  Her statement is unclear; 
it implies that humans outside Capitalism are not like facts 
—are not facts—are unreal, paradoxical, "unreliable".  By 
her metaphysics it is impossible for humans to be non-factual 
(to be other than what they are). 
535Anthem, p. 122. 
Atlas   Shrugged,   p.   991. 
537Anthem,   p.   123. 
538 Ibid.,   p.   123.     This  is   inscrutably,   unintelligib- 
ly poetical. 
539Ibid.,   pp.   121-122. 
Capitalism, p. 335. 
541 Ibid., p. 335. 
542 Atlas Shrugged, p. 1085. 
543Ibid., p. 1085. 
544 For the New Intellectual, p. 22. 
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545 Ibid., p. 23.  Francis Bacon3 in contrast, 
held that it was "Aristotle, who corrupted natural philosophy 
by his logic: fashioning the world out of categories; assign- 
ing to the human soul, the noblest of substances, a genus 
from words of the second intention."  "Aphorisms", lxiii; 
in Op. cit., p. 43.  He saw the pre-Socratics as more pro- 
found and correct than the post-Socratic Greek dogmatists: 
"all is tainted and corrupted: in Aristotle's school by logic; 
in Plato's by natural theology; in the second school of 
Platonists...by mathematics, which ought only to give definite- 
ness to natural philosophy, not to...give it birth".  See in 
"Aphorisms", xcvi; in Op. cit., p. 67.  He denied that all 
that makes us civilized beings is due to Aristotelians and 
other renowned classical philosophers: according to Bacon 
the founders of Philosophy "prattle, but cannot generate; for 
their wisdom abounds in words but is barren of works. And 
therefore the signs which are taken from the origin and 
birthplace of philosophy are not good."  "Aphorisms", lxxi; 
in Op. cit., p. 50. 
546 Ibid., p. 22.  To Bacon, the Philosopher was 
merely the Sophist, and his theory the "chief" of sophistical 
impostures. 
547 Ibid., p. 22.  Nicholas Lossky, who is perhaps 
the best-known pre-Soviet Russian philosopher (and with whom 
Ayn Rand studied at the University of Petrograd, and firmly 
disagreed), wrote that "The principal difference between 
Platonism and Aristotelianism" is "that the system of Plato 
is dialectical, and that of Aristotle formally logical"— 
a difference of method, more than conclusions.  Lossky, 
History of Russian Philosophy; N.Y.: Universities Press, 
1951; p.   293.  "In Platonism the idea is a self-developing 
meaning, itself positing its 'other,'...within itself.... In 
Platonism the idea is throughout an antinomically interpen- 
etrating. . .play of meanings, so that meaning passes into its 
'opposite' and its 'opposite' into it. In Aristotelianism the 
idea has the static nature of thinghood and in this respect... 
is absolutely immoveable, and there is no transfusion of 
meanings; there is...static meaning poised on the immoveable 
power of facts".  History of Russian Philosophy, p. 294. 
But Plato more consistently reaches dialectical (paradoxical) 
conclusions by dialectical methods. 
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548 For the New Intellectual, p. 23. 
549 Ibid., p. 22.  Bacon realized that Aristotle's 
"scientific method" was really to arrive at a prejudicial 
opinion, and then to appear to have arrived at it by clever 
but empirically inadequate experimentation.  Thus, rational 
analysis became "an inferior servant" to higher Reason— 
so that "in the physics of Aristotle you hear hardly anything 
but words of logic" and see hardly any experimental proof. 
"Aphorisms", lxiii; in Op. cit., p. 43.  To juxtapose the 
Philosopher as the "Father of Science" against Plato as the . 
opposite, arch-Mystic is incorrect; both were mystical. 
"Politics", Book I, Chapter 1, sec. 8, Rackham, 
trans.; in Aristotle, Vol. XXI, p. 9.  Men "are drawn toward" 
and into this Ideal state by irresistable, telic necessity; 
the state is drawn to its Ideal (exists for the "Highest 
Good").  For Aristotle, men cannot be "just" outside of the 
collective (which is a "partnership in moral interests"); 
as moral beings (by their Purpose) men must form an association 
in which they can acheive the Moral Life—so that their having 
Moral Life is the Purpose of the association. 
551 
"Politics", Book I, Ch. 1, sec. 1; in Op. cit., 
p. 3.  The familial collectivity (the family) is not prior to 
the political collectivity, because the good of the family is 
only a component of, or else, subservient to the Good of the 
City.  A single village or tribe is also subservient. 
552
"Politics", Bk. I, Ch. 1, sec. 11; in Op. cit., 
p. 11. It is Good (the End of "Man") by which men must come 
to be political animals, though not every man is yet political. 
553
"Politics", Bk. I, Ch. 1, sec. 12; in Op. cit., 
p. 11.  This is false, because any collection of humans is 
neither logically nor temporally prior to the individuals. 
5 54 J
 "Nichomachean Ethics", Book VI, Ch. 3, sec. 3, 
Wardman, trans.; in The Philosophy of Aristotle, Bambrough, 
ed.; N.Y.: New American Library, 1963; p~! 346.  The second 
version of Aristotle's statement is from Aristotle, Vol. XXI, 
p. 333.  Thus, he admitted that all knowledge involves 
perception of the things known. 
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J
 ^"Posterior Analytics", Book I, Ch. 16, vs. 
81b, Wardman, trans.; in The Philosophy of Aristotle, 
p. 184.  After losing all sensory faculties (or nearly all 
of them—all but the olfactory sense, if that were possible) 
a human cannot possibly create any new identifications, since 
(Aristotle knew) all knowledge involves perception. 
556,,Posterior Analytics", Bk. I, Ch. 6, vs. 74b; 
in Op. cit., p. 169.  For Aristotle, "to examine the opinions 
of the multitude", or any other meaningless notions, is "a 
superfluous task": "The Platonic Ideas can be dismissed: they 
are just sounds and noises", for examples.  See in "Posterior 
Analytics", Bk. I, Ch. 22; in Op. cit., p. 189. 
"Nichomachean Ethics", Bk. I, Ch. 8, sec. 1, 
Rackham, trans.; in Aristotle, Vol. XIX, p. 37. 
558
"Posterior Analytics", Bk. I, Ch. 6; in The 
Philosophy of Aristotle, p. 169.  According to him, as for 
Rand, "all truth is not of the same family tree"; some apparent 
knowledge is not really knowledge at all, but "Ignorance— 
not just 'not knowing,' but actually being ignorant as a 
positive state".  "Posterior Analytics", I, 16; p. 181. 
559 He urged that "we must be accurate and not follow 
analogies".  "Nichomachean Ethics", Bk. VI, Ch. 3, sec. 2; 
in The Philosophy of Aristotle, p. 346.  (But he did not urge 
that one must never follow analogies, as this statement is 
taken in context.) 
SfiO 
Thompson, Wayne, Aristotle's Deduction and 
Induction; Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1975; pp. 16-17. 
Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 65. 
Ibid.j p. 65. 
Ibid., p. 66. 
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564Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
Marx, "Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts", 
Third Manuscript, Bottomore, trans.; in Marx's Concept of Man, 
Fromm, ed.; N.Y.: Frederick Ungar, 1961; p. 140. 
566 
Atlas Shrugged, p. 1083.  "A cannot be a quality 
of B and B of A: there cannot be a quality of a quality. 
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